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COMMENT

RETHINKING TITLE VII’S
PROTECTIONS AGAINST SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN AN
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY. COLL., 853 F.3D
339 (7TH CIR.)
Tyler Corcoran*
I. Introduction
II. Analysis
III. Conclusion

5
11
14

I. Introduction
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act (“Title VII”), thereby making it illegal for an
employer to discriminate against any individual because
of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”1 It
is the scope of Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination that is of principal concern in Hively v. Ivy
J.D. Candidate, May 2020, The University of Tennessee
College of Law; M.A. Financial Economics, B.A. Political
Science, University of Detroit Mercy.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
*
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Tech Community College of Indiana.2 The overarching
issue presented in Hively is one of statutory
interpretation: whether Title VII’s protections against
sex
discrimination
prohibit
employers
from
discriminating against individuals based on the
individual’s sexual orientation.3 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals answered this question in the
affirmative, holding that individuals who allege that they
“experienced employment discrimination on the basis of
[their] sexual orientation [have] put forth a case of sex
discrimination for Title VII purposes.”4
The plaintiff, Kimberly Hively (“Hively”), started
her career as an adjunct professor at Ivy Tech
Community College of Indiana (“Ivy Tech”) in 2000.5
Between 2009 and 2014, Hively unsuccessfully applied
for at least six full-time positions at Ivy Tech until her
part-time contract was not renewed in July 2014.6 In
December 2013, Hively—convinced that Ivy Tech was
discriminating against her based on her sexual
orientation—received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and
filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana.7 Hively’s complaint alleged
that she was “[d]enied full[-]time employment and
promotions based on sexual orientation” which she
alleged violated Title VII.8
In response, Ivy Tech successfully filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017)
(en banc).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 351–52.
5 Id. at 341.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir.
2016) (first alteration in original), rev’d 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir.
2017) (en banc).
2
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be granted, asserting that “sexual orientation is not a
protected class under Title VII.”9 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
decision after “an exhaustive exploration of the law
governing claims involving discrimination based on
sexual orientation” because the Seventh Circuit “felt
bound to adhere to [its] earlier decisions.”10 Citing “the
importance of the issue,” and cognizant of the power of
the full court to overrule its earlier decisions, a majority
of the regularly active judges on the Seventh Circuit
voted to grant a petition to rehear en banc.11
Historically, the United States Courts of Appeals
have interpreted the prohibition against sex
discrimination to not include discrimination premised on
an
individual’s
sexual
orientation.12
This
interpretation—adopted by both the Seventh Circuit and
most of its sister courts—is guided by the inference that
when Congress passed Title VII, the word “sex” referred
to “nothing more than the traditional notion of ‘sex’”13
However, the Second Circuit recently muddied the
interpretive waters when it noted that, although that
particular panel was powerless to overturn precedent, an

Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
Id. at 343.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 340.
13 Id. at 341 (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998),
and abrogated by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998)); see also Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods.,
Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003); Spearman v. Ford Motor
Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamner v. St. Vincent
Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000).
See generally Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.”).
9

10
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openly gay man had “pleaded a claim of gender
stereotyping that was sufficient to survive dismissal.”14
Although notably absent in the debate about the
scope of sex discrimination protections in an employment
context, the Supreme Court has provided opinions on
some related issues.15 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, the Supreme Court ruled that workplace sexual
harassment is within the reach of Title VII.16 In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that
gender-norm stereotyping falls within Title VII’s
prohibitions against sex discrimination.17 Also in an
employment context, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., provided more clarity, stating that it does
not matter if the harasser and the victim are of the same
sex for the purposes of a gender nonconformity claim.18
More recently, the Supreme Court has issued
decisions that seemingly recognize the rapid rate at
which society’s views on homosexuality (e.g., an
individual’s sexual orientation) have evolved.19 These
Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (citing Christiansen v. Omnicom
Group, Inc., 852 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2017)).
15 Id. at 342.
16 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
17 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also
Hively, 853 F.3d at 342.
18 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
19 See Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United States
v. Windsor: Law as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in
Amendment 2 and the Defense of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 351, 476 (2013). See generally Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples
have the right to marry); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.
744 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act’s
definition of marriage, which excluded same-sex couples from
receiving federal benefits, was unconstitutional); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a state statute
criminalizing homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (holding that an amendment to the Colorado
14
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decisions, together with the historical interpretation that
Title VII does not outlaw sexual-orientation
discrimination, have created a “paradoxical legal
landscape,” where individuals can get fired from their
jobs simply for getting married.20 In light of this
dichotomy, the Hively court granted a rehearing en banc
to clarify both “what it means to discriminate on the basis
of sex” and “whether actions taken on the basis of sexual
orientation are a subset of actions taken on the basis of
sex.”21
Finding the traditional first steps of statutory
analysis inadequate,22 the Hively court adopted the
Oncale
court’s
interpretive
approach,
mostly
disregarding the legislative intent in passing Title VII.23
In an 8–3 decision, the Hively court held that
“discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a
Constitution, which prohibited any legal action designed to
protect homosexuals, was unconstitutional).
20 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (quoting Hively, 830 F.3d at 714).
21 Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
22 E.g., reviewing the “plain language” of the statute and
analyzing the “legislature’s intent” in passing the statute. Id.
at 343. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILIP
FRICKEY, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed.
2007); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006); Victoria F. Nourse,
A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
407 (1989).
23 The Oncale approach held that Title VII prohibits “sexual
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory
requirements,” including male-on-male harassment in the
workplace. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The Oncale court was
unmotivated by the legislative intent in passing Title VII
because “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than
the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
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form of sex discrimination,” and that employers are
therefore prohibited from engaging in sexual-orientation
discrimination.24 Invoking “the logic of the Supreme
Court’s decisions,” and persuaded by the “common-sense
reality that it is actually impossible to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on
the basis of sex,” the Seventh Circuit created a split
amongst the United States Courts of Appeals with its
Hively decision.25
To be clear, although it is unlikely Ivy Tech will
appeal the Seventh Circuit’s opinion to the Supreme
Court, this case is still not entirely over.26 Rather, Hively
simply reversed the decision granting Ivy Tech’s motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, remanding the additional issues back to
the district court for further litigation.27
The immediate effect of the Hively decision is that
victims of sexual-orientation discrimination in the
Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction now have a cognizable Title
VII sex discrimination claim;28 such a sex discrimination

Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
Id. at 351.
26 See Matthew Haag & Niraj Chokshi, Civil Rights Act Protects
Gay Workers, Federal Appeals Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, April
4, 2017, at A17.
27 For example, whether Ivy Tech committed discriminatory
actions against Hively based on her sex has yet to be
determined.
28 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1048 (7th Cir. 2017); Hamzah v.
Woodman’s Food Mkt., Inc., 693 F. App’x 455, 458 (7th Cir.
2017); United States EEOC v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc., 246 F.
Supp. 3d 952, 956 (C.D. Ill. 2017); Trahanas v. Northwestern
Univ., No. 15-CV-11192, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104098, at *12
(N.D. Ill. July 6, 2017); Somers v. Express Scripts Holdings,
No. 1:15-cv-01424-JMS-DKL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54970, at
*42 n.8 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 11, 2017).
24
25
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claim is supported by invoking either the tried-and-true
comparative method or the associational theory.29
II. Analysis
The Supreme Court is now likely to enter the
debate concerning the scope of Title VII’s sex
discrimination prohibition given the circuit split.30 To be
certain, it is of fundamental importance for the Supreme
Court to provide ultimate authority on whether
employers are prohibited from engaging in sexualorientation discrimination. If the Supreme Court grants
certiorari and reviews the issue on first impression, then
the four contrasting philosophies relating to statutory
interpretation provide helpful insight into the likely
ruling.31
Similarly, now that the Supreme Court is likely to
pick up this issue,32 it is critical to have a clear
understanding of the legal theories justifying an
interpretation that sexual-orientation discrimination is a
form of sex discrimination. The first of the two
approaches relies on the comparative method where the
court tries to “isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex
to the employer’s decision” by controlling every variable
but the plaintiff’s sex.33 The comparative method,
therefore, attacks the key point of a Title VII sex
discrimination claim: “whether the [plaintiff’s] protected
characteristics played a role in the adverse employment

Hively, 853 F.3d at 345–49.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and
the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace
Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 329 (2017).
31 The four contrasting approaches to statutory interpretation
are illuminated by the majority opinion, the two separate
concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinion. See Hively,
853 F.3d 339.
32 Eskridge, supra note 30, at 329.
33 Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
29
30
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decision.”34 The second approach supporting the theory
that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination
includes acts based on an individual’s sexual orientation
relies on the associational theory.35 The associational
theory holds that when people are “discriminated against
because of the protected characteristic of one with whom
[they] associate[],” then they are “actually being
disadvantaged because of [their] own traits.”36
With a firmer understanding of both the
comparative method and the associational theory, it is
now possible to understand the legal reasoning
underlining Hively. Serendipitously, Hively presents four
different strains of statutory analysis: the majority’s
opinion offers a text-book case study in purposivism;37
Judge Flaum’s concurring opinion demonstrates a

Id.
Id. at 347.
36 Id.; see also Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir.
2008) (“[A]n employer may violate Title VII if it takes action
against an employee because of the employee’s association with
a person of another race.”); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,
134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the key question
for an associational race discrimination claim is whether the
plaintiff’s race was the cause of the discrimination); Parr v.
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th
Cir. 1986) (“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon
an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition,
that he has been discriminated against because of his race.”);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“[R]estricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
37 Purposivism is the theory where a “formulation as to the
purpose behind the enactment of a particular statute guides
the jurist in analyzing the statute’s language.” Asher Hawkins,
Note, The Least “Constructive” Provisions?, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 625, 638 (2014–2015) (citing Richard A. Posner, Justice
Breyer Throws Down The Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1710
(2006)).
34
35
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textualist approach;38 Judge Sykes’ dissent adopts the
originalist approach;39 and Judge Posner’s concurring
opinion, for its part, embraces a form of legal pragmatism
(hereinafter “Posnerism”).40
In a utilitarian sense, the Hively court certainly
reached the most correct decision in holding that sex
discrimination includes discriminatory acts taken based
on an individual’s sexual orientation. The alternative
methods of statutory interpretation (i.e., textualism,
originalism, and Posnerism) would each bring different

Hively, 853 F.3d at 357 (Flaum, J., concurring). Textualism
is the approach whereby a jurist primarily analyzes the
enacted text as “the key tool in statutory interpretation.” Abbe
R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1762 (2010); see
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 23–25 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
39 Hively, 853 F.3d at 359 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Originalism
is the theory that seeks to “implement the democratically
elected legislature’s original design, as embodied in a statute’s
text and history.” Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory
Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System
Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 237 (1997); see also
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Statutory Authority in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073,
1078 (1992) ([O]riginalism resolves the interpretative
questions in statutory cases by asking how the enacting
Congress would have decided the question.”).
40 Hively, 853 F.3d at 352 (Posner, J. concurring). Judge
Posner, in his concurrence, seemingly eschewed all traditional
theories of statutory interpretation and adopted a form of
pragmatism: “I would prefer to see us acknowledge openly that
today we, who are judges rather than members of Congress,
are imposing on a half-century-old statute a meaning of ‘sex
discrimination’ that the Congress that enacted it would not
have accepted.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 357 (Posner, J. concurring).
38
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negative externalities to society.41 But Hively was correct
in that it logically follows from existing legal precedent.42
III. Conclusion
To be clear, Hively was a landmark decision that
reflects society’s evolving understanding of the meaning
of “sex.” Drawing on the logic used by the Supreme Court
in ruling on cases concerning sex discrimination,43 the
Hively court felt empowered to overturn its own
precedent—thereby recognizing society’s growing
acceptance for individuals with a nontraditional sexual
orientation. This recognition is the beauty of applying
purposivism when interpreting old or ambiguous
statutes: the judiciary can force outdated and anarchistic
laws to reflect modern societal mores now.

See Gluck, supra note 38, at 1764–68; see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (1999).
42 See generally Hively, 853 F.3d at 351.
43 Id. at 341–42.
41
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ARTICLE

NOW IS THE WINTER OF
GINSBURG’S DISSENT
Unifying the Circuit Split as to Preliminary
Injunctions and Establishing a Sliding Scale
Test
Taylor Payne*

Abstract
The preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy that
may be granted to prevent harm to a movant before
adjudication on the merits can be reached. The United States
Supreme Court most recently iterated in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. the four factors a court must
consider for a preliminary injunction to issue.1 A movant
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that the
movant is likely to succeed on the merits; that the movant is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
Taylor Payne was born in Henderson, Kentucky. He studied
English at Middle Tennessee State University and was
awarded his Juris Doctor by the Ohio Northern University
Pettit College of Law. Taylor is an associate attorney with
McClellan, Powers, Ehmling & Rogers and resides in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee.
1 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
*
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relief; that the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and
that an injunction is in the public interest. 2 Federal circuits
have long been split over how to apply these factors and what
kind of test these factors create. Following Winter, there is still
no consensus. The circuits apply three different tests to
preliminary injunction questions: the sequential test, the
sliding scale test, and the gateway factor test.
Circuits that apply the sequential test require a movant
to prove each of the four factors in turn, and a failure to prove
one factor bars injunctive relief. Circuits that apply the sliding
scale test balance all four factors, and a higher showing on one
factor can make up for a lesser showing on another factor.
Circuits that apply the gateway factor test require movants to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and a
likelihood of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief before addressing the remaining two
elements. Under this approach the first two factors are
dispositive.
This article argues that the sliding scale test is the most
appropriate test when determining whether to issue a
preliminary injunction. The history of equity in the United
States supports this assertion. Further, the Supreme Court has
historically endorsed the sliding scale test.

I. Introduction
II. Background
A. History of Equity
B. The Preliminary Injunction
C. The Supreme Court Preliminary Injunction
Decisions
1. Munaf v. Geren
2. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
i. Ginsburg’s Dissent
3. Nken v. Holder
4. Glossip v. Gross

17
20
20
28
35
35
37
40
41
43

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674,
689–90 (2008); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S.
531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
311–12 (1982)).
2
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5. Trump v. International Refugee Assistance
Project
45
II. The Circuit Split
46
A. The Sequential Test: The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits
47
1. Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment
v. Jewell
48
B. The Sliding Scale Test: The Second, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits
50
1. Southern Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v.
Great Lakes Brewing Company
51
C. The Gateway Factor Test: The First, Third, and
Eighth Circuits
54
1. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg
55
III. Analysis and Proposal
57
A. Analysis
57
1. The Sequential Test
58
2. The Sliding Scale Test
60
3. The Gateway Factor Test
64
B. Proposal
68
1. The Language of Winter Does Not Abrogate the
Sliding Scale Test
69
2. The Plain Language of Winter Does Not Alter
Any Element of the Test
70
3. The Winter Test Has Factors, Not Elements
76
4. Precedent of the Supreme Court Supports a
Sliding Scale Test
78
5. All Circuits Balance the Equities Regardless
of the Test Applied
79
IV. Conclusion
83
I. Introduction
A national music publisher takes notice that a
national restaurant chain is violating the music
publisher’s copyright for the public performance of
certain music. To rectify this, the music publisher seeks
to immediately enjoin the continuing copyright violation.
[17]
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The music publisher must tread carefully, however. If the
publisher brings the action in the Seventh Circuit, an
injunction may be issued, but if brought in the Fourth
Circuit, the injunction may not issue. Different circuits
apply different standards to preliminary injunctions, and
between the several circuits different results may follow.
The circuit split over the test for the issue of
preliminary injunctions is not a recent development.3
Discrepancies between the circuits have existed for a long
time. Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.4 is
the most recent Supreme Court case to address the
requirements for a preliminary injunction, and some
circuits have used Winter as the strop on which to hone
their policy.
Following Winter, the circuits are divided as to
whether that case mandated the sequential test, the
sliding scale test, or the gateway factor test. A sequential
test, generally, is a test that is applied step by step—each
element must be fulfilled in turn. For example, the test
for adverse possession is generally a sequential test. In
Washington, a claimant must show possession that is
exclusive, actual and uninterrupted, open and notorious,
hostile, and in good faith before a judgment in favor of
the movant will be entered.5 The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits apply the sequential test to
preliminary injunction questions. These circuits require
a movant to demonstrate all four elements, as stated in
Winter, before a preliminary injunction will issue—
failure to prove any single element will result in the
preliminary injunction being denied.
A sliding scale test, generally, is a test that may
be fulfilled if the elements of the test taken together favor
See SBRMCOA, LLC v. Morehouse Real Estate Invs., LLC, 62
V.I. 168, 183–86 (V.I. 2015); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades
of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split Over Preliminary
Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2012).
4 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
5 Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 434 (Wash. 1984).
3
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a certain outcome. For example, unconscionability is
sometimes a sliding scale test. California courts have
used a sliding scale where substantive and procedural
unconscionability are balanced but are not required to be
present in the same degree.6 Less procedural
unconscionability may be counterbalanced by a lot of
substantive unconscionability and vice versa. The
Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits apply a
sliding scale test to preliminary injunction questions by
balancing the four traditional factors given in Winter.
Under the sliding scale test, a lesser showing on a single
factor can be balanced by a greater showing on another
factor, and a preliminary injunction may still issue,
despite the weak showing on a single factor.
A gateway factor test, generally, is a test that
considers certain elements to be threshold elements
which must be met before the remaining elements of the
test are considered. For example, the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 requires juries to conduct a gateway
analysis under the Eighth Amendment to determine
whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty
before balancing any mitigating factors.7 The First,
Third, and Eighth Circuits apply the gateway factor test,
a hybrid test which blends the sequential test and the
sliding scale test. These circuits first examine the
likelihood of success on the merits and the likelihood of
irreparable
harm—the
gateway
factors—before
balancing the remaining factors. A lack of either of these
gateway factors is dispositive and will result in an
injunction not being issued. The circuit courts disagree
on whether the test for issuing a preliminary injunction
is a sequential test, sliding scale test, or a gateway factor
test.

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 674 (Cal. 2000).
7See United States v. Gooch, Crim. Action No. 04-128-23
(RMC), 2006 WL 3780781, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2006).
6
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Winter states that
courts have historically applied the sliding scale test
which awards “relief based on a lower likelihood of harm
when the likelihood of success is very high.”8 Ginsburg
states that the Supreme Court has historically followed
this test, and that Winter does not abrogate previous
holdings that have applied that test.9 The sliding scale
test should be applied by all circuits.
Part II of this article discusses the background of
the preliminary injunction beginning with the origins of
equity, the historical standards for preliminary
injunctions, and the most recent Supreme Court cases
interpreting preliminary injunctions. Part III of this
article addresses the circuit split and how the circuit
courts interpret Winter as well as the precedential merits
of the sequential test and the sliding scale test. Part IV
analyzes each approach and proposes that every circuit
court should apply the sliding scale test in determining
whether to issue a preliminary injunction.
II. Background
A. History of Equity
Historically, equity was a separate realm of
jurisprudence from law. Equity practice arose because
English Courts of Law adhered to an unwavering writ
system.10 Each writ was a unique, prefabricated
complaint that required plaintiffs to provide specific facts
to meet each element of the writ. In this writ system, a
plaintiff could bring claims before a common law King’s
Court only with these pre-existing writs—writs which
Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
Id.
10 Anthony Disarro, A Farewell to Harms: Against Presuming
Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Litigation, 35 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 743, 748 (2012).
8
9
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have merged into modern day common law torts, such as
trespass or conversion11—and, much to many a plaintiff’s
chagrin, the scope of these writs was quite narrow.12 If a
person were punched in the face, he could pursue the writ
of trespass vi et armis,13 which promised a plaintiff
damages if—and only if—the plaintiff presented the
evidence listed in the writ in the manner defined by the
writ.14
The King’s Chancellor prepared and maintained
the paperwork for the standardized writs whenever a
complaint meeting the requirements of a specific writ
was presented.15 English judges initially served as the
King's personal representatives in exercising the King’s
own desire to ensure justice was served.16 In some cases,
however, a plaintiff could not fit his claim within the
narrow requirements of a writ and could not go to court,
so the plaintiff would petition the King directly for
relief.17 Courts gradually grew apart from the King as
judges began to recognize substantive law independent of
any particular ruler.18 As the common law courts
gradually became an institution separate from the King,
petitions to the King continued to be made.19
The nature of the system of writs used by the
courts motivated the continued appeals to the King.
Although the writ system was orderly and consistent,
Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary
Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 439 (2003).
12 Id. at 440.
13 Vi et armis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“By or
with force and arms.”).
14 John F. Pries, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in
Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 9 (2013).
15 Main, supra note 11, at 438–39.
16 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts
and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 805
(2001).
17 Main, supra note 11, at 441.
18 Pushaw, supra note 16, at 805.
19 Main, supra note 11, at 440–41.
11
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writs did not resolve every injustice, and many would-be
plaintiffs were left without a cause of action.20 In 1258,
the Chancellor was prohibited from creating any new
writs.21 No new avenues of relief were laid.22 By the early
fourteenth century, appeals to the King had become so
numerous that appeals for relief were referred to the
Chancellor.23
The Chancellor was “the keeper of the [K]ing’s
conscience” and the King's secretary.24 The Chancery
itself was the secretary of the state.25 As the voice of the
King, the Chancellor could resolve issues referred to
him.26 Free from the fetters of the unbending writ system,
the Chancellor could resolve disputes to fair and just
ends.27
The traditional view of equity was based on three
fundamental ideas. First, natural law served as the
proper source for rules to decide equitable disputes.28
Second, equity eschewed precedent in favor of deciding
each case on its own facts.29 Third, equity was “absolute
and unlimited” judicial authority to decide a case as

See Pries, supra note 14, at 10.
Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction:
Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 501
(2003).
22 Pries, supra note 14, at 10.
23 Main, supra note 11, at 441.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 438.
26 Id. at 441.
27 See David W. Lannetti, The “Test”—Or Lack Thereof—For
Issuance of Virginia Temporary Injunctions: The Current
Uncertainty and a Recommended Approach Based on Federal
Preliminary Injunction Law, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 273, 279
(2015).
28 John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835, and the
History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1433
(1998).
29 Id. at 1434.
20
21
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justice required.30 The overall goal of equity was to
provide an avenue for “remedial substantive justice in
cases and situations where the common law, with its
commitment to fixed rules and inflexible adherence to
precedent, will do harm.”31 Equity relaxed the rigid and
uniform application of law by “incorporating standards of
fairness and morality into the judicial process.”32
A distinct court soon rose under the Chancellor,
called the Court of Chancery, and practice in that court
was less formal than the Courts of Law, requiring
plaintiffs to merely tell the Chancellor about their
problems.33 Over time, the Court of Chancery’s decisions
became predictable, and a nebulous law of equity
emerged.34 The decisions either followed newly created
equitable remedies or equitable remedies which followed
preexisting legal causes of action.35
Due to the dichotomy between the Courts of Law
and the Courts of Equity, conflict arose between the
common law courts and the Chancellor with the Courts
of Law charging the Chancellor with “attempting to
subvert the whole law of England by substituting
conscience for definite rule.”36 This was especially evident
when certain circumstances would give a plaintiff a
choice of remedy both in law and in equity.37 In other
cases, a plaintiff who could not otherwise recover in law
could recover in equity if the Chancellor felt recovery was
Id. at 1435 (quoting LORD NOTTINGHAM, MANUAL OF
CHANCERY PRACTICE AND PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY AND
EQUITY 189 (D.E.C. Yale ed. 1965)).
31 Id. at 1435.
32 Main, supra note 11, at 430.
33 Preis, supra note 14, at 11.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 11–12.
36 Lannetti, supra note 27, at 279 (quoting Susan H. Black, A
New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles from the
Past Offer Any Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36
ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984)).
37 Main, supra note 11, at 442.
30
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appropriate.38 For example, Courts of Law could award
only damages to provide a remedy after a wrong was
committed but had no authority to prevent the wrong
from occurring in the first place.39 A Chancellor could
issue an injunction which Courts of Law were loath to
issue, allowing a plaintiff with no legal remedy to recover
in equity.40
A few Chancellors sought to rectify the split
between equity and law, and under the Chancellorships
of Lord Bacon, Lord Nottingham, and Lord Hardwicke,
the imperfect maxim that “equity follows law” was born.41
Chancery developed the adequacy doctrine wherein a
plaintiff could only obtain equitable relief if the plaintiff
could demonstrate a lack of adequate legal remedy.42
Though equity would follow the law in cases where a
preexisting writ afforded relief, equity could not follow
law where a legal remedy did not exist, hence “equity
follows law” was an imperfect maxim.43 This reformed
view of equity would endure in the subsequent
generation of legal scholarship.
As North America was colonized, “[e]quity was
transplanted to the American Colonies along with the
common law.”44 The traditional concepts of equity were
transplanted as well.45 For example, chancellors in
Virginia were bound to decide cases “according to equity
and good conscience,” just as English chancellors had
long practiced.46 By the time the Constitution was
Id.; Preis, supra note 14, at 13–14.
Lannetti, supra note 27, at 280.
40 Preis, supra note 14, at 12.
41 JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
287 (2009); Preis, supra note 14, at 12.
42 Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1019; Denlow, supra note 21, at
501.
43 Preis, supra note 14, at 12–13.
44 Kroger, supra note 28, at 1438.
45 Id.
46 Id. (quoting 1777 Va. Acts ch. 15).
38
39
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drafted, “there was a movement to merge law and equity
for procedural purposes, because Americans were
skeptical” of equity and its shortcomings.47
Specific grievances regarding the courts of equity
included the lack of juries, abuse of power by colonial
governors acting as chancellors, and that the equity court
system was not dissimilar enough from the English Court
of Chancery, which was wrapped tightly around the
throne.48 In response to these criticisms, “[t]he Judiciary
Act of 1789 gave American federal courts jurisdiction
over all suits in equity, and the Supreme Court has held
that this jurisdiction is equivalent to ‘the jurisdiction in
equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in
England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act.’”49 Three
years later, in 1791, Congress “produced the Permanent
Process Act, which stated that in equity cases, federal
courts were to proceed ‘according to the principles, rules
and usages which belong to courts of equity . . . as
contradistinguished from courts of common law.’”50 The
Supreme Court would then interpret these acts to create
a uniform scheme of equitable power for federal courts.
The Supreme Court held in Robinson v. Campbell
that a federal court was not bound to apply state law that
created specific equitable remedies.51 In 1819, in United
States v. Howland, Chief Justice Marshall stated that “as
Dylan Ruga, The Role of Laches in Closing the Door on
Copyright Infringement Claims, 29 NOVA L. REV. 663, 671
(2005).
48 Id.
49 Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1020 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999)).
50 Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”:
Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts,
60 DUKE L.J. 249, 270 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
Permanent Process Act, ch. 36, § 2, 1. Stat. 275, 276 (1792)).
51 Id. at 276 (citing Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. 212, 222–23
(1818)).
47
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the [c]ourts of the Union have a [c]hancery jurisdiction in
every state, and the judiciary act confers the same
[c]hancery powers on all, and gives the same rule of
decision, its jurisdiction in Massachusetts must be the
same as in other [s]tates.”52 Howland held that federal
courts would apply a uniform body of equity procedures,
regardless of substantive or procedural state law or the
adequacy of state law remedies.53
Three years after Howland, in 1822, the first
federal rules of equity were drafted—likely by Justice
Story—to codify uniform equity procedure in the lower
federal courts.54 The Supreme Court also issued an
additional set of equity rules in 1842.55 Both sets of equity
rules gave the circuit courts authority to “make further
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the rules
hereby prescribed, in their discretion,” and any gaps left
by the equity rules would “be regulated by the practice
of the High Court of Chancery in England.”56
In its early equitable decisions, other factors also
played important roles in Supreme Court decisions.57 The
Court rejected stare decisis by employing discretionary
authority in procedural and substantive matters to reach
results equitable in a particular case.58 Also, the Court
United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. 108, 115 (1819).
Collins, supra note 50, at 272 (citing Howland, 17 U.S. at
115); John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV.
173, 178 (1999).
54 Collins, supra note 50, at 273. See generally Rules of Practice
for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.)
v–xiii (1822).
55 Collins, supra note 50, at 273. See generally Rules of Practice
for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
xxxix–lxx (1842).
56 Rules of Practice, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at xiii, r. 32, 33; accord
Rules of Practice, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at lxix, r. 89, 90; see also
Collins, supra note 50, at 274.
57 See Kroger, supra note 28, at 1474 (citing GARY L.
MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1982)).
58 Id.
52
53
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relied upon discourses outside of the realm of law to
justify its decisions based on moral reasoning and public
policy.59 All of these principles have continued to be
applied to equity cases in federal courts.60
In 1938, the federal district courts of the United
States recognized a single unified set of actions, both
legal and equitable, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.61 Like previous iterations of federal equity
law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remained open
ended as to how courts should apply equitable remedies.
Modern cases like Brown v. Board of Education62
demonstrated that the long-held principles applied by the
Supreme Court were still viable even after the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.63 Modern equity
jurisprudence has led to much debate over the limit of
contemporary federal equity powers as viewed in the
framework of the historical application of equity in the
United States.64
Gary McDowell argues in his book, Equity and the
Constitution, that both the Warren and Burger Courts'
equity jurisprudence was “illegitimate” because the
“understanding of equity expressed in Brown (II) and its
progeny differs from the traditional understanding” of
equity.65 McDowell states that “[t]he Court, in using its
‘historic equitable remedial powers’ to impose its politics
on society, is often forced to ignore or deny the great
tradition of equitable principles and precedents, which
had always been viewed as the inherent source of
restraint in equitable dispensations.”66 In The Law’s
Id.
Id.
61 Main, supra note 11, at 431 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There
shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”)).
62 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63 Kroger, supra note 28, at 1471–72.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1473 (quoting MCDOWELL, supra note 57, at 9).
66 Id. at 1472 (quoting MCDOWELL, supra note 57, at 4).
59
60
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Conscience: Equitable Constitutionalism in America,
Peter Charles Hoffer responds to McDowell’s criticism,
stating that Brown and subsequent cases are “very good
constitutional equity” but poor constitutional law.67 As to
both of these commentators, John Kroger states that both
reach “contradictory, but equally suspect” conclusions.68
The modern Supreme Court has continued to apply
traditional equitable principles in cases where an
equitable remedy is appropriate.69 The primary
difference between modern equity jurisprudence and the
equity jurisprudence of the past is that law and equity
have largely fused following the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Though the line between law and equity has
blurred, the division has persisted, however, in
remedies.70 “Courts and scholars continue[] to refer to
some remedies as ‘legal’ and others as ‘equitable.’”71 Legal
and equitable remedies both are awarded by courts of
law.
One equitable remedy perpetuated from centuries
past is the injunction—an action in equity designed to
protect a plaintiff from irreparable injury to his property
or other rights by prohibiting or commanding certain
acts.72 The next section will discuss the origins of the
preliminary injunction and how it has evolved in
American law.
B. The Preliminary Injunction

Kroger, supra note 28, at 1472 (quoting PETER CHARLES
HOFFER,
THE
LAW'S
CONSCIENCE:
EQUITABLE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA xiii (1990)).
68 Id. at 1473.
69 See id. at 1474.
70 Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68
VAND. L. REV. 997, 999 (2015).
71 Id.
72 Ladner v. Siegel, 148 A. 699, 701 (Pa. 1930); 42 AM. JUR. 2D
Injunctions § 2 (2018).
67
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An injunction is a court order that requires a
party to act or abstain from acting.73 Injunctions are
equitable remedies derived from decisions in the English
Court of Chancery.74 “There are three basic types of
injunctions . . . : (1) temporary restraining orders, (2)
preliminary
injunctions,
and
(3)
permanent
75
injunctions.” Each variety of injunction varies in
duration, but all require a party to act or refrain from
acting, and all are enforceable through contempt.76 “[T]he
primary purpose for granting a preliminary injunction .
. . is ‘to preserve the relative positions of the parties until
a [full] trial on the merits can be held.’”77 A preliminary
injunction cannot be issued ex parte, like a temporary
restraining order, and unlike a permanent injunction, a
full hearing is not needed for a preliminary injunction to
issue.78
The
modern
standards
for
preliminary
injunctions developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries when the “Court of Chancery began to speak in
terms of irreparable harms and [the] assessment of the
[likely] outcome on the merits.”79 “By the nineteenth
century, the Court of Chancery first began to speak of the
role of preliminary injunctions in preserving the ‘status
quo.’”80 These early articulations regarding maintenance
of the status quo were soon synthesized in William Kerr's
influential treatise on injunctions:

Denlow, supra note 21, at 498–99.
Id. at 500.
75 Id. at 499.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 507 (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,
395 (1981)).
78 Id.
79 Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 126 (2001).
80 Id. at 127.
73
74
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The effect and object of the interlocutory
injunction is merely to preserve the
property in dispute in statu quo until the
hearing or further order. In interfering by
interlocutory injunction, the court does not
in general profess to anticipate the
determination of the right, but merely
gives [it] as its opinion that there is a
substantial question to be tried, and that
till the question is ripe for trial, a case has
been made out for the preservation of the
property in the meantime in statu quo.81
Kerr states that injunctions seek to preserve the
status quo. He also notes that a court issuing an
injunction does not “profess to anticipate the
determination of the right,”82 that is, that a court need
not determine that a claim will absolutely be successful.
Kerr illustrates this point multiple times:
A man who comes to the Court for an
interlocutory injunction is not required to
make out a case which will entitle him at
all events to relief at the hearing. It is
enough if he can show that he has a fair
question to raise as to the existence of the
right which he alleges, and can satisfy the
Court that the property should be
preserved in its present actual condition,
until such question can be disposed of.83

WILLIAM W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY 11–12 (1867), as quoted in Lee, supra
note 79, at 128.
82 Id.
83 KERR, supra note 81, at 11–12, as quoted in Denlow, supra
note 21, at 502.
81
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Kerr states that a party seeking an injunction need only
demonstrate a “fair question”84 of the right he is seeking
to enforce, not an absolute likelihood of success.
The United States Supreme Court addressed
Kerr’s treatise in Russell v. Farley,85 the Court’s first
substantive decision regarding injunctions.86 In Russell,
the Court noted in dicta that the “settled rule of the Court
of Chancery, in acting on applications for injunctions,”
required that preliminary injunctive relief depended on a
comparison of the balance of the harms between the
parties.87 Further, when considering an injunction, a
court must “regard the comparative injury which would
be sustained by the defendant, if an injunction were
granted, and by the complainant, if it were refused,” and
“if the legal right is doubtful, either in point of law or of
fact, the court is always reluctant to take a course which
may result in material injury to either party.”88
In discussing Kerr’s treatise, the Court did not
state that a likelihood of success must be shown to issue
an injunction. Rather, a balancing test examining the
harms and “comparative injuries” the parties may
sustain should be applied.89 Further, even a low
likelihood of success does not bar a court from issuing an
injunction. If no “material injury” will result from the
injunction, a court may issue the injunction.90 “Russell’s
dicta also is consistent with the notion of a “sliding
scale”—if the moving party’s ‘legal right is doubtful,’ then
the court should be more ‘reluctant’ to enter the
preliminary injunction,” but a court is not barred.91
Id.
Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1881).
86 Lee, supra note 79, at 114.
87 Id. (quoting Russell, 105 U.S. at 438).
88 Id. (quoting Russell, 105 U.S. at 438).
89 Russell, 105 U.S. at 438.
90 Id.
91 Lee, supra note 79, at 114 (quoting KERR, supra note 81, at
220).
84
85
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Arthur Wolf asserted that if the movant could
demonstrate a clear legal right, “plain and free from
doubt,” the injunction would issue; whereas if the legal
right was in doubt, then the movant would have to show
a balance of hardships in her favor.92 Courts would
consider the likelihood of success, but that element was
not dispositive. “[A]s early as Russell, the Supreme Court
had adopted at least three of the four factors currently
applied by the [Circuit] [C]ourts.”93
Following Russell, the Court issued unclear but
largely consistent opinions regarding preliminary
injunctions. In its per curiam opinion in Ohio Oil citing a
lower court decision,94 the Court “suggest[ed] that if the
movant can show he will likely suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of a preliminary injunction and that the
preliminary injunction will cause only ‘inconsiderable’
harm to the nonmovant, then the injunction should be
granted.”95 This was merely a reiteration of the balancing
test in Russell. Into the 1940s, in Yakus v. United States,
the Court continued to hold that “even though
irreparable injury may otherwise result to the plaintiff,”
other factors must be considered.96
In the late 1930s, the final element—the public
interest element—emerged,97 creating a four-part test
Id. (quoting Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The
Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173, 177–78
(1984)).
93 Id.
94 Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815–16 (1929) (per
curiam) (citing Love v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
185 F. 321, 331–32 (8th Cir. 1911)).
95 Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1026 (citing Ohio Oil Co., 279
U.S. at 814).
96 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944). Cf.
Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1026 (asserting that Yakus creates
a stricter standard by holding that “irreparable injury was
necessary, but not sufficient, to obtain a preliminary
injunction”).
97 Lannetti, supra note 27, at 288; Lee, supra note 79, at 114;
92
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generally consisting of: “(1) the movant’s likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) the irreparable harm to the
movant in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the
balance of the equities between the movant and the
nonmovant; and (4) the public interest” and how it will be
affected by the injunction.98 Though widely adopted by
courts, the analysis of the public interest factor remained
inconsistent, even at the Supreme Court level.99
In Hecht Company v. Bowles, the Supreme Court
held that “the standards of the public interest[,] not the
requirements of private litigation[,] measure the
propriety and need for injunctive relief” in price setting
cases.100 In Hecht, the Court also rejected a proposal to
apply a rigid test, noting that equity allows a court “to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
case” and that “[f]lexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished” law from equity.101 The Court felt that
applying a rigid test would be a “major departure from
that long tradition” of flexibility in equity.102 Subsequent
Supreme Court cases continued to apply a flexible
standard.
In Brown v. Chote, the Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court opinion that balanced two factors to
determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction: the
plaintiff’s “possibilities of success on the merits” and “the
Lannetti, supra note 27, at 289.
Id. at 289–90; see Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark &
Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 646 (1943) (noting that the district court
“considered no evidence and made no findings upon the
question whether equitable relief should be denied on other
grounds, such as inadequacy of consideration and the like”).
100 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944); see also
Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 3 (1943);
Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 158 (1939);
Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F.2d 38, 42 (7th Cir.
1944).
101 Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329; see also Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).
102 Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329–30.
98
99
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possibility that irreparable injury would have resulted,
absent interlocutory relief.”103 A year later in Granny
Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto
Truck Drivers, the Court noted that when seeking a
temporary restraining order the Court may treat the
request identically to a preliminary injunction and
require the party seeking the injunction to “bear the
burden of demonstrating the various factors justifying
preliminary injunctive relief, such as the likelihood of
irreparable injury” if an injunction is denied and the
“likelihood of success on the merits.”104 The Court did not
fully describe the test for a preliminary injunction;
rather, the Court succinctly noted “various factors” must
be proven, such as the likelihood of injury and success.105
The Court did not abandon the four-factor sliding scale
test.106
Following those cases, the Court observed in
Doran v. Salem Inn that the “traditional standard for
granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff
to show that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer
irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on
the merits.”107 “[T]he Court cautioned that a district
court must ‘weigh carefully the interests of both sides,’”
and this requirement is “stringent.”108
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always
been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal
Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456 (1973) aff’g 342 F. Supp.
1353 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Denlow, supra note 21, at 510.
104 Granny Goose Foods v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck
Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 441. But see Denlow, supra note 21, at 510 (asserting
the Court moved away from the sliding scale test and spoke of
a two-factor test).
107 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Denlow,
supra note 21, at 510–11 (quoting Doran, 422 U.S. at 931).
108 Denlow, supra note 21, at 510–11 (quoting Doran, 422 U.S.
at 931–32 (citing Brown,411 U.S. at 457)).
103

[34]
34

NOW IS THE WINTER OF GINSBURG’S DISSENT
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 15 (2018)

remedies.109 This follows the traditional notions of equity.
Trial courts have the discretion to allow equitable claims
to be tried ahead of legal ones to protect the rights of the
plaintiff to have a fair and orderly adjudication of the
controversy.110 Though not always clear, the Supreme
Court—even in the modern day—has continued to apply
the sliding scale test and uphold traditional notions of
equity. The next section will examine the most recent
decisions issued by the Supreme Court regarding
preliminary injunctions.
C.
The
Supreme
Injunction Decisions

Court

Preliminary

1. Munaf v. Geren
Munaf was a consolidated case involving two separate
but factually similar cases.111 Two American citizens,
Mohammad Munaf and Shawqi Omar, voluntarily
traveled to Iraq and allegedly committed crimes there.112
Both were captured by an international coalition of
military forces, including the United States, and
detained pending investigation and prosecution under
Iraqi law.113 They were then placed in the custody of the
U.S. military.114 Both plaintiffs sought habeas corpus
petitions.115 Before a writ of habeas corpus was issued,
the district court granted a preliminary injunction at
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)
(citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975);
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974); Beacon Theaters,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07 (1959); Hecht Co., 321
U.S. at 329).
110 Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959).
111 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
112 Id. at 679.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 680–81.
115 Id. at 679.
109
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Omar’s request to prevent his transfer to Iraqi custody,
to prevent sharing details concerning his potential
release with the Iraqi government, and to prevent
presenting him to the Iraqi courts for investigation and
prosecution.116 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.117
On petition of certiorari, the Supreme Court
examined the jurisdictional limits of the injunction and
“whether United States district courts may exercise their
habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our Armed Forces from
transferring individuals detained within another
sovereign’s territory to that sovereign’s government for
criminal prosecution.”118 The Court addressed these
issues “cognizant that ‘courts traditionally have been
reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive
in military and national security affairs.’”119
The Court noted that a preliminary injunction is an
“extraordinary and drastic remedy,”120 never awarded as
of right.121 Further, a party seeking a preliminary
injunction must “demonstrate, among other things, ‘a
likelihood of success on the merits.’”122 The district court
failed to address the likelihood of success on the merits of
Omar’s claim, and only concluded that the “jurisdictional
issues” presented questions “so serious, substantial,
difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for
litigation
and
thus
for
more
deliberative
Id. at 683.
Id. at 682.
118 Id. at 689.
119 Id. (quoting Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530
(1988)).
120 Id. at 689 (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (3d ed. 2013)).
121 Id. at 690 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440
(1944)).
122 Id. (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006)).
116
117
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investigation.”123 Likewise, on appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that it “need not address” the merits of Omar’s habeas
claims because the merits had “no relevance.”124 The D.C.
Circuit stated that the only question before it was
whether the district court had jurisdiction.125
The Supreme Court held that a difficult question
as to jurisdiction was no reason to grant a preliminary
injunction.126 Finding a low likelihood of success on the
merits due to potential impediments to reaching the
merits of the case was not a determination of the
“likelihood of success on the merits.”127 If the likelihood
of success on the merits only meant that the district court
likely had jurisdiction, then preliminary injunctions
would become a matter of right, not the drastic,
exceptional remedy they are.128 The Court concluded that
it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant
a preliminary injunction on the basis of “jurisdictional
issues” in Omar’s case without even considering the
merits of the underlying habeas petition, so the Court
reversed and remanded with instruction to consider the
likelihood of success on the merits.129 The next major
Supreme Court case involving with preliminary
injunctions is Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.
2. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council

Id. (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23–24, 27
(D.D.C. 2006)).
124 Id. (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir.
2007)).
125 Id. (citing Omar, 479 F.3d at 11).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 690–91.
123
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Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
concerned the Navy’s use of “mid-frequency active” sonar
during training exercises involving surface ships,
submarine, and aircraft together as a “strike group.”130
The Southern California waters where the exercises were
conducted contained thirty-seven species of marine
mammals that the Natural Resources Defense Council
alleged were being harmed by the sonar.131 The district
court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
Navy from using the sonar during its training exercises,
but the Ninth Circuit remanded the case, holding the
injunction to be overbroad.132
The district court then entered another
preliminary injunction, imposing six specific restrictions
on the Navy’s use of sonar during its training exercises.133
The Navy appealed, seeking two of the district court’s
restrictions removed. The Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the district court’s injunction holding that “‘the
Navy may return to the district court to request relief on
an emergency basis’ if the preliminary injunction
‘actually result[s] in an inability to train and certify
sufficient naval forces to provide for the national
defense.’”134 In reaching their holdings, both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit held that a preliminary
injunction may be entered based only on a “possibility” of
irreparable harm.135 The United States Supreme Court
then granted certiorari.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 7 (2008).
Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 8.
134 Id. at 31 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518
F.3d 658, 703 (9th Cir. 2008), [hereinafter “Winter II”]).
135 Id. at 21 (citing Winter II, 518 F.3d at 696; Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (quoting Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v.
Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 2007); Earth Island Inst. V.
United States Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir.
2006))).
130
131
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In the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Roberts,
author of Munaf, wrote that “a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”136 The Court noted
that historically it has iterated that irreparable harm
must be “likely” to occur, not merely possible, the
standard used by the Ninth Circuit.137 In determining
whether irreparable harm is likely to occur, the Court
“must balance the competing claims of injury and must
consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief.”138 Further, the Court
should especially heed “public consequences in employing
the extraordinary remedy of injunct[ive relief].”139
In determining whether a preliminary injunction
should issue, the Court “conclude[d] that the balance of
equities and consideration of the overall public interest .
. . tip strongly in favor of the Navy.”140 Even if the
plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s
training exercises, any such injury was outweighed by
the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective,
realistic training of its sailors.141 The Court held that a
proper consideration of the four preliminary injunction
factors required denial of the requested injunctive relief,
and the Court removed the restrictions to the extent
sought by the Navy.142

Id. at 20.
Id. at 22.
138 Id. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 542 (1987)).
139 Id. at 24 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
305, 312 (1982)).
140 Id. at 26.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 33.
136
137
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i. Ginsburg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsburg concluded in her dissent that the
district court “conscientiously balanced the equities and
did not abuse its discretion.”143 Justice Ginsburg provided
more specific facts in her dissent than the majority did in
its opinion and stated that “[i]n light of the likely,
substantial harm to the environment” and “NRDC’s
almost inevitable success on the merits of its claim,” the
Ninth Circuit’s decision should be upheld.144 It is notable
that the majority opinion stated that “[a]lthough the
[Ninth Circuit] referred to the ‘possibility’ standard, and
cited Circuit precedent along the same lines, it affirmed
the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s conclusion that plaintiffs had
established a ‘near certainty’ of irreparable harm” and
that it was unclear whether using a “possibility”
standard actually bore on the Ninth Circuit’s decision.145
The facts, states Justice Ginsburg, clearly show that the
Natural Resources Defense Council met its burden.146
Though Justice Ginsburg comes to the opposite
conclusion of the majority, the most important element of
her dissent is Justice Ginsburg’s statements regarding
the test for preliminary injunctions.
Justice Ginsburg noted that “[f]lexibility is a
hallmark of equity jurisdiction,” and that a Chancellor
has the power “to do equity and to mould each decree to
the necessities of the particular case.”147 Equity, as
distinguished from Law, is flexible.148 “[C]ourts do not
insist that litigants uniformly show a particular,
predetermined quantum of probable success or injury

Id. at 44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 53.
145 Id. at 22 (majority opinion).
146 Id. at 53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 51 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
305, 312 (1982)).
148 Id. at 51.
143
144
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before awarding equitable relief.”149 Rather, courts
evaluate equitable claims on a sliding scale, even
“awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm
when the likelihood of success is very high.”150 Ginsburg
stated that the Court has never rejected such a
formulation and the majority did not do so in its opinion,
a contention not disputed by the majority.151 The next
major Supreme Court case involving preliminary
injunctions is Nken v. Holder.152
3. Nken v. Holder
Nken v. Holder involved Jean Marc Nken, a
citizen of Cameroon who entered the United States on a
transit visa in April 2001.153 Nken sought asylum and to
stay his removal until a determination of asylum was
made.154 An immigration judge and the Fourth Circuit
both denied asylum and his request to stay removal.155
Nken then appealed to the Supreme Court for a stay of
removal pending adjudication of a petition for review of
his case or, in the alternative, for a resolution to a split
among the circuits as to what standard governs a request
for a stay.156
The Court noted that a stay pending appeal
functionally overlaps with a preliminary injunction.157
Both a stay and a preliminary injunction can have the
practical effect of preventing some action before a
conclusive legal determination; however, “a stay achieves
this result by temporarily suspending the source of
Id.
Id.
151 Id.
152 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
153 Id. at 422.
154 Id. at 423.
155 Id. at 422–23.
156 Id. at 423.
157 Id. at 428.
149
150
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authority to act—the order or judgment in question—not
by directing an actor's conduct,” as an injunction does.158
“A stay ‘simply suspend[s] judicial alteration of the status
quo,’ while injunctive relief ‘grants judicial intervention
that has been withheld by lower courts.’”159
The Court lists the four factors for a stay. A court
must determine: “(1) whether the stay applicant has
made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay
will substantially injure the other parties interested in
the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies” if
the injunction is issued.160 These four factors are
virtually identical to the factors recited in Winter.161
Though the elements considered for a stay and a
preliminary injunction may be similar,162 the Court is
careful to note that a stay and a preliminary injunction
are not “one and the same”; rather, the elements are
similar “because similar concerns arise whenever a court
order” requires “action before the legality of that action
has been conclusively determined.”163 The Court cites to
Winter, though, for the assertion that a mere possibility
of irreparable harm is not sufficient for a stay to issue.164
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence notes that the
statutory authority governing stays is a very narrow
category.165 Justice Kennedy notes that the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
Id. at 428–29.
Id. at 429 (alteration in original) (quoting Ohio Citizens for
Responsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 479
U.S. 1312, 1313 (Scalia, Circuit Justice 1986)).
160 Id. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987)).
161 See id. (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 24 (2008)).
162 Id. (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 24).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 435 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 22).
165 Id. at 437 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158
159
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of 1996 repealed prohibitions on removal as well as an
automatic stay provision thus allowing courts to review
petitions of aliens after they have been removed.166 These
changes greatly raised the threshold for proving
“irreparable harm” because only the most extreme
circumstances would cause irreparable harm.167 Removal
alone no longer constitutes irreparable harm because a
petition may still be granted in absentia.168 Though the
requirements for a stay and preliminary injunction are
similar, they vary in application and should not be
considered identical. The next major Supreme Court case
involving preliminary injunctions is Glossip v. Gross.169
4. Glossip v. Gross
In Glossip v. Gross, several prisoners sentenced to
death in the State of Oklahoma filed an action in federal
court to enjoin the use of the drug midazolam in
executions.170 The complaint contended that midazolam
violated the Eighth Amendment protections against cruel
and unusual punishments by creating an unacceptable
risk of severe pain.171 After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the district court denied the prisoners’
application for a preliminary injunction, finding that
they had failed to prove that midazolam was
ineffective.172 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, accepting the district court’s finding of fact
regarding midazolam’s efficacy. Before the United States
Supreme Court accepted certiorari, Oklahoma executed
one of the prisoners; however, the Court “subsequently
voted to grant review and then stayed the executions of
Id. at 438.
Id.
168 Id.
169 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
170 Id. at 2731.
171 Id.
172 Id.
166
167
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[the remaining plaintiffs] pending the resolution of this
case.”173
The Court discussed the history of the Eighth
Amendment—made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment—and what methods of
execution are considered infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments.174 In order for a prisoner to successfully
challenge a method of execution, they must
establish that the method presents a risk
that is “‘sure or very likely to cause serious
illness and needless suffering,’ and give
rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’” To
prevail on such a claim, “there must be a
‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an
‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that
prevents prison officials from pleading that
they were ‘subjectively blameless for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’”175
The Court cited the factors from Winter: “[a] plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”176 The parties agreed
that the primary issue was whether the plaintiffs were
able to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, as
required for a preliminary injunction.177
The Court did not define a “likelihood of success on
the merits;” rather, the Court examined whether the
Id. at 2736.
Id. at 2737.
175 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35,
50 (2008) (plurality opinion)).
176 Id. at 2736 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
177 Id. at 2737.
173
174
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plaintiffs would succeed on their individual claims.178
First, the Court held that plaintiffs “failed to identify a
known and available alternative method of execution
that entails a lesser risk of pain,” which must be shown
to succeed on all Eighth Amendment method-ofexecution claims.179 Second, the Court held that “the
[d]istrict [c]ourt did not commit clear error when it found
that the prisoners failed to establish that Oklahoma’s use
of a massive dose of midazolam in its execution protocol
entails a substantial risk of severe pain.”180 Because the
plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence as to their
claims, the Court affirmed the lower court decision.181 A
very recent case involving preliminary injunctions is
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project.182
5. Trump v. International Refugee Assistance
Project
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project
involves a series of consolidated cases involving
challenges to President Donald J. Trump’s Executive
Order No. 13780, Protecting the Nation From Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States.183 The executive
branch sought a stay on injunctions enjoining the
enforcement of Executive Order No. 13780.184 Though the
primary issue in this case was whether to stay an
injunction—as opposed whether to issue one—the Court
made several notes about its prior decisions involving
preliminary injunctions.

Id. at 2736–37.
Id. at 2731 (citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 61 ).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080
(2017).
183 Id. at 2082.
184 Id. at 2083.
178
179
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First, the Court noted that “[c]rafting a
preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and
judgment, often dependent as much on the equities of a
given case as the substance of the legal issues it
presents”.185 Further, “a court must also ‘conside[r] . . .
the overall public interest.’”186 The purpose of a
preliminary injunction is “to balance the equities as the
litigation moves forward.”187 The Court did not cite to the
factors in Winter.
Second, the Court noted that “[b]efore issuing a
stay, it is ultimately necessary . . . to balance the
equities—to explore the relative harms to [the parties],
as well as the interests of the public at large.”188 The
Court mentions no element-based test; rather, the Court
states that the circuit courts “took account of the equities
in fashioning interim relief, focusing specifically on the
concrete burdens” arising if the executive order was
enforced.189 The Court granted President Trump’s stay
over all aspects of the injunction except provisions
barring foreign nationals with connections to the United
States.190 The next section will address the Circuit Split
over the requirements for a preliminary injunction to
issue.
II. The Circuit Split
This section will first outline the sequential test
applied by the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. Then, this section will outline the sliding scale
test applied by the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Id. at 2087 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 20, 24 (2008); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 120, § 2948).
186 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Winter, 518 F.3d at 26).
187 Id.
188 Id. (quoting Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. &
Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U. S. 1301, 1305 (1991)).
189 Id. at 2087.
190 Id. at 2088.
185
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District of Columbia Circuits. Finally, this section will
discuss the gateway factor test as applied by the First,
Third, and Eighth Circuits.
A. The Sequential Test: The Fourth, Fifth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
apply the sequential test. A sequential test generally is a
step-wise test where each individual element must be
met before the relief sought will be granted.191 These
circuits require plaintiffs to demonstrate each element
before a preliminary injunction will be issued. “[A]ny
modified test which relaxes one of the prongs for
preliminary relief and thus deviates from the [Winter]
standard test is impermissible” in these circuits.192 The
Winter analysis is a “difficult” and “stringent” test to
fulfill, and the failure of a plaintiff to establish even one
of the four elements bars injunctive relief.193 Each factor
is independent of the others, and “satisfying one

For additional sequential tests, see Pepper v. Barnhart, 342
F.3d 853, 854 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing a three-step
sequential test to determine the validity of an alleged
disability); Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir.
2008) (applying the Supreme Court’s two-part sequential test
for qualified immunity).
192 Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d
1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016).
193 See e.g., Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 732
F.3d 535, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2013); Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City
of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 275, 278 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned
Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d
343, 348 (5th Cir. 2012); S. Monorail Co. v. Robbins & Myers,
Inc., 666 F.2d 185, 186 (5th Cir. 1982); Spiegel v. City of
Houston, 636 F.2d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); Vision
Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1979).
191
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requirement does not necessarily affect the analysis of
the other requirements.”194
One commentator suggests that Winter creates a
sequential test because the “most natural reading of
Winter is that it requires a sequential test, with likely
success on the merits constituting one of the four
required elements.”195 Further, “Winter’s articulation of
the traditional preliminary injunction test contains four
factors, joined by semicolons and the conjunction ‘and,’” a
formulation generally indicating that “all of the elements
are required.”196 It is alleged that circuits which do not
follow the sequential test “ignore the plain meaning of
Winter’s text and instead invoke the ‘venerab[ility]’ of
their sliding-scale tests in order to justify their
conclusions.”197 A case illustrative of the sequential test
is Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v.
Jewell.198
1. Diné Citizens Against
Environment v. Jewell

Ruining

Our

In Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our
Environment v. Jewell, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent drilling on certain oil wells while a
claim under the National Environmental Policy Act
proceeded.199 In 2000, the Bureau of Land Management
Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 457
(5th Cir. 2016).
195 Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1049.
196 Id.
197 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Citigroup Global Mkts,
Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010); Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th
Cir. 2010)).
198 Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d
1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016).
199 Id. at 1280.
194
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began revising its 1988 Resource Management Plan.200
The Bureau contacted “the New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Geology to develop a ‘reasonably foreseeable
development scenario,’ . . . to predict the foreseeable oil
and gas development likely to occur over the next twenty
years.”201 It was projected “that 9,970 new oil and gas
wells would be drilled on federally managed lands in the
New Mexico portion of the San Juan Basin.”202 In 2014,
the Bureau prepared amended predictions to add the
possibility of an additional 1,930 oil wells and 2,000 gas
wells.203 In 2015, plaintiffs filed suit challenging approval
for 260 of these wells and seeking to enjoin their use.
The district court issued a 101-page decision
giving its reasoning for not issuing a preliminary
injunction.204 The district court held that though the
plaintiffs had proven irreparable harm, they were not
likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and if the
injunction were issued, the potential harm to plaintiffs
would be outweighed by the economic harms to the
defendant and the public.205 Plaintiff appealed.206
The circuit court noted that for a preliminary
injunction to issue, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2)
irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued; (3) that
the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the
preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party;
and (4) that the injunction, if issued, will not adversely

Id.
Id. at 1279.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1280.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
200
201
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affect the public interest.”207 Further, “[b]ecause a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the
[plaintiff]’s right to [injunctive] relief must be clear and
unequivocal.”208
The plaintiffs demonstrated “irreparable harm
but had not satisfied the other three prerequisites for
obtaining a preliminary injunction,” and each of the
preliminary injunction elements must be met for a
preliminary injunction to issue.209 The circuit court then
affirmed the district court’s holdings as to each element
under an abuse of discretion standard.210 Because the
court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
reasoning, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
rejection of the preliminary injunction.211 The following
section will address the policy considerations behind the
sliding scale test.
B. The Sliding Scale Test: The Second, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits
The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
apply the sliding scale test by balancing the four
traditional factors given in Winter.212 A sliding scale test
Id. at 1281 (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111
(10th Cir. 2002)).
208 Id. (quoting Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2008)).
209 Id. at 1281.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special
Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010);
Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life
Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009); All. For The Wild
Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011). Though
the Seventh Circuit has not expressly stated that the effect
Winter had on preliminary injunctions, the Seventh Circuit
207
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generally is a test where a “strong showing on one factor
could make up for a weaker showing on another.”213 Each
of these circuits balance the preliminary injunction
factors against each other to determine whether to issue
a preliminary injunction. A case illustrative of this
approach is Southern Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC
v. Great Lakes Brewing Company.214
1. Southern Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v.
Great Lakes Brewing Company
Southern Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v.
Great Lakes Brewing Company involved a claim for a
preliminary injunction in a dispute between a craft beer
company and a beer distributor.215 The Great Lakes
Brewing Company is a craft beer manufacturer based in
Ohio; “its home and most important market, accounting
for two-thirds of its sales.”216 Glazer’s of Ohio, Inc., an
alcohol distributor specializing in beer distribution, was
Great Lakes’ distributor in the Columbus market.217
Great Lakes and Glazer’s entered into a written
reached holdings in accord with the Second and Ninth District.
See Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 270, 286-87 (7th
Cir. 2001); Michigan v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127376, at *108 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 2, 2010) (noting that if potential harm in a worst case
scenario is great, a preliminary injunction may be warranted).
213 Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011); A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.
App. 3d 487 (Cal. 1982); 15 Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 1972)
§ 1763A, 226-227.
214 Glazer’s Distrib. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co.,
860 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2017).
215 Id. at 847.
216 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
217 Id.
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agreement for distribution which included provisions for
the termination of the agreement, such as a change in
ownership of Glazer’s.218
In January 2016, rumors of a merger between
Glazer’s and another large distributor, Southern Wine &
Spirits of America (“Southern”) became public.219 “Great
Lakes asked Ohio Glazer’s for details of the impending
deal ‘in order to assess their options in the Greater
Columbus market.’”220 Ohio Glazer’s informed Great
Lakes that Great Lakes’ consent was not necessary.221
Great Lakes considered the merger plans a change of
ownership as defined by their agreement, withheld
consent, and offered to provide evidence to support its
reasonable business judgment in that regard.222 The
merger was completed in June 2016, with Glazer’s and
Southern becoming Ohio Southern Glazer’s, and Great
Lakes cancelled the franchise agreement by written
notice.223
Glazer’s attempted to salvage the relationship
through a letter stating that “while it did not believe prior
consent was required, it ‘respectfully request[ed] its
consent’ after the fact, [and] offer[ed] to provide any
information Great Lakes might need to make that
decision.”224 “Great Lakes declined the invitation to
retroactively cure the purported breach and sought to
implement a mutually agreeable plan to ensure an
orderly transition to a new distributor.”225

Id.
Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 848.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
218
219
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Glazer’s immediately filed a declaratory action in
federal court, seeking a preliminary injunction barring
Great Lakes from terminating its franchise agreement.226
The District Court granted the motion for a preliminary
injunction by balancing the four traditional preliminary
injunction factors: (1) whether the movant has a strong
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the
movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the
injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause
substantial harm to others; (4) and whether the public
interest would be served by the issuance of an
injunction.227 The District Court held that the first three
factors weighed in favor of granting the injunction, and
the fourth factor was neutral.228 An appeal followed.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the District Court’s
analysis of each of the four factors. As to Glazer’s
likelihood of success on the merits, the Sixth Circuit
found that “the contractual basis for Great Lakes’
proposed termination [was] valid under” Ohio law, and
“[t]hus, the sole basis on which plaintiff intended to
succeed at trial [was] without legal support.”229 The
second factor, whether Glazer’s was likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
was based on whether the injury was “fully compensable
by monetary damages” and whether “the nature of the
plaintiff’s loss would make damages difficult to
calculate.”230 The Circuit Court found that Glazer’s had
proven irreparable harm because “Great Lakes[’]
Id. at 849.
Id. (citing Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 818–19
(6th Cir. 2012)).
228 Id.
229 Id. at 852.
230 Id. (quoting Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436
(6th Cir. 2012); Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511
(6th Cir. 1992)).
226
227
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products make up a large portion of Ohio Southern
Glazer’s portfolio, comprising 25% of the Columbus
branch’s beer revenue and 4% of that branch's overall
revenue.”231
As to the third factor, whether the injunction
would cause substantial harm to others, there was no
sign that restricting Great Lakes from terminating the
franchise would harm anyone else because Columbus
area retailers would continue to receive Great Lakes
products through other means.232 The fourth factor,
whether the public interest would be served by the
injunction, did not favor an injunction.233 The Circuit
Court held that the public had a strong interest in
holding private parties to their agreements, and Ohio law
supported Great Lakes’ termination of the franchise
agreement.234 Based on these conclusions, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the issuance of the injunction because
only two factors were in favor of the injunction.235 The
next section will address the policy considerations of the
gateway factor test.
C. The Gateway Factor Test: The First, Third,
and Eighth Circuits
The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits apply the
gateway factor test, a hybrid test which blends the
sequential test and the sliding scale test. These circuits
first examine the likelihood of success on the merits and
the likelihood of irreparable harm—the gateway
factors—before balancing the factors together.236 These
Id. at 853.
Id.
233 Id. at 853.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 854.
236 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017).
231
232
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gateway factors must be met before any balancing
occurs.237 A lack of either of the first two factors is
dispositive.238 These circuits do not apply either a purely
sequential or a purely sliding scale test. A case
illustrative of this approach is Reilly v. City of
Harrisburg.
1. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg
In Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, the City of
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, issued an ordinance
prohibiting anyone from “knowingly congregat[ing],
patrol[ling], picket[ing], or demonstrat[ing] in a zone
extending 20 feet from any portion of an entrance to, exit
from, or driveway of a health care facility.”239 The
ordinance exempted certain classes, including police and
employees of the health care facility.240 Plaintiffs—
“individuals purporting to provide ‘sidewalk counseling’
to those entering abortion clinics . . . to dissuade [them]
from getting abortions”—argued that the ordinance
created unconstitutional “buffer zones” that prevented
them from effectively counseling.241 The plaintiffs
“claim[ed] that the ordinance violat[ed] their First
Amendment rights to speak freely, exercise their religion,
and assemble, as well as their Fourteenth
Amendment due process and equal protection rights.”242
The plaintiffs “sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinance.”243 The district court ruled
that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
demonstrating that they were likely to succeed on the
Id.
Id.
239 Id. at 175 (quoting HARRISBURG, PA. MUN. CODE § 3-371.4A).
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
237
238
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merits, and thus denied plaintiffs their requested
relief.244
The Third Circuit historically applied a four factor
to test to preliminary injunctions.245 For an injunction to
issue, a plaintiff must demonstrate, “(1) a reasonable
probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2)
that it will be irreparably injured . . . if relief is not
granted.”246 Further, if they are relevant, a court should
consider, “(3) the possibility of harm to other interested
persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4)
the public interest.”247 The circuit court noted that in
Nken that the Supreme Court held that the “first two
factors of the traditional standard are the most
critical.”248 Nken would be nonsensical if it elevated two
factors and then required a moving party to prevail in a
balance of all factors.249 The Third Circuit then settled its
own precedent by holding “that a movant for preliminary
equitable relief must meet the threshold for the first two
‘most critical’ factors,” and “[i]f these ‘gateway factors’
[were] met, a court . . . then determines . . . if all four
factors . . . balance in favor of granting the requested
preliminary relief.”250
The Third Circuit did not reach the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims. The Third Circuit remanded the case to
the district court to reconsider the case in accordance
with the test created in Reilly.251 The next section will
analyze the policy considerations and justifications
between the three approaches.
Id.
Id. at 176 (citing Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican
Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919–20 (3d Cir. 1974)).
246 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Del. River Port Auth.,
501 F.2d at 919–20).
247 Id. (quoting Del. River Port Auth., 501 F.2d at 919–20).
248 Id. at 179 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S at 434).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 180.
244
245
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III. Analysis and Proposal
This section will analyze the considerations
behind the sliding scale test, the sequential test, and the
gateway factor test and discuss how each comports with
equitable precedent and traditional notions of Supreme
Court equity. This section will then propose a solution to
the split based on that analysis.
A. Analysis
There are three different tests that circuit courts
apply to preliminary injunctions: the sequential test, the
sliding scale test, and the gateway factor test. Circuits
that apply the sequential test analyze each preliminary
injunction factor in turn, and if any factor is not proven
to a certain degree, a preliminary injunction will not be
issued. Circuits that apply the sliding scale test balance
each of the four factors and issue an injunction if the
factors taken together balance in favor of the plaintiff.
These circuits will award “relief based on a lower
likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is very
high.”252
Circuits that apply the gateway factor test
consider the first two factors of the preliminary
injunction test—the likelihood of success on the merits
and the likelihood of irreparable harm—dispositive of
whether the injunction should issue. These circuits first
examine those two factors; if those factors are met, the
remainder of the factors will be examined, and all four
factors will be balanced. The next section will examine
the sequential test and the considerations that have led
circuits to apply it.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008)
(citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 120, § 2948.3).
252
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1. The Sequential Test
The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
apply the sequential test. The Fourth Circuit justifies the
sequential test based on Winter’s articulation of four
requirements.253 Prior to Winter, the Fourth Circuit
applied a four-part test, the Blackwelder test, which
asked: “[(1)] Has the petitioner made a strong showing
that it is likely to prevail upon the merits? [(2)] Has the
petitioner shown that without such relief it will suffer
irreparable injury? [(3)] Would the issuance of the
injunction substantially harm other interested parties?
[(4)] Wherein lies the public interest?”254
The Fourth Circuit abandoned this test on the
grounds that Winter requires a plaintiff to make a clear
showing that it will likely succeed on the merits and that
it is likely to be irreparably harmed absent preliminary
relief.255 Further, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court “emphasized the public interest
requirement” by requiring courts of equity to “pay
particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of [the] injunction,”
a factor that was not always examined under
Blackwelder.256 Without further explanation, the Fourth
Circuit concludes that each of the four factors must be
proven before a preliminary injunction will issue.257

The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009).
254 Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189,
193 (4th Cir. 1977) (quoting Airport Comm’n of Forsyth Cty.,
N.C. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 296 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1961)).
255 Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346–47.
256 Id. at 347 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24).
257 Id. at 346.
253
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The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits applied
four factor tests virtually identical to the Winter test
before Winter was decided. Before Winter, the Fifth
Circuit held that a preliminary injunction was an
extraordinary equitable remedy that may be granted only
if plaintiff established four factors identical to the Winter
test.258 Winter did not alter the Fifth Circuit’s application
of a sequential test, and the circuit continues to affirm
that the injunction is an “extraordinary remedy.”259 The
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, likewise, before Winter,
applied sequential tests similar in construction to the
Winter test and, following Winter, have not substantially
altered their tests.260

McKinney ex rel. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Creative
Vision Res., LLC, 783 F.3d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 2015).
259 Id. (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24).
260 See Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.
2005) (quoting Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182,
1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “(1) [he or she] will suffer irreparable injury
unless the injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury . . .
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party; (3) the injunction, if issued, would
not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a
substantial likelihood [of success] on the merits” (alterations in
original)); Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810 F.3d 767, 774
(11th Cir. 2015) (holding that district court may issue a
preliminary injunction where the moving party demonstrates
“(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that
irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues;
(3) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs
whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the nonmoving party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest.”); see also Siegel v. LePore, 234
F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000); All Care Nursing Serv., Inc.
v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir.
1989).
258

[59]
59

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

Out of the four circuits which apply the sequential
test, only the Fourth Circuit altered its approach
following Winter. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have traditionally applied a four-part sequential test.
Though Winter did not change the test for all four of the
sequential test circuits, all four circuits have held that no
prong of the test for a preliminary injunction may be
relaxed to require less than a “likelihood” of success or
irreparable harm.261 The next section will examine the
policy considerations behind the circuits that apply the
sliding scale test.
2. The Sliding Scale Test
The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuits continue to employ the sliding scale
test by balancing the four traditional factors given in
Winter. The Second Circuit historically required a party
seeking a preliminary injunction to show “(a) irreparable
harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits
or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to
make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of
hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting
the preliminary relief.”262 This circuit has noted that the

N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish v. U. S. Dep’t of the Interior, 854
F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Although we have applied
this modified approach in the past, our recent decisions
admonish that it is not available after the Supreme Court’s
ruling in [Winter].”); United States v. Stinson, 661 F. App’x
945, 951 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jysk Bed 'N Linen, 810 F.3d
at 774 n.16) (“[T]he plaintiff must show a likelihood of success
on the merits rather than actual success.”).
262 Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities
Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72
(2d Cir. 1979).
261
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overall burden of this test is no lighter than the likelihood
of success on the merits prong stated in Winter.263
The Second Circuit holds that the value of this
approach, “lies in its flexibility in the face of varying
factual scenarios and the greater uncertainties inherent
at the outset of particularly complex litigation.”264
Preliminary injunctions, being extraordinary remedies,
should not be “mechanically confined to cases that are
simple or easy.”265
The Second Circuit holds that “Munaf, Winter,
and Nken have not undermined . . . [the circuit’s]
approval of the more flexible approach signaled” by the
Supreme Court in 1929’s Ohio Oil.266 The Second Circuit
holds that Winter was decided upon the balance of the
equities and the public interest, not upon a sequential
test.267 Although Winter did not reject the sliding scale
test,268 courts cannot apply a lesser standard than the
“likelihood” standard in Winter.269 As previously stated,
the Second Circuit holds that the sliding scale test as it
has long been applied is not a lesser standard than
“likelihood of success on the merits” standard.270 The
Id. at 35.
Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 37; see Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815
(1929) (per curiam).
267 Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21–24, 32 (2008)).
268 All. For The Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132
(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 50 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
269 Id. (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Barker ex rel.
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. A.D. Conner Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d
707, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods,
Inc., 276 F.3d 270, 286–87 (7th Cir. 2001)).
270 See supra note 263.
263
264
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Second Circuit contends that “[i]f the Supreme Court had
. . . [intended] to abrogate the more flexible standard for
a preliminary injunction,” the Court would have
referenced “the considerable history of the flexible
standards applied in this circuit, seven of our sister
circuits, and in the Supreme Court itself.”271
The Seventh Circuit, citing to Winter, holds that
“[i]rreparable injury is not enough to support equitable
relief.”272 In addition to irreparable injury there must
also be a “plausible claim on the merits,” and the “balance
of equities” must favor the plaintiff.273 “[T]he more net
harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the
plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still
supporting some preliminary relief.”274 The Seventh
Circuit notes that a preliminary injunction need not be
an exhaustive remedy.275 It can be limited to rectifying
only “some preliminary relief.”276
Though the Ninth Circuit’s decision was
overturned in Winter due to its application of less than a
“likelihood” of irreparable harm, the Ninth Circuit
continues to apply a sliding scale on the grounds that the
Supreme Court has not defined “likelihood.”277 The Ninth
Circuit holds that in Munaf the Supreme Court did
nothing more than note that the lower court had failed to
Citigroup, 598 F.3d. at 38.
Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life
Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555
U.S. 7; Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 157 F.3d 500
(7th Cir. 1998)).
273 Id. (citing Winter, 555 U.S. 7; Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 157 F.3d 500).
274 Id.
275 All. For The Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1133
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 582
F.3d at 725).
276 Id. (quoting Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 582 F.3d at
725).
277 Id.
271
272
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address the likelihood of success on the merits, but the
Court provided nothing in the way of a definition for a
“likelihood of success on the merits.278 Nken, likewise,
included the phrase “likely to succeed on the merits,” but
the Court did not suggest that this factor requires a
showing that the movant is “more likely than not” to
succeed on the merits for a preliminary injunction to
issue.279 Further the Ninth Circuit states that in Winter,
the Supreme Court only “cabined that flexibility with
regard to the likelihood of harm,” leaving open the
possibility of treating likelihood of success on the merits
differently.280
Similar to the Second and Ninth Circuits, the
District of Columbia Circuit weighs the four preliminary
injunction factors and “allow[s] that a strong showing on
one factor could make up for a weaker showing on
another.”281 Two justices of this circuit have suggested
that Winter appears to require “that a party moving for a
preliminary injunction must meet four independent
requirements.”282 Despite this observation, this circuit
has not yet decided whether Winter requires a sequential
test and continues to apply a sliding scale test.283 The
following section will analyze the gateway factor test and
the policy consideration behind it.
Id. at 1134.
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009); All. For The Wild
Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc.,
598 F.3d at 35).
280 All. For The Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1139.
281 Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
282 Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1296
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh & Henderson, JJ., concurring).
283 League of Women Voters of the U. S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1,
7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that “appellants satisfy each of the
four preliminary injunction factors, this case presents no
occasion for the court to decide whether the ‘sliding scale’
approach remains valid”).
278
279
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3. The Gateway Factor Test
The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits apply the
Gateway Factor test, a hybrid test which blends the
sequential test and the sliding scale test. The status of
the law in the Third Circuit has been muddied by
inconsistent precedent. The Third Circuit has
acknowledged an “inconsistent line of cases within [the
Third Circuit] holding that all four factors must be
established by the movant and the ‘failure to establish
any element in its favor renders a preliminary injunction
inappropriate.’”284 This line of cases stated that an
“injunction shall issue only if the plaintiff produces
evidence sufficient to convince the district court that all
four factors favor preliminary relief.”285 If a plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that all four elements favored their
claim for a preliminary injunction, a preliminary
injunction would be “inappropriate.”286
This test was unlike the sliding scale test, as
followed by other circuits where “[t]he more the balance
of harms tips in favor of an injunction, the lighter the
burden on the party seeking the injunction to
demonstrate that it will ultimately prevail.”287 This line
of Third Circuit cases required each factor to be analyzed

Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citing Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d
205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014); NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters.,
Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)).
285 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dept’
of Health & Human Serv., No. 13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419, at
*1 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013) (quoting N.J. Hosp. Ass’n v. Waldman,
73 F.3d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 1995)).
286 Id. (quoting NutraSweet Co, 176 F.3d at 153).
287 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Korte v. Sebelius, 528
Fed. App’x 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012)).
284
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in turn and each element met for a preliminary
injunction to issue.288
The second line of Third Circuit cases applied a
balancing test. These cases required “[a]s a prerequisite
to the issuance of a preliminary injunction” a plaintiff to
show a “reasonable probability of eventual success in the
litigation, and [] that it will be irreparably injured
pendente lite if relief is not granted to prevent a change
in the status quo.”289 Further, “in considering whether to
grant a preliminary injunction, [a court] should take into
account, when . . . relevant, [] the possibility of harm to
other interested persons from the grant or denial of the
injunction, and [] the public interest.”290 These factors
would then be “delicate[ly]” balanced.291
This conflicting standard began with Opticians
Association of America v. Independent Opticians of
America, holding that a court “must consider four factors”
and that “[o]nly if the movant produces evidence
sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors
favor preliminary relief should the injunction issue.”292
Through
various
subtle
misinterpretations
of
longstanding jurisprudence starting with Opticians, the
Third Circuit’s precedent became confused and
unclear.293 In Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, the Third
Circuit sought to unify its precedent in light of Winter
with—quite appropriately—four reasons why Winter
does not support the sequential test.
Id.
A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 761,
763 (3d Cir. 1971) (quoting Ikirt v. Lee Nat’l Corp., 358 F.2d
726, 727 (3d Cir. 1966)).
290 Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transp.,
Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 920 (3d Cir. 1974).
291 Id.
292 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173,177 (alteration in
original) (quoting Opticians Ass’n of America v. Indep.
Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 191–92 (3d Cir. 1990)).
293 Id.
288
289
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First, Winter held that an injunction is a matter
of equitable discretion that requires a court to balance
the equities, and Justice Ginsburg in her dissent stated
that the Court has never rejected the sliding scale
formulation.294 Second, other courts, such as the Seventh
Circuit, agree with the Third Circuit that Winter
supports a sliding scale test.295 “Third, no test for
considering preliminary equitable relief should be so
rigid as to diminish, let alone disbar, discretion” because
such a test would contravene traditional principles of
equity.296 Fourth, barring the use of a sliding scale test is
“inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s post-Winter
instruction in Nken” which directed courts that “when
evaluating whether interim equitable relief is
appropriate, ‘[t]he first two factors of the traditional
standard are the most critical.’”297
The Third Circuit reads Winter in conjunction
with Nken to create a hybrid test. When seeking a
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must meet the
threshold for the first two factors—that it can likely
succeed on the merits and that it is more likely than not
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief.298 “If these gateway factors are met, a court then
considers . . . in its sound discretion if all four factors,
taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested
preliminary relief.”299

Id. at 177–78 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 31–32 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
295 Id. (quoting Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. 582 F.3d
at 725).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 179 (alteration in original) (quoting Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 434(2009)).
298 Id.
299 Id.
294
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Though the Third Circuit purports to apply a
sliding scale test, this test is a hybrid test: the gateway
factor test. The first two factors are applied sequentially
and only if those are met are the remaining two factors
considered and balanced.300 The Eighth Circuit applies a
similar test.
The Eighth Circuit, like a Third Circuit, applies a
hybrid test to determine whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. The Eighth Circuit has long
applied four factors comparable to the Winter factors
when considering preliminary injunctions.301 The factors
cited in Dataphase Systems are consistent with the
factors stated in Winter; however, Winter altered the
Eighth Circuit’s historical requirement that the plaintiff
establish “a fair ground for litigation” to require the
plaintiff to establish “likelihood of success on the
merits.”302
The Eighth Circuit holds that a court must
“flexibly weigh the case’s particular circumstances to
determine whether the balance of equities so favors the
movant that justice requires the court to intervene.”303
Like the Third Circuit, this circuit first examines
gateway factors. The lack of irreparable harm is “an
independently sufficient ground upon which to deny” an
injunction regardless of what the plaintiff proves

Id.
Valspar Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d
729, 731 (D. Minn. 2014) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL
Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
302 Arnzen v. Palmer, No. C12-4001-DEO, 2012 WL 1245722, at
*2 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 12, 2012) (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 645 F.3d 978, 993 (8th Cir. 2011)).
303 Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182
F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United Indus. Corp. v.
Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 1998)).
300
301
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regarding the other three factors.304 Further, the Eighth
Circuit holds that “[t]he basis of injunctive relief in the
federal courts has always been irreparable harm and the
inadequacy of legal remedies.”305 This creates a hybrid
test. The Eighth Circuit will not issue a preliminary
injunction if there is a lack of irreparable harm
regardless of the severity of the other factors.
The First Circuit likewise does not balance the
factors equally. “The likelihood of success on the merits
and irreparable harm weigh heavily in the analysis and
these factors are assessed in relation to one another”;306
however, the likelihood of success on the merits has been
held to be the most important factor and may be
dispositive.307 First Circuit courts have also held that
when the likelihood of success on the merits is great, a
preliminary injunction will issue even if the plaintiff does
not demonstrate an equal likelihood of irreparable
harm.308
The next section will describe a proposal for the
universal application of the sliding scale test among the
several circuits.
B. Proposal

Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003).
Bandag, Inc. v. Jack’s Tire & Oil, Inc., 190 F.3d 924, 926
(8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07 (1959)); Planned Parenthood
Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 n.5 (8th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc., 359 U.S. at
506–07).
306 Am. Consumer Credit Counseling, Inc. v. Am. Consumer
Credit, LLC, Civil Action No. 16-cv-12170-IT, 2017 WL
1534190, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 2017).
307 Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Harnett, 731 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2013).
308 E.E.O.C. v. Astra U.S.A. Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir.
1996).
304
305
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Federal Courts should apply the sliding scale test
when determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction. Winter and other Supreme Court cases do not
abrogate the sliding scale test traditionally applied when
determining whether a preliminary injunction should
issue. Further, cases subsequent to Winter do not apply a
sequential test, and a sequential test is not mentioned.
The traditional sliding scale test comports with the
function of the preliminary injunction and the traditional
notions of equity currently and historically applied by the
Supreme Court.
This section will first discuss how the language of
Winter does not abrogate the traditional sliding scale
test. Next, this section will discuss how Winter does not
alter any aspect of the traditional sliding scale test. Then,
this section will discuss the significance of the Winter test
containing “factors” as opposed to “elements.” Then, this
section will discuss how Supreme Court precedent
supports the sliding scale approach. Finally, this section
will conclude with a discussion of how the equities must
be balanced regardless of which test is applied,
concluding that only the sliding scale test allows the
equities to be properly balanced.
1. The Language of Winter Does Not Abrogate
the Sliding Scale Test
Winter does not abrogate the traditional sliding
scale test. First, the language of Winter does not suggest
that a sequential test has now replaced the sliding scale
test. Nothing in the opinion expressly or implicitly
creates a sequential test. The Fourth Circuit may apply
the sequential test, but the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have always applied the sequential test, Winter
notwithstanding. These circuits have noted that Winter
requires a showing of likelihood of success on the merits
[69]
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plus a likelihood of irreparable harm, but they have not
stated how Winter has altered their test beyond that.309
The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to expressly
interpret Winter to create a sequential test.
The Fourth Circuit holds that Winter created a
strict sequential test but does not cite language or give
reasoning as to how the Supreme Court mandated it.
This circuit only concludes that the factors must be
proven “as articulated.”310 Nothing in Winter suggests
that the Sliding Scale Test may no longer be applied.
Further, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent in Winter,
states that the Supreme Court has historically followed a
test which awards “relief based on a lower likelihood of
harm when the likelihood of success is very high.”311
Justice Ginsburg states that Winter does not abrogate
that test,312 and the majority does not dispute her
contention.313
2. The Plain Language of Winter Does Not Alter
Any Element of the Test
Second, the plain language of Winter changes
nothing about the sliding scale test. The Supreme Court
held that issuing a preliminary injunction based only on
a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with the

Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d
1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016).
310 The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
575 F.3d 342,
348 (4th Cir. 2009).
311 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
312 Id.
313 Cf. SBRMCOA, LLC v. Morehouse Real Estate Invs., LLC,
62 V.I. 168, 183–84 (V.I. 2015) (noting that the “Ginsburg
sliding scale test” is a unique variation of the sliding scale test).
309
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Court’s characterization of preliminary injunctions.314
The Ninth Circuit—the circuit where Winter originated—
acknowledges that, following Winter, “any modified test
which relaxes one of the prongs for preliminary relief” is
impermissible.315 Further, the Ninth Circuit states that
in Winter, the Supreme Court only “cabined that
flexibility with regard to the likelihood of harm,” leaving
open the possibility of treating likelihood of success on
the merits differently.316 The Ninth Circuit’s assertions
are not correct, however. In Winter, the Court did not
“cabin flexibility;” the Court merely restated its
longstanding rule. The Supreme Court has always
required a showing of a likelihood of success on the
merits.317 Further, the Supreme Court has never
endorsed a test which always issues an injunction if
certain requirements are met.
In Ohio Oil, the Supreme Court noted that when
“questions presented in an application for a[]
[preliminary] injunction are grave, and the injury to the
moving party is certain and irreparable,” the injury to the
defendant is inconsequential or indemnifiable through
bond, and the final decree is in the moving party’s favor,
the injunction usually will be granted.318 The Court notes
that the injunction will “usually” be granted regardless of

Winter, 555 U.S at 23.
Diné, 839 F.3d at 1282; Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc.,
276 F.3d 270, 286–87 (7th Cir. 2001).
316 All. For The Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1139
(9th Cir. 2011).
317 Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) (per
curiam) (holding that for a preliminary injunction to issue it
must be shown that the injury to the moving party will be
certain and irreparable if the application be denied and the
final decree be in his favor).
318 Id. (citing Love v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 185
F. 321, 331–32 (8th Cir. 1911)).
314
315
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whether the factors are fulfilled.319 A preliminary
injunction, as has often been stated, is not an automated
process. It is not a right that arises if certain conditions
are met.
The lack of clarity in the test for preliminary
injunctions is a byproduct of the flexibility of the test
itself. The Supreme Court has long adhered to certain
equitable principles that are demonstrated throughout
its decisions.320 Most importantly, the Court has always
been flexible in issuing preliminary injunctions to reach
equitable conclusions.321
In Ohio Oil, the Court held that harm must be
“certain and irreparable” and the final decree “is in the
moving party’s favor” without further definition.322 In
Winter, a moving party must show “that he is likely to
succeed on the merits” and “that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.”323
Also, “[t]he standard for a preliminary injunction is
essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with
the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of
success on the merits rather than actual success.”324
Likelihood then is less than actual success and greater
than merely possible success, but the standard is still
amorphous. District courts are given great discretion in
issuing preliminary injunctions and are not overturned

Id.
Kroger, supra note 28, at 1471–72 (quoting HOFFER, supra
note 67, at xiii).
321 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944); see also
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).
322 Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330; see also Meredith, 320 U.S. at
235.
323 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
324 Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S.
531, 546, n.12 (1987)).
319
320
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unless there has been an abuse of discretion.325 The test
is unclear so that it can be flexible.
In Winter, the district court did not consider all
facts before it when reaching its conclusion.326 In
considering all the facts, the Supreme Court found that
in determining that the plaintiffs suffered only a
“possibility” of irreparable harm—the harm was too
remote.327 “A preliminary injunction will not be issued
simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future
injury.”328 The district court effectively reached a
conclusion counter to long standing precedent due to its
lack of consideration of the facts.
If the facts in Winter had pointed to a likelihood of
irreparable harm, the Supreme Court would have
allowed the lower court decision to stand regardless of the
language used. In cases involving questions of national
defense, which Winter involved, the Court will “give great
deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a
particular military interest.”329 The Court noted that “it
is not clear that articulating the incorrect standard
affected the Ninth Circuit's analysis of irreparable
harm.”330 It would not have mattered if the Ninth Circuit
had applied the facts to a likelihood standard.
Id. at 33 (holding that the “District Court abused its
discretion by imposing a 2,200-yard shutdown zone and by
requiring the Navy to power down its MFA sonar during
significant surface ducting conditions”); see also Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir. 2007)
(reviewing the district court's legal conclusions and findings of
fact for abuse of discretion).
326 Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
327 Id. at 21.
328 Id.
329 Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
330 Id. at 22.
325
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“Likelihood” is not a magic word that allows a court to
abuse its discretion; rather, it is a standard less than
actual success which must be met when fact pattern in
question is analyzed.
Munaf only noted that the lower court had failed
to address the likelihood of success on the merits, but the
Court provided nothing in the way of a definition for a
“likelihood of success on the merits.”331 Nken, likewise,
included the phrase “likely to succeed on the merits,” but
the Court did not suggest that this factor requires a
showing that the movant is more likely than not to
succeed on the merits for a preliminary injunction to
issue.332 In Winter, the facts simply did not demonstrate
a likelihood of irreparable harm. The Ninth Circuit is
incorrect in its assertion that Winter changed the
standard for irreparable harm.
One commentator has posited that the “plain
language” of Winter establishes a sequential test because
“Winter’s articulation of the traditional preliminary
injunction test contains four factors, joined by semicolons
and the conjunction ‘and.’”333 Further, the commentator
suggests that “[t]ypically, this sort of formulation
indicates a list where all of the elements are required.”334
Syntax and punctuation are thin nails on which to hang
such a heavy assertion. For one, Winter does not use
semi-colons to separate the preliminary injunction
factors: “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008).
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 419 (2009).
333 Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1049; e.g., Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
334 Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1049
331
332
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his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.”335
Further, a semicolon and conjunction formulation
is not always used to create a sequential test. Some
Supreme Court cases create sequential tests without
using such a formulation.336 For example, Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady, is often cited as creating a four-part test
for evaluating the constitutionality of state taxes though
the Court never expressly cites a test.337 Oftentimes, the
Supreme Court actually states whether a test is
sequential.338 In Winter, the Court does not expressly
state that the test is sequential, and Justice Ginsburg
does not believe the Winter test to be sequential. Further,
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (citing a
sequential test for equal protection violations in grand jury
selection without a semicolon and conjunction formulation); see
also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S.
59, 78 (1978); Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49, (1999) (“To state a claim for relief in
an action brought under § 1983, respondents must establish
that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation
was committed under color of state law.”); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 592 (1986)
(noting each of these economic factors weighs more heavily as
the time needed to recoup losses grows).
337 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287
(1977); see Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S.
298, 310–11 (1994) (holding that Complete Auto created a four
part test: “(1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus
to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3)
discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly
related to the services provided by the State”).
338 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 352 (1987) (“Under
Batson v. Kentucky and the framework established in
Castaneda v. Partida, McCleskey must meet a three-factor
standard.”); Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 311.
335
336
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the semicolon and conjunction formulation is used for
applications that are not tests at all.339
Courts have considered punctuation when
interpreting statutes, but Winter did not interpret a
statute. A semicolon can be used to punctuate a long
sentence and indicate unrelated elements.340 A semicolon
can be used to separate unrelated requirements in a
statute.341 In some cases, a semicolon can be interpreted
as “or” or “and” and still create a logical sentence.342
Context is important, and Winter does not specify a
sequential test anywhere.
3. The Winter Test Has Factors, Not Elements
Third, the Court refers to the four parts of the
preliminary injunction test as “factors,” not elements.343
“Elements” is the term generally used for sequential
tests. For example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey the
Supreme Court noted that “in order for a jury trial of a
crime to be proper, all elements of the crime must be
proved to the jury.”344 Factors are generally reserved for
See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 582 (1998) (listing
lower court propositions separated by semicolons and a
conjunction).
340 See, e.g., In re Jolly, 143 B.R. 383, 387 (E.D. Va. 1992).
341 See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199
F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
342 Fed. Ins. Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 127 F.3d 563, 571 (7th
Cir. 1997).
343 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23–24
(2008).
344 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500 (2000) (emphasis
added); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992) (holding that the elements of standing “are not mere
pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the
plaintiff's case”). Compare Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230
(1983) (“We do not agree, however, that these elements should
be understood as entirely separate and independent
339
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Sliding Scale Tests.345 For example, in Miller-El v.
Cockrell, the Court held that the credibility of a
prosecutor’s race-neutral statements “can be measured
by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by
how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are;
and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in
accepted trial strategy.”346
The Court also uses “factors” to mean conditions
considered in reaching a decision.347 In Winter, the Court
separates the requirements created by the district court
for its injunction with semicolons.348 The Court’s use of

requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case, which the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois would imply.”), with
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 99 (1974) (quoting Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)) (“[T]hree elements must
coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.”).
345 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 630 (1978) (in Florida, a trial
court “is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against
seven mitigating factors to determine whether the death
penalty shall be imposed”) (White, J., dissenting).
346 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003).
347 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009) (holding that
certain factors weigh in favor of reconsideration of Saucier).
348 Winter, 555 U.S. at 17–18 (“(1) imposing a 12-nautical mile
‘exclusion zone’ from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to conduct
additional monitoring for marine mammals; (3) restricting the
use of ‘helicopter-dipping’ sonar; (4) limiting the use of MFA
sonar in geographic ‘choke points’; (5) shutting down MFA
sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of
a vessel; and (6) powering down MFA sonar by 6 dB during
significant surface ducting conditions, in which sound travels
further than it otherwise would due to temperature differences
in adjacent layers of water.”).
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certain punctuation is neither dispositive nor helpful in
determining whether the Winter test is sequential.
4. Precedent of the Supreme Court Supports a
Sliding Scale
Fourth, Supreme Court precedent supports the
Sliding Scale Test for issuing preliminary injunctions.
One commentator suggests that earlier Supreme Court
cases support a sequential test. In Doran v. Salem Inn,
the Court stated that the plaintiff must show “he will
suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to
prevail on the merits.”349 The Doran Court continued, “It
is recognized, however, that a district court must weigh
carefully the interests on both sides.”350 In Yakus, the
Court “indicated that irreparable injury was necessary,
but not sufficient, to obtain a preliminary injunction”;351
however, the Court continued that “the award is a matter
of sound judicial discretion, in the exercise of which the
court balances the conveniences of the parties and
possible injuries to them.”352 Applying a strict sequential
test will allow preliminary injunctions to issue only in the
narrowest of narrow, simple circumstances. The court in
Citigroup v. VCG stated in its opinion that “limiting the
preliminary injunction to cases that do not present
significant difficulties would deprive the remedy of much
of its utility.”353 The Supreme Court has never rejected
Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1051 (quoting Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)).
350 Doran, 422 U.S. at 931.
351 Weisshaar, supra note 3, at 1051 (citing Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)).
352 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440.
353 Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities
Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, at 36 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 120, § 2948.3); see also Dataphase
349
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the sliding scale test which requires a balancing of the
equities and did not do so in Winter.354
The Supreme Court had the opportunity in Winter
to create a definitive sequential test; however, the Court
did not do so. The Court’s primary concern in Winter was
the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a mere “possibility” of
irreparable harm was sufficient to warrant an
injunction.355 That does not follow the “basic doctrine of
equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act
. . . when the moving party has an adequate remedy at
law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied
equitable relief.”356 In Winter, the Supreme Court merely
stated its own precedent and objected to the Ninth
Circuit’s failure to consider all the facts.
5. All Circuits Balance the Equities Regardless
of the Test Applied
Fifth, the Winter factors create a balancing test
whether the sequential test, sliding scale test, or the
gateway factor test is applied. The third factor in the
Winter test requires “that the balance of equities” tip in
the movant’s favor.357 “In each case, courts ‘must balance
the competing claims of injury and must consider the
effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief.’”358 If the movant has shown only a
Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
354 Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
355 Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d
1276,. 1288 (10th Cir. 2016) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
356 Id. at 1287–88 (alteration in original) (quoting Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971)).
357 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
358 Id. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 542 (1987)).
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likelihood of success on the merits or only irreparable
harm, the balance of the equities will not likely
sufficiently favor the movant.359 Further, the balance the
equities may tip somewhat in favor of movant, but the
lack of a likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable harm may not tip the equities far enough.360
A sequential test circuit may deny an injunction because
a movant has not shown a likelihood of success on the
merits while a sliding scale circuit would deny that same
injunction on the grounds that not showing a likelihood
of success on the merits fails to tip the balance of equities
in favor of the movant. Circuits may reach identical
conclusions regardless of the test applied, but this is not
a universal maxim.
“The [Supreme] Court has repeatedly held that
the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has
always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of
See, e.g., Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Bureau of Gambling
Control, 356 F. App’x 89, 94 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
plaintiff only established a likelihood of success on the merits);
Young v. 3.1 Phillip Lim, LLC, Case No.: SA CV 16-1556-DOC
(KESx), 2016 WL 6781200, at *4, *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2016)
(holding that plaintiff established a likelihood of success on the
merits but that the balance of equities favored defendant);
Dep’t of Educ. v. C.B. ex rel. Donna, Civil No. 11-00576
SOM/RLP, 2012 WL 220517, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 24, 2012)
(holding the Dept. of Education “does not show that it will
suffer irreparable harm or that the balance of equities tips in
its favor”; however, “[t]he DOE does show that it is likely to
succeed on the merits. The public interest factor is neutral”);
Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d
953, 991 (N.D. Iowa 2011); Champagne v. Gintick, 871 F. Supp.
1527, 1537 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding that even with a likelihood
of success on the merits, the balance of the equities would still
favor against an injunction).
360 Brown v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distrib., Action No.
2:16cv476, 2016 WL 9415418, at *8–9 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13,
2016).
359
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legal remedies.”361 This is because an injunction should
issue only where the intervention of a court of equity “is
essential in order effectually to protect property rights
against injuries otherwise irremediable.”362 Winter is
merely reiterating that a preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a
clear showing that the movant is entitled to such relief363
and never as a matter of right.364 The four factor test
exists to ensure that when an injunction—a drastic
remedy depriving a party of certain freedom to act—is
issued there is no other way to make the movant whole.
When courts balance the equities, they consider
the likelihood of success on the merits and the likelihood
of irreparable harm. Without a likelihood of success on
the merits and without a likelihood of irreparable harm,
the equities as far as issuing a preliminary injunction are
concerned, cannot be balanced except in extraordinary
circumstances, such as the equities being balanced as a
matter of law.365 If the movant is not likely to succeed and
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (citing
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975);
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974); Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–507 (1959); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
362 Weinberger, 456 U.S at 312 (citing Cavanaugh v. Looney,
248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
363 Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
364 Id. at 24 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90
(2008)).
365 See Bhandari v. Capital One, N.A., No. C 12-04533 PSG,
2012 WL 5904694, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012) (holding that
failure to show likelihood of success on the merits and success
in showing irreparable harm tip the balance in favor of the
defendant); Cf. Defs. of Wildlife v. Salazar, 812 F. Supp. 2d
1205, 1210 (D. Mont. 2009) (holding that though the plaintiffs
have failed to meet their burden for issuing a preliminary
injunction, the plaintiffs are likely to be able to meet their
361

[81]
81

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

not likely to be irreparably harmed, an injunction would
not fulfill its purpose.
There must be a likelihood of success on the
merits and a likelihood of irreparable harm before a
preliminary injunction will issue; however, one of these
factors may have a “lower likelihood” than the other.366
The Supreme Court has never defined what a “likelihood”
of success on the merits entails. The Court has held that
“likelihood” is less than “actual success.”367 As the Tenth
Circuit has noted, under the “serious questions” test still
applied by some Circuits, a party must show that there
are serious questions going to the merits and that the
balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor, a burden
no less than a “likelihood of success.”368 The test is vague
because the entire point of a preliminary injunction is to
balance the equities. If the test were mechanical, a
preliminary injunction would not be an extraordinary
remedy that is malleable to fit any set of circumstances;
rather, an injunction would be a matter of right.
Regardless of how the factors are applied, the Winter test
still requires a balancing of the equities. To the extent
that the third element of the Winter test is “balancing of
the equities,” all three tests are balancing tests. Insisting
on a rigid application of the factors may deprive courts of
the flexibility historically associated with equity.

burden to show the balance of equities tip in their favor
because Congress has determined that equities already tip in
the favor of plaintiffs).
366 Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
367 Id. at 32 (majority opinion) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village
of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987)).
368 Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d
1276, 1288 (10th Cir. 2016) (Lucerno, J., dissenting) (citing
Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities
Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010)).
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IV. Conclusion
The traditional sliding scale test for a preliminary
injunction to issue is a sliding scale Test which most
totally balances the equities. This sliding scale test was
not abrogated by Winter. Circuits which apply the
sequential test or the gateway factor test are still
required to balance the equities as the third factor in the
Winter analysis. In applying the Winter test, circuits who
do not apply the sliding scale test should err on the slide
of flexibility as historically applied to preliminary
injunctions by the Supreme Court. Preserving flexibility
in the application of equitable remedies is paramount to
ensuring that an actual equity result is reached. In
considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction,
courts should focus on the reaching an equitable remedy,
a result which can only be reached through the
application of the flexible sliding scale test.
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Abstract
Over the past 40 years, Tennessee has imposed sustained death
sentences on 86 of the more than 2,500 defendants found guilty
of first degree murder; and the State has executed only six of
those defendants. How are those few selected? Is Tennessee
consistently and reliably sentencing to death only the “worst of
the bad”? To answer these questions, we surveyed all of
Tennessee’s first degree murder cases since 1977, when
Tennessee enacted its current capital punishment system.
Tennessee’s scheme was designed in response to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, which held
that a capital punishment system operating in an arbitrary
manner violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. Tennessee’s “guided discretion” scheme
was purportedly structured to reduce the risk of arbitrariness
by limiting and guiding the exercise of sentencing discretion.
Our survey results and analysis show, however, that the state’s
capital punishment system fails to satisfy Furman’s command.
Rather, it has entrenched the very problems of arbitrariness
that Furman sought to eradicate. This article explains the legal
background of Tennessee’s death sentencing scheme, presents
the most salient results of our survey, and examines the various
factors that contribute to the arbitrariness of Tennessee’s
system—including infrequency of application, geographical
disparity, timing and natural deaths, error rates, quality of
defense
representation,
prosecutorial
discretion
and
misconduct, defendants’ impairments, race, and judicial
disparity.
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D. (i)(7) Aggravator—Felony Murder
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I. Introduction
Imagine entering a lottery in which you are given
a list of Tennessee’s 2,514 adult first degree murder cases
since 1977, when our modern death penalty system was
installed, along with a description of the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case in whatever detail
[87]
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you request. You are not told what the final sentences
were—whether life, life without parole (LWOP), or death.
Your job is to make two guesses. First, you must guess
which 86 defendants of the 2,514 received sustained
death sentences (i.e., death sentences sustained on
appeal and in post-conviction and federal habeas review).
Second, you must guess which six defendants were
actually executed during the 40-year period from 1977 to
2017. What are the odds that your guesses would be
correct?
We submit that the odds would be close to nil.
Even with an abundance of information about the cases,
trying to figure out who was sentenced to death, and who
was actually executed, would be nothing but a crapshoot.
And what would you look for to make your
guesses? The egregiousness of the crime? Maybe, but the
vast majority of the most egregious cases (including rapemurder cases and multiple murder cases involving
children) resulted in life or LWOP sentences. Perhaps it
would make sense to look for other factors, such as the
county where the case occurred (with a strong preference
for Shelby County); the race of the defendant (choosing
black for the most recent cases would be a very good
strategy); the prosecutor (because some prosecutors like
the death penalty, and others do not; and some
prosecutors cheat, while others do not); the defense
lawyers (because some know how to effectively try a
capital case, and others do not); the wealth or appearance
of the defendant (virtually all capital defendants were
indigent at the time of trial, and all defendants on death
row are indigent); the publicity surrounding the trial; the
trial judge (because some judges are more prosecution
oriented, and others are more defense oriented); the
judges who reviewed the case on appeal or in postconviction or federal habeas (because some judges are
more inclined to reverse death sentences, and others
almost always vote the other way); or the year of the
sentencing (because a defendant convicted of first degree
murder during the mid-1980’s was at least ten times
[88]
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more likely to be sentenced to death than a defendant
convicted over the most recent years).1 In guessing who
may have been executed, perhaps the age of the
defendant and his health would be relevant (because at
current rates a condemned defendant is four times more
likely to die of natural causes than to suffer the fate of
execution).
Of course, other than the egregiousness of the
crime, none of these factors should play a role in deciding
the ultimate penalty of death. Yet we know, and the
statistical evidence bears out, that these are exactly the
kinds of factors we would need to consider in making our
guesses in the lottery, if we were to have any chance
whatsoever of guessing correctly.
The intent of this article is to bring to light a
survey conducted by one of the co-authors, attorney H. E.
Miller, Jr., of Tennessee’s first degree murder cases over
the 40-year period from July 1, 1977, when Tennessee’s
current capital sentencing scheme went into effect,
through June 30, 2017. Mr. Miller conducted his survey
in order to address the issue of arbitrariness in
Tennessee’s capital sentencing system. Mr. Miller’s
report is attached as Appendix 1.
Before turning to a discussion of Mr. Miller’s
survey, we need to set the stage with the historical
context of Tennessee’s system. Accordingly, in Part II we
discuss the legal background of Tennessee’s scheme
beginning with the seminal United States Supreme
Court decision in Furman v. Georgia2 through the
enactment of Tennessee’s scheme in response to Furman.
In Parts III and IV we discuss two important
developments in Tennessee’s scheme. In Part III we
discuss the expansion of the class of death eligible
defendants resulting from two sources: (i) the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of the
“aggravating circumstances” that define the class, and
1
2

See infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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(ii) the General Assembly’s addition over the years of new
“aggravating circumstances.” In Part IV we discuss the
Tennessee Supreme Court’s evisceration of its
“comparative proportionality review” of death sentences.
In Part V, we return to our lottery analogy by comparing
two extreme cases: one resulting in the death sentence
and the other in a life sentence. Then, having set the
historical stage, in Part VI we turn to a description and
evaluation of the results of Mr. Miller’s survey. Finally,
in Part VII, we look at what others have said about our
capital sentencing system, and we state our conclusion
that Tennessee’s death penalty system is nothing more
than a capricious lottery.
II. Background
We tend to forget the reason behind Tennessee’s
current capital sentencing scheme. It stems from the
1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, where the United States
Supreme Court expressed three principles that underlie
the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence under the
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.3
The first principle is that death is different: “The
penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its
total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal
justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity.”4
Id.
Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has
reiterated this principle. The death penalty “is different in kind
from any other punishment imposed under our system of
criminal justice.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
“From the point of view of the defendant, it is different both in
its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society,
3
4
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The second principle is that the constitutionality
of a punishment is to be judged by contemporary,
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.”5
And third, viewing how the sentencing system
operates as a whole, the death penalty must not be
imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.6 Justices
Stewart and White issued the decisive opinions in
Furman that represent the Court’s holding—the common
denominator among the concurring opinions constituting
the majority.7 Justice Stewart explained it this way:
[T]he death sentences now before us are
the product of a legal system that brings
them, I believe, within the very core of the
Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against
cruel and unusual punishments, a
guarantee applicable against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the first place, it is clear that these
the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens
also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state
action.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977).
5 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plurality opinion) quoted in
Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice
Douglas further explained, “[T]he proscription of cruel and
unusual punishments ‘is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice.’” Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J.
concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
378 (1909)). The Court’s constitutional decisions should be
informed by “contemporary values concerning the infliction of
a challenged sanction.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
6 Furman, 408 U.S. at 274.
7 Justices Brennan and Marshall opined that the death penalty
is per se unconstitutional. Justice Douglas’s position on the per
se issue was unclear, but he found that the death penalty
sentencing schemes at issue were unconstitutional.
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sentences are “cruel” in the sense that they
excessively go beyond, not in degree but in
kind, the punishments that the state
legislatures have determined to be
necessary. In the second place, it is equally
clear that these sentences are “unusual” in
the sense that the penalty of death is
infrequently imposed for murder, and that
its imposition for rape is extraordinarily
rare. But I do not rest my conclusion upon
these two propositions alone.
These death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of
all the people convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random
handful upon whom the sentence of death
has in fact been imposed. My concurring
Brothers have demonstrated that, if any
basis can be discerned for the selection of
these few to be sentenced to die, it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of
race. But racial discrimination has not
been proved, and I put it to one side. I
simply conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under
legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed.8
And Justice White explained:

Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal citations
omitted).
8
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I begin with what I consider a near
truism: that the death penalty could so
seldom be imposed that it would cease to be
a credible deterrent or measurably to
contribute to any other end of punishment
in the criminal justice system. It is perhaps
true that no matter how infrequently those
convicted of rape or murder are executed,
the
penalty
so
imposed
is
not
disproportionate to the crime and those
executed may deserve exactly what they
received. It would also be clear that
executed defendants are finally and
completely incapacitated from again
committing rape or murder or any other
crime. But when imposition of the penalty
reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it
would be very doubtful that any existing
general need for retribution would be
measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said
with confidence that society’s need for
specific deterrence justifies death for so
few when for so many in like circumstances
life imprisonment or shorter prison terms
are judged sufficient, or that community
values are measurably reinforced by
authorizing a penalty so rarely invoked.
. . . [C]ommon sense and experience tell
us that seldom-enforced laws become
ineffective measures for controlling human
conduct and that the death penalty, unless
imposed with sufficient frequency, will
make little contribution to deterring those
crimes for which it may be exacted.
....
It is also my judgment that this
point has been reached with respect to
capital punishment as it is presently
[93]
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administered under the statutes involved
in these cases. . . . I cannot avoid the
conclusion that as the statutes before us
are now administered, the penalty is so
infrequently imposed that the threat of
execution is too attenuated to be of
substantial service to criminal justice.9
Since Furman and Gregg, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the judicial system must guard against
arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty, and
the qualitative difference of death from all other
punishments requires a correspondingly greater need for
reliability, consistency, and fairness in capital sentencing
decisions.10 Therefore, courts must “carefully scrutinize[]
Id. at 311–13 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (“In
capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that
factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of
reliability.”); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“[B]ecause of its severity and
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from
any other punishment, and hence must be accompanied by
unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a
given offense.”), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884–85
(1983) (“[B]ecause there is a qualitative difference between
death and any other permissible form of punishment, ‘there is
a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case.’” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 305 (1976))); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99
(1983) (“The Court . . . has recognized that the qualitative
difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital
sentencing determination.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
358 (1977) (“It is of vital importance to the defendant and to
the community that any decision to impose the death sentence
be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion.”).
9

10
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. . . capital sentencing schemes to minimize the risk that
the penalty will be imposed in error or in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. There must be a valid penological
reason for choosing from among the many criminal
defendants the few who are sentenced to death.”11
Furman makes at least three more key points
concerning a proper Eighth Amendment analysis in the
death penalty context:
(i) Courts must view how the entire sentencing
system operates—i.e., how the few are selected to be
executed from the many murderers who are not—and not
just focus on the particular case under review.12 As the
Supreme Court explained, we must “look[] to the
sentencing system as a whole (as the Court did in
Furman . . . )”;13 a constitutional violation is established
if a defendant demonstrates a “pattern of arbitrary and
capricious sentencing.”14 It is worth noting that in
Furman, Justice White’s opinion makes no reference to
the facts or circumstances of the individual cases under
review, and Justice Stewart’s opinion only refers to the
dates of the trials in the cases in a footnote.15 Their
opinions, along with the other three concurring opinions,
dealt with the operation of the death penalty system
under a discretionary sentencing scheme, and not with
the merits of the individual cases.
(ii) How the capital sentencing system, operating
as a whole, as well as evolving standards of decency, will
change over time and eventually can reach a point where

Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460 n.7.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976).
13 Id. (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 195 n.46.
15 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 n.11 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring). See generally id. at 310–14 (White, J.,
concurring). Indeed, there is virtually no reference to the facts
of the cases under review in any of the nine Furman opinions.
11
12
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the system is operating in an unconstitutional manner—
as was the case in Furman.16
(iii) An essential factor to consider in the Eighth
Amendment analysis is the infrequency with which the
death penalty is carried out.17
To analyze the Eighth Amendment issue by
viewing the sentencing system as a whole and
ascertaining the infrequency with which the death
penalty is carried out, it is necessary to look at statistics.
After all, frequency is a statistical concept. A similar need
to analyze statistics, particularly statistical trends,
applies when assessing evolving standards of decency.
And, indeed, that is exactly what the majority did
in Furman. Each of the concurring opinions in Furman
relied upon various forms of statistical evidence that
purported to demonstrate patterns of inconsistent or
otherwise arbitrary sentencing.18 Evidence of such
inconsistent results and of sentencing decisions that
could not be explained on the basis of individual
culpability indicated that the system operated arbitrarily
and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.19

Post-Furman, by virtue of our evolving standards of decency,
the Court has removed various “classes of crimes and criminals
from death penalty eligibility. Examples include those who
rape adults, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)[;] the insane,
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)[;] the intellectually
disabled, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)[;] juveniles,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)[;] and those who rape
children, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).” State v.
Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 224 n.6 (Tenn. 2013) (Koch, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (parallel citations
omitted).
17 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 290.
18 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 249–52 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 291–94 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309–10 (Stewart,
J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 364–66
(Marshall, J., concurring).
19 Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
16
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The death penalty statutes under review in
Furman, and virtually all then-existing death penalty
statutes, were “discretionary.”20 Under those sentencing
schemes, if the jury decided that the defendant was guilty
of a capital offense, then either the jury or judge would
decide whether the defendant would be sentenced to life
or death. The sentencing decision was completely
discretionary, with no narrowing of discretion or
guidance in the exercise of discretion if the defendant was
found guilty. Furman determined that under those kinds
of discretionary sentencing schemes, the death penalty
was being imposed capriciously, in the absence of
consistently applied standards, and accordingly, any
particular death sentence under such a system would be
deemed unconstitutionally arbitrary.21 This problem
arose in large measure from the infrequency of the death
penalty’s application and the irrational manner by which
so few defendants were selected for death.
In response to Furman, various states enacted
two different kinds of capital sentencing schemes, which
the Court reviewed in 1976. The two leading decisions
were Woodson v. North Carolina,22 and Gregg v.
Georgia.23
In Woodson, the Court examined a mandatory
sentencing scheme—if the defendant was found guilty of
the capital crime, a death sentence followed
automatically.24 Presumably, a mandatory scheme would
In 1838, Tennessee was the first state to convert from a
“mandatory” capital sentencing scheme to a “discretionary”
scheme, purportedly to mitigate the strict harshness of a
mandatory approach. Eventually all states with the death
penalty followed course and converted to discretionary
schemes. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 139 (2002).
21 Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
22 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
23 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286.
20
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eliminate the Furman problem of unfettered sentencing
discretion. The Court, however, found that such a
mandatory scheme violates the Eighth Amendment on
three independent grounds. Most significantly for our
purposes, the Court determined that North Carolina’s
mandatory death penalty statute
fail[ed] to provide a constitutionally
tolerable response to Furman’s rejection of
unbridled jury discretion in the imposition
of capital sentences. . . . [W]hen one
considers the long and consistent
American experience with the death
penalty in first[ ]degree murder cases, it
becomes evident that mandatory statutes
enacted in response to Furman have
simply papered over the problem of
unguided and unchecked jury discretion.25
The Court again looked at the historical record. The
mandatory statute merely shifted discretion away from
the sentencing decision to the guilty/not-guilty decision,
which historically had involved an excessive degree of
discretion—and therefore arbitrariness—in capital
cases. The Court emphasized that mandatory sentencing
schemes “do[] not fulfill Furman’s basic requirement by
replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with
objective standards to guide, regularize, and make
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence
of death.”26
In Gregg, the Court upheld a “guided discretion”
sentencing scheme.27 This type of scheme, patterned in
part after section 210.6 of the Model Penal Code,28 was
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
27 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
28 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
25
26
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designed to address Furman’s concern with arbitrariness
by: (i) bifurcating capital trials in order to treat the
sentencing decision separately from the guilty/not-guilty
decision;29 (ii) narrowing the class of death-eligible
defendants by requiring the prosecution to prove
aggravating circumstances, thereby narrowing the range
of discretion that could be exercised;30 (iii) allowing the
defendant to present mitigating evidence to ensure that
the sentencing decision is individualized, which is
another constitutional requirement;31 (iv) guiding the
jury’s exercise of discretion within that narrowed range
by instructing the jury on the proper consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances;32 and (v)
ensuring adequate judicial review of the sentencing
decision as a check against possible arbitrary and
capricious decisions.33 The Court explained the
fundamental principle of Furman, that “where discretion
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken
or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.”34
When Gregg was decided, states had no prior
experience with “guided discretion” capital sentencing.
Whether such a scheme would “fulfill Furman’s basic
requirement”35
of
removing
arbitrariness
and
capriciousness from the system, and whether it would
comply with our evolving standards of decency, could
only be determined over time. Essentially, Gregg’s
discretionary sentencing statute was an experiment,
never previously attempted or tested.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191.
Id. at 196–97.
31 Id. at 206.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 174–175.
34 Id. at 189.
35 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
29
30
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In 1977, Tennessee responded to Furman,
Woodson, and Gregg by enacting its version of a guided
discretion capital sentencing scheme.36 Tennessee’s
scheme was closely patterned after the Georgia scheme
upheld in Gregg and included the same elements
itemized above. While the Tennessee General Assembly
subsequently amended Tennessee’s statute a number of
times, its basic structure remains.37 As was the case in
Georgia, under Tennessee’s scheme, a death sentence can
be imposed only in a case of “aggravated” first degree
murder upon a “balancing” of statutorily defined
aggravating circumstances38 proven by the prosecution
and any mitigating circumstances presented by the
defense.39 The Tennessee Supreme Court is statutorily
See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-204, -206 (2014).
In 1993, the General Assembly provided for life without
parole as an alternative sentence for first degree murder.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f) (2014). In 1995, as part of the
“truth-in-sentencing” movement the General Assembly
amended the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-501 pertaining to release eligibility, which has been
interpreted to require a defendant sentenced to life for murder
to serve a minimum of 51 years before release eligibility. Id. §
40-35-501 (Supp. 2017); see Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106
(Tenn. 2006). In 1999, the General Assembly adopted lethal
injection as the preferred method of execution and
subsequently, in 2014, allowed for electrocution as a fallback
method if lethal injection drugs are not available. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-23-114 (Supp. 2017). Additionally, over the years the
General Assembly has broadened the class of death-eligible
defendants by adding and changing the definition of certain
aggravating circumstances. See discussion infra Part III.
38 Aggravating circumstances are defined in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-13-204(i) (2014).
39 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g) (2014). To impose a
death sentence, the jury must unanimously find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance(s)
outweigh any mitigating circumstances; if a single juror votes
for life or life without parole, then the death sentence cannot
be imposed. Id.
36
37
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required to review each death sentence to “determine
whether: (A) [t]he sentence of death was imposed in any
arbitrary fashion; (B) [t]he evidence supports the jury’s
finding of statutory aggravating circumstance or
circumstances; (C) [t]he evidence supports the jury’s
finding that the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances;
and (D) [t]he sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the nature of the crime and the
defendant.”40 The Court’s consideration of whether a
death sentence is “excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases” is referred to as
“comparative proportionality review.”41
III. Aggravators and the Expanded Class of
Death-Eligible Defendants
The thesis of this article is that Tennessee’s
capital punishment system operates as a capricious
lottery. To put into proper context the lottery metaphor
and recent trends in Tennessee’s capital sentencing, it is
important to understand how the Tennessee General
Assembly and the Tennessee Supreme Court have
gradually expanded the class of death-eligible
defendants. The expansion of this class has
correspondingly broadened the range of discretion for
prosecutors in deciding whether to seek death and for
juries in making capital sentencing decisions at trial.
This in turn has increased the potential for
arbitrariness.42
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1) (2014).
See State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 232 (Tenn. 2005).
42 This phenomenon—the expansion over time of the class of
death-eligible defendants—has occurred in a number of states
and is sometimes referred to as “aggravator creep.” See Edwin
Colfax, Fairness in the Application of the Death Penalty, 80 IND.
L.J. 35, 35 (2005).
40
41
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A fundamental feature of the capital sentencing
scheme approved in Gregg and adopted by Tennessee is
the narrowing of the class of first degree murder
defendants who are eligible for the death penalty by
requiring proof of the existence of one or more statutorily
defined “aggravating circumstances” that characterize
the crime and/or the defendant.43 As the Court in Gregg
explained, “Furman mandates that where discretion is
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken
or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.”44 A central part of the majority opinion
in Gregg specifically addressed whether the statutory
aggravating circumstances in that case effectively
limited the range of discretion in the capital sentencing
decision.45 The Court has repeatedly stressed that a
state’s “capital sentencing scheme must ‘genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others
found guilty of murder.’”46
In addition to defining the class of death-eligible
defendants, aggravating circumstances also provide the
prosecution with a means of persuading the jury to
impose a death sentence. At sentencing, the jury is called
upon to “weigh” the aggravating circumstances against
the mitigating circumstances, and if the jury finds that
the aggravators outweigh the mitigators, then the
sentence “shall be death.”47 The more aggravators the
prosecution can prove, the more likely the jury will give
See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1).
44 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
45 Id. at 200–04.
46 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
47 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (2014).
43
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greater weight to the aggravators and return a death
verdict. Moreover, along with expanding the number and
definitional range of aggravators, the court and the
legislature have also expanded the range of evidence that
the prosecution can present to the jury at the sentencing
hearing which also enhances the prosecution’s case for
death.48
The Tennessee statute enacted in 1977 defined
eleven aggravating circumstances that set the boundary
around the class of death-eligible defendants.49 Over the

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) allows the
prosecution to introduce, among other things, evidence relating
to “the nature and circumstances of the crime” or “the
defendant’s character and background.” The Court has broadly
interpreted this provision by holding that this kind of evidence
“is admissible regardless of its relevance to any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance.” State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn.
2001). The legislature also amended section 39-13-204(c) to
allow introduction of evidence relating to a defendant’s prior
violent felony conviction, which is discussed below in
connection with the (i)(2) aggravator. Additionally, following
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the legislature
amended section 39-13-204(c) to permit victim impact
testimony in the sentencing hearing. See State v. Nesbit, 978
S.W.2d 872, 887–94 (Tenn. 1998).
48

The original version of the sentencing statute, Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-2404(i) (1977), defined the eleven
aggravating circumstances:
(1) The murder was committed against a
person less than twelve years of age and the
defendant was eighteen years of age, or older.
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of
one or more felonies, other than the present
charge, which involved the use or threat of
violence to the person.
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to two or more persons, other than
the victim murdered, during his act of murder.
49
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(4) The defendant committed the murder for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration,
or employed another to commit the murder for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration.
(5) The murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or
depravity of mind.
(6) The murder was committed for the purpose
of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a
lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or
another.
(7) The murder was committed while the
defendant was engaged in committing, or was
an accomplice in the commission of, or was
attempting to commit, or was fleeing after
committing or attempting to commit, any first
degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or
unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(8) The murder was committed by the
defendant while he was in lawful custody or in
a place of lawful confinement or during his
escape from lawful custody or from a place of
lawful confinement.
(9) The murder was committed against any
peace officer, corrections official, corrections
employee or fireman, who was engaged in the
performance of his duties, and the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that
such victim was a peace officer, corrections
official, corrections employee or fireman,
engaged in the performance of his duties.
(10) The murder was committed against any
present or former judge, district attorney
general or state attorney general, assistant
district attorney general or assistant state
attorney general due to or because of the
exercise of his official duty or status and the
defendant knew that the victim occupied said
office.
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years, the Tennessee General Assembly has added six
aggravators to the original list, bringing the total number
to 17, and it has amended other aggravators to further
expand the class of death-eligible defendants.50
(11) The murder was committed against a
national, state, or local popularly elected
official, due to or because of the official's lawful
duties or status, and the defendant knew that
the victim was such an official.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2404(i) (enacted 1977) reprinted in
Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267, 274 n.1 (Tenn. 1980).
50 Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(1)–(17)
(2014) now defines the aggravators as follows (emphasis added
for substantive changes from 1977 statute):
(1) The murder was committed against a
person less than twelve (12) years of age and
the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or
older;
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of
one (1) or more felonies, other than the present
charge, whose statutory elements involve the
use
of
violence
to
the
person;
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other
than the victim murdered, during the act of
murder;
(4) The defendant committed the murder for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration,
or employed another to commit the murder for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration;
(5) The murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or
serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to
produce death;
(6) The murder was committed for the purpose
of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a
lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or
another;
(7) The murder was knowingly committed,
solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant,
while the defendant had a substantial role in
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committing or attempting to commit, or was
fleeing after having a substantial role in
committing or attempting to commit, any first
degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse,
aggravated child neglect, rape of a child,
aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or
unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb;
(8) The murder was committed by the
defendant while the defendant was in lawful
custody or in a place of lawful confinement or
during the defendant’s escape from lawful
custody or from a place of lawful confinement;
(9) The murder was committed against any law
enforcement
officer,
corrections official,
corrections employee, probation and parole
officer, emergency medical or rescue worker,
emergency medical technician, paramedic or
firefighter, who was engaged in the
performance of official duties, and the
defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the victim was a law enforcement
officer,
corrections
official,
corrections
employee, probation and parole officer,
emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency
medical technician, paramedic or firefighter
engaged in the performance of official duties;
(10) The murder was committed against any
present or former judge, district attorney
general or state attorney general, assistant
district attorney general or assistant state
attorney general, due to or because of the
exercise of the victim's official duty or status
and the defendant knew that the victim
occupied such office;
(11) The murder was committed against a
national, state, or local popularly elected
official, due to or because of the official's lawful
duties or status, and the defendant knew that
the victim was such an official;
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While the Tennessee legislature’s expansion of
aggravators is significant, it is perhaps more significant
that the Tennessee Supreme Court has interpreted a
number of the most frequently used aggravators in a
broad fashion. The important interpretations are as
follows:
A. (i)(2) Aggravator—Prior Violent Felony
Conviction
In a large number of murder cases, the defendant
was previously convicted of a violent felony, and
prosecutors frequently use the prior violent felony
conviction as an aggravator in seeking death sentences.51

(12) The defendant committed “mass murder,”
which is defined as the murder of three (3) or
more persons, whether committed during a
single criminal episode or at different times
within a forty-eight-month period;
(13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the
body of the victim after death;
(14) The victim of the murder was seventy (70)
years of age or older; or the victim of the murder
was particularly vulnerable due to a significant
disability, whether mental or physical, and at
the time of the murder the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known of such
disability;
(15) The murder was committed in the course of
an act of terrorism;
(16) The murder was committed against a
pregnant
woman,
and
the
defendant
intentionally killed the victim, knowing that
she was pregnant; or
(17) The murder was committed at random and
the reasons for the killing are not obvious or
easily understood.
51 See, e.g., State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 51–52 (Tenn. 2017);
State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d 486, 521–22 (Tenn. 2015); State v.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court has broadened the
application of this aggravator in a number of ways.
First, notwithstanding the plain language of the
statute as amended, which requires that the “statutory
elements” of the prior conviction involve the use of
violence to the person, it is not necessary for the statutory
elements of the prior crime to explicitly involve the use of
violence.52 Instead, according to the court, in cases
involving a prior crime which statutorily may or may not
involve the use of violence, it is only necessary for the
prosecution to prove to the judge (not the jury), based
upon the record of the prior conviction, that as a factual
matter the prior crime actually did involve the
defendant’s use of violence to another person.53
Thus, for example, in State v. Cole54 the defendant
had been convicted of robbery and other crimes for which
“the statutory elements of each of [the crimes] may or
may not involve the use of violence, depending upon the
facts
underlying the conviction.”55 The Tennessee
Supreme Court sustained the use of the prior violent
felony aggravator upon the trial judge’s determination
that the evidence underlying the prior convictions
Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 817–18 (Tenn. 2014); State v. Odom,
336 SW.3d 541, 570 (Tenn. 2011).
52 State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 151 (Tenn. 2006).
53 Id. (holding that the prior conviction may be used as an
aggravator if the element of “violence to the person” was set
forth in “the statutory definition, charging document, written
plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, [or] any explicit
factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant
assented” (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16
(2005))); see also State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 11–12 (Tenn. 2001)
(“In determining whether the statutory elements of a prior
felony conviction involve the use of violence against the person
for purposes of § 39-13-204(i)(2), we hold that the trial judge
must necessarily examine the facts underlying the prior felony
. . . .”).
54 155 S.W.3d 885 (Tenn. 2005).
55 Id. at 900.
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established that in fact the crimes involved the
defendant’s use of violence.56
Second, the court has held that the “prior
conviction” need not relate to a crime that occurred before
the alleged capital murder; it is only necessary that the
defendant be “convicted” of that crime before his capital
murder trial.57 The “prior convicted” crime may have
occurred after the murder for which the prosecution
seeks the death penalty. It is not unusual for the
prosecution to obtain a conviction for a more recent crime
in order to create an aggravator for use in the capital trial
on a prior murder.58
Third, a prior conviction of a violent felony that
occurred when the defendant was a juvenile, if he was
tried as an adult, can qualify as an aggravator to support
a death sentence for a murder that occurred later when
the defendant was an adult59 even though juvenile
offenders are not eligible for the death penalty.60
Additionally, in 1998 the legislature expanded the
range of permissible evidence the prosecution can
introduce relating to a prior violent felony conviction.61
The 1998 amendment permits introduction of evidence
“concerning the facts and circumstances of the prior
Id. at 899–905. Arguably the procedure by which the trial
judge made the finding of violence to the person was modified
by the court in State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006).
57 See State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 357 (Tenn. 1997) (“[S]o
long as a defendant is convicted of a violent felony prior to the
sentencing hearing at which the previous conviction is
introduced, this aggravating circumstance is applicable.”).
58 See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 736 (Tenn. 1994)
(affirming the use of a prior violent felony aggravator even
where the prosecutor admitted that the defendant’s multiple
trials had been ordered in such a way as to create an additional
aggravating circumstance).
59 State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 616–18 (Tenn. 2004).
60 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
61 1998 Tenn. Pub. Acts 915 (codified as amended at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c) (2014)).
56
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conviction” to “be used by the jury in determining the
weight to be accorded the aggravating factor.”62 The
amendment gives the prosecution extremely broad
license to use such evidence because “[s]uch evidence
shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury
and shall not be subject to exclusion on the ground that
the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by
prejudice to either party.”63
B. (i)(5) Aggravator—Heinous, Atrocious, or
Cruel
A murder defendant is eligible for the death
penalty if “[t]he murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious
physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce
death”64—often referred to as the “HAC aggravator.” Any
murder, by definition, is a heinous crime that can evoke
in a normal juror a strong, visceral negative reaction. In
most premeditated murder cases the prosecution can
allege the HAC aggravator. But under Furman and
Gregg, most murder cases should not be eligible for
capital punishment. The challenge is to create a
meaningful, rational, and consistently applied distinction
between first degree murder cases in general, all of which
are “heinous” in some sense of the term, and the
supposedly few murders that are “especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel” justifying a death sentence, in order
for this aggravator to serve the function of meaningfully
narrowing the class of death eligible defendants.
What constitutes an “especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel” murder is ultimately a subjective determination
without clearly delineated criteria. In the early period
following Furman, the United States Supreme Court
Id.
Id.
64 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c)(i)(5) (2014).
62
63
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struck down similar kinds of aggravators as
unconstitutionally vague.65 The Tennessee Supreme
Court responded to those cases by applying a “narrowing
construction” of the statutory language, stipulating that
the HAC aggravator is “directed at ‘the conscienceless or
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.”66 In Cone v. Bell, a Sixth Circuit panel declared
Tennessee’s HAC aggravator to be unconstitutionally
vague.67 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Sixth
Circuit and upheld Tennessee’s version based upon the
narrowing construction.68 Although the Supreme Court
upheld Tennessee’s HAC aggravator, it was a close call,
and the criteria for its application remains subjective.
Even with its narrowing construction in response
to early U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Tennessee
Supreme Court manages to give the HAC aggravator a
very broad definition. The court’s fullest description of
this aggravator can be found in State v. Keen, where the
court explained:
The
atrocious[,]

or

“especially
cruel”

heinous,
aggravating

See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)
(invalidating Oklahoma’s “especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel” aggravator); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)
(invalidating Georgia’s “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman” aggravator).
66 State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn. 1981) (quoting State
v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973); accord State v. Melson,
638 S.W.2d 342, 367 (Tenn. 1982). The Tennessee Supreme
Court’s narrowing construction included language purportedly
defining the term “torturous.” The Tennessee legislature
followed suit by amending the language of the HAC aggravator
to provide that it must involve “torture or serious physical
abuse beyond that necessary to produce death.” TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204(c)(i)(5) (2014).
67 Cone v. Bell, 359 F.3d 785, 794–97 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d per
curiam, 543 U.S. 447 (2005).
68 Bell, 543 U.S. 447, 459–60.
65
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circumstance “may be proved under either
of two prongs: torture or serious physical
abuse.” This [c]ourt has defined “torture”
as the “infliction of severe physical or
mental pain upon the victim while he or
she remains alive and conscious.” The
phrase “serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death,” on the other
hand, is “self-explanatory; the abuse must
be physical rather than mental in nature.”
The “word ‘serious’ alludes to a matter of
degree,” and the term “abuse” is defined as
“an act that is ‘excessive’ or which makes
‘improper use of a thing,’ or which uses a
thing ‘in a manner contrary to the natural
or legal rules for its use.’”
Our case law is clear that “[t]he
anticipation of physical harm to oneself is
torturous” so as to establish this
aggravating circumstance. Our case law is
also clear that the physical and mental
pain suffered by the victim of
strangulation may constitute torture
within the meaning of the statute.69
The court has also held that although the HAC
aggravator now contains two prongs—“torture” or
“serious physical abuse”—jurors “do not have to agree on
which prong makes the murder ‘especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.’”70
The case of State v. Rollins71 illustrates the broad
scope of the court’s definition of the HAC aggravator. The
defendant was found guilty of stabbing the victim
State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 206–07 (Tenn. 2000) (citations
omitted).
70 State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 219–20 (Tenn. 2016)
(citing Keen, 31 S.W.3d at 208–09).
71 State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d 553, 572 (Tenn. 2006).
69
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multiple times.72 In the guilt phase, the medical
examiner testified to the cause of death, describing in
detail the multiple stab wounds.73 In the sentencing
hearing, the medical examiner testified again, largely
repeating his evocative guilt-phase testimony and
further describing some of the stab wounds as
“defensive,” meaning that the victim was conscious and
experienced physical and mental suffering during the
assault.74 According to the court, this evidence was
sufficient to establish the HAC aggravator.75 It follows
that in any murder case in which the victim was aware
of what was happening and/or suffered physical pain
during the assault, it may be possible to find the
existence of the HAC aggravator. Certainly, the
prosecution can allege it in a wide range of cases. With
the court’s nebulous definition, it is difficult to see how
the HAC aggravator meaningfully narrows the class of
death eligible defendants.
C. (i)(6) Aggravator—Avoiding Arrest or
Prosecution
The (i)(6) aggravator applies when “[t]he murder
was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the
defendant or another.”76 This aggravator can be alleged
in any case in which the murder occurred during the
commission of another crime, because in any such case
the prosecution can argue that a motivating factor in the
murder was to eliminate the victim as a witness. As with
other aggravators, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
broadly defined this aggravator.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 572.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c)(i)(6) (2014).
72
73
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Although this aggravator addresses the
defendant’s motivation, not much is required to prove it.
While “[t]he defendant’s desire to avoid arrest or
prosecution must motivate the defendant to kill, [] it does
not have to be the only motivation. Nor does it have to be
the dominant motivation. The aggravating circumstance
is not limited to the killings of eyewitnesses or those
witnesses who know or can identify the defendant.”77
As one scholar has explained, “When applied
broadly to any victim who could have possibly identified
the defendant, this aggravating circumstance applies to
almost all murders, in violation of the narrowing
principle.”78
D. (i)(7) Aggravator—Felony Murder
Many murders are committed during the
commission of another crime, and a “felony murder” can
be prosecuted as first degree murder even if the
defendant was not the assailant and lacked any intent to
kill.79 Also, a defendant who caused the victim’s death
during the commission of another felony can be guilty of
felony murder even if the defendant neither
premeditated nor intended the victim’s death.80 If the
defendant is guilty of felony murder, then the prosecution
can allege and potentially prove the (i)(7) aggravator. 81
PENNY J. WHITE, TENNESSEE CAPITAL CASE HANDBOOK,
15.40 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (citing State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d
132, 144 (Tenn. 2006); Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 162
(Tenn. 2001); State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 133 (Tenn. 1998);
State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 529 (Tenn. 1997) (Birch, C. J.,
dissenting); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tenn. 1992)).
78 Id. at 15.41.
79 See generally TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a) (2014) (listing
the elements of first degree premeditated murder and first
degree felony murder).
80 State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 205 (Tenn. 2013).
81 The other felonies that support this aggravator are “first
degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft,
77
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In the felony murder case of State v.
Middlebrooks, the court invalidated the earlier version of
this aggravator, because there was no distinction
between the elements of the crime of felony murder and
the felony murder aggravator.82 The Court held that in
such a case, the felony murder aggravator was
unconstitutional because, by merely duplicating the
elements of the underlying felony murder, it did not
sufficiently narrow the class of death eligible
defendants.83
The legislature responded by amending the
statute in 1995 to add two elements to the felony murder
aggravator: that the murder was “knowingly” committed,
solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant; and that the
defendant had a “substantial role” in the underlying
felony while the murder was committed.84 In State v.
Banks, the court upheld the amended felony murder
aggravator because its elements did not merely duplicate
the elements of felony murder, and therefore, according
to the court, the aggravator satisfied the constitutional
requirement to narrow the class of death eligible
defendants.85
Although the legislature amended the (i)(7) felony
murder aggravator in response to the Middlebrooks
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or
discharging of a destructive device or bomb” TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-204(i)(7) (2011).
82 State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 341 (Tenn. 1992),
superseded by statute, 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 377 (codified as
amended at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(7) (2011)).
83 Id. at 323.
84 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(7) (2014).
85 State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 152 (Tenn. 2008); see also
State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 501 (Tenn. 2004)
(upholding felony murder aggravator when the defendant did
not kill the victim); Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tenn.
1997) (upholding the aggravator when defendant was charged
with both premeditated and felony murder relating to the same
murder).
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problem, it is not clear how this amendment created a
practical difference in the statutory definition. The
“knowing” and “substantial role” elements in the
amended statute are relatively easy to prove and
potentially could apply to virtually every felony murder,
and these elements do not effectively perform a
narrowing function.86
*

*

*

*

Because the court and legislature have expanded
the number and meaning of aggravating circumstances
that could support a death sentence, we submit that a
large majority of first degree murder cases are now
death-eligible. It is hard to imagine a case in which the
prosecution could not allege and potentially prove the
existence of an aggravator. With this development, it is
especially significant that, as discussed in Part VI below,
Tennessee has experienced a sharp decline in sustained
death sentences over the past ten to twenty years,
notwithstanding the availability of death as a sentencing
option in a larger number of first degree murder cases.
This not only implicates the problem of arbitrariness, it
also strongly indicates that Tennessee’s evolving
standard of decency is moving away from the death
penalty.
IV. Comparative Proportionality Review and
Rule 12
Another important development in Tennessee’s
death penalty jurisprudence has been the evisceration of
any kind of meaningful “comparative proportionality
See, e.g., State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 205 (Tenn. 2013)
(upholding felony murder aggravator when, although
defendant caused victim’s death during a carjacking, there was
no proof that he intended the death or knew that death would
ensue).
86
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review”87 of death sentences by the Tennessee Supreme
Court.
As noted above, in an effort to protect against the
“arbitrary and capricious” imposition of the death
penalty, and following Georgia’s lead, the Tennessee
scheme requires the Tennessee Supreme Court to
conduct a “comparative proportionality review” in every
capital case.88 Section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) of the
Tennessee Code Annotated provides that the court shall
determine whether “the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the nature of the crime and the
defendant.”89 According to the court, the statute’s
purpose is to ensure “rationality and consistency in the
imposition of the death penalty.”90 Justice Aldolpho A.
Birch, Jr., explained:
The principle underlying comparative
proportionality review is that it is unjust to
impose a death sentence upon one
defendant
when
other
defendants,
convicted of similar crimes with similar
facts,
receive
sentences
of
life
imprisonment (with or without parole). . . .
Thus, proportionality review serves a
crucial role as an “additional safeguard
against
arbitrary
or
capricious
sentencing.”91

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2014).
Id.
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 665–66 (Tenn.
1988).
91 State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 793 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State v.
Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn. 1997)).
87
88
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This follows from the principle that a state’s “capital
sentencing scheme ‘. . . must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder.’”92
To facilitate comparative proportionality review, the
Court promulgated Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12
(formerly Rule 47) in 1978, requiring that “in all cases . . .
in which the defendant is convicted of first[ ]degree
murder,” the trial judge shall complete and file so-called
Rule 12 reports to include information about each of the
cases.93 Rule 12 was intended to create a database of first
degree murder cases for use in comparative proportionality
review in capital cases. In State v. Adkins, the court stated
that “our proportionality review of death penalty cases . . .
has been predicated largely on those reports and has never
been limited to the cases that have come before us on
appeal.”94 On January 1, 1999, the court issued a press
release announcing the use of CD-ROMs to store copies of
Rule 12 forms, in which then-Chief Justice Riley Anderson
was quoted as saying, “The court’s primary interest in the
database is for comparative proportionality review in
[capital] cases, which is required by court rule and state
law[.] . . . The [Tennessee] Supreme Court reviews the data
to ensure rationality and consistency in the imposition of
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)) (emphasis added).
93 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 12. As of November 27, 2017, the Rule 12
report included 76 detailed questions plus sub-questions
divided into six parts, as follows: A. Data Concerning the Trial
of the Offense (12 questions); B. Data Concerning the
Defendant (18 questions); C. Data Concerning Victim, CoDefendants, and Accomplices (15 questions); D. Representation
of the Defendant (13 questions); E. General Considerations (8
questions); and F. Chronology of Case (10 questions).
Additionally, the prosecutor and the defense attorney are given
the opportunity to submit comments to be appended to the
report. Id.
94 State v. Adkins, 725 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tenn. 1987) (emphasis
added).
92
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the death penalty and to identify aberrant sentences during
the appeal process.”95
The collection of Rule 12 data for comparative
proportionality review was based on the idea, derived from
Furman, that capital cases must be distinguishable in a
meaningful way from non-capital first degree murder cases.
If there is no meaningful and reliable way to distinguish
between capital and non-capital first degree murder cases,
then the capital punishment system operates arbitrarily,
contrary to constitutional principles and modern notions of
human decency.
Under this concept of arbitrariness, Rule 12 data
collection can make sense. By gathering and analyzing this
kind of data, we can begin to see statistically whether our
judicial system is consistently and reliably applying
appropriate criteria or standards for selecting only the
“worst of the bad” defendants for capital punishment,96 or
whether there are other inappropriate criteria (such as race,
poverty, geographic location, prosecutorial whim, or other
factors) that play an untoward influence in capital
sentencing decisions.
Unfortunately, the history of the court’s
comparative proportionality review, and of Rule 12, has
been problematic.97 Rule 12 data has rarely, if ever,
Press Release, Tenn. Admin. Office of the Courts, Court
Provides High-Tech Tool for Legal Research in Murder Cases
(Jan. 1, 1999), http://tncourts.gov/press/1999/01/01/courtprovides-high-tech-tool-legal-research-murder-cases
[https://perma.cc/WQH4-KY65].
96 Members of the Tennessee Supreme Court have used the
term “worst of the bad” in reference to the proposition that the
death penalty should be reserved only for the very worst cases.
See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 739 (Tenn. 1994);
State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 265 (Tenn. 1993) (Reid, C.J.,
concurring); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 350 (Tenn.
1992) (Drowota, J., concurring and dissenting).
97 In only one case has the Tennessee Supreme Court set aside
a death sentence based on comparative proportionality review.
See State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 793 (Tenn. 2001).
95
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entered into the court’s comparative proportionality
analysis. There was no effort by the court or any other
public agency to organize or quantify Rule 12 data in any
comprehensive way. All we have now are CD-ROMs with
copies of more than a thousand Rule 12 reports that have
been filed, with no indices, summaries, or sorting of
information. There exist no reported Tennessee appellate
court opinions that cite or use any statistical data
compiled from the Rule 12 reports. And perhaps most
significantly, in close to one-half of first degree murder
cases, trial judges have failed to file Rule 12 reports,
leaving a huge gap in the data.98
In the 1990s, Tennessee Supreme Court Justices
Lyle Reid99 and Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.100 began dissenting
from the court’s decisions affirming death sentences
because of what they perceived to be inadequate
comparative proportionality review. Justice Reid
criticized the majority for conducting comparative
proportionality review “absen[t] a structured review
process.”101
Then in 1997, the court decided State v. Bland,
which dramatically changed the court’s purported
methodology
for
conducting
a
comparative

See discussion infra Part VI; see also infra Appendix 1.
Justice Reid retired from the bench in 1998. Press Release,
Tenn. Admin. Office of the Courts, Retired Chief Justice Reid’s
Portrait Unveiled at Jackson Supreme Court Building (Sept.
22,
2014),
http://www.tncourts.gov/news/2014/09/22/
retired-chief-justice-reids-portrait-unveiled-jackson-supremecourt-building [https://perma.cc/BJV4-UFFL].
100 Justice Birch retired from the bench in 2006. Press Release,
Tenn. Admin. Office of the Courts, Justice Adolpho A. Birch,
Jr., to Retire After 43 Years of Judicial Service (Jan. 26, 2006),
http://www.tncourts.gov/press/2006/01/26/justice-adolphobirch-jr-retire-after-43-years-judicial-service
[https://perma.cc/45RS-XA7R].
101 State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 363 (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J.,
dissenting).
98
99
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proportionality review.102 Among other things, the court
narrowed the pool of cases to be compared in the analysis.
Under Bland, the court now compares the capital case
under review only with other capital cases it has
previously reviewed, and not with the broader pool of all
first degree murder cases, including those that resulted
in sentences of life or life without parole.103 Justices Reid
and Birch dissented in Bland. Justice Reid repeated his
earlier complaints that the court’s comparative
proportionality
review
analysis
lacks
proper
standards.104 Justice Birch agreed with Justice Reid and
further dissented from the court’s decision to narrow the
pool of cases to be considered.105 Thereafter, Justice Birch
repeatedly dissented from the court’s decisions affirming
death sentences, on the ground that the court’s
comparative proportionality analysis was essentially
meaningless.106 Justice Birch stated: “I believe that the
three basic problems with the current proportionality
analysis are that: (1) the proportionality test is

State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 665 (Tenn. 1997).
Id.
104 Id. at 674–79 (Reid, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 679 (Birch, J., dissenting). Because of the meaningless
of the court’s comparative proportionality analysis, Justice
Birch consistently dissented when the court affirmed death
sentences. See, e.g., State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, 69 (Tenn.
2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting) (“I have repeatedly
expressed my displeasure with the current protocol since the
time of its adoption in State v. Bland. As previously discussed,
I believe that the three basic problems with the current
proportionality analysis are that: (1) the proportionality test is
overbroad, (2) the pool of cases used for comparison is
inadequate, and (3) review is too subjective. In my view, these
flaws undermine the reliability of the current proportionality
protocol.”) (citations omitted).
106 See State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 632–33 (Tenn. 2004)
(Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). In this case, Justice
Birch presented a list of such cases.
102
103
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overbroad, (2) the pool of cases used for comparison is
inadequate, and (3) review is too subjective.”107
In the 2014 decision of State v. Pruitt, Justices
William C. Koch, Jr.,108 and Sharon G. Lee dissented from
the court’s comparative proportionality methodology.109
Justice Koch pointed out the problems with Bland as
follows:
[T]he Bland majority then changed the
proportionality analysis in a way that
deviates not only from the language of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) but
also from the relevant decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. Three
prominent features of the State v. Bland
analysis illustrate the difficulties with this
change in approach.
First, the [c]ourt narrowed the pool of
cases to be considered in a proportionality
analysis. Rather than considering all cases
that resulted in a conviction for first[
]degree murder (as the [c]ourt had done
from 1977 to 1997), the [c]ourt limited the
pool to “only those cases in which a capital
sentencing hearing was actually conducted
. . . regardless of the sentence actually
imposed.” By narrowly construing “similar
cases” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13Id. at 633.
Justice Koch retired from the bench in July 2014. Press
Release, Tenn. Admin. Office of the Courts, Supreme Court
Justice Koch Announces Retirement to Become Dean at
Nashville
School
of
Law
(Dec.
19,
2013),
https://www.tncourts.gov/news/2013/12/19/supreme-courtjustice-koch-announces-retirement-become-dean-nashvilleschool-law [https://perma.cc/GQM5-7ZDN].
109 State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 223 (Tenn. 2013) (Koch, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
107
108
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206(c)(1)(D),
the
[c]ourt
limited
proportionality review to only a small
subset of Tennessee’s murder cases—the
small minority of cases in which a
prosecutor actually sought the death
penalty.
The second limiting feature of the
State v. Bland proportionality analysis is
found in the [c]ourt’s change in the
standard of review. The majority opinion
held that a death sentence could be found
disproportionate only when “the case,
taken as a whole, is plainly lacking in
circumstances consistent with those in
similar cases in which the death penalty
has been imposed.” This change prevents
the reviewing courts from determining
whether the case under review exhibits the
same level of shocking despicability that
characterizes the bulk of our death penalty
cases or, instead, whether it more closely
resembles cases that resulted in lesser
sentences.
The third limiting feature of the
State v. Bland analysis is the seeming
conflation of the consideration of the
circumstances in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13206(c)(1)(B) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13206(c)(1)(C) with the circumstance in
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D).
When reviewing a sentence of death for
first[ ]degree murder, the courts must
separately address whether “[t]he evidence
supports the jury’s finding of statutory
aggravating
circumstance
or
circumstances;” whether “[t]he evidence
supports the jury’s finding that the
aggravating
circumstance
or
[123]
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circumstances outweigh any mitigating
circumstances;” and whether “[t]he
sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the nature
of the crime and the defendant.”
As applied since 1997, State v.
Bland has tipped the scales in favor of
focusing on the evidentiary support for the
aggravating circumstances found by the
jury and on whether these circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
Instead of independently addressing the
evidence regarding “the nature of the
crime and the defendant,” Bland’s analysis
has prompted reviewing courts to uphold a
death sentence as long as the evidence
substantiates
the
aggravating
circumstance or circumstances found by
the jury, as well as the jury’s decision that
the
aggravating
circumstance
or
circumstances outweigh any mitigating
circumstances.110
In an earlier case, Justice Birch pointedly
summarized the problem with the court’s comparative
proportionality jurisprudence: “Because our current
comparative proportionality review system lacks
objective
standards,
comparative
proportionality
analysis seems to be little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ to
affirm whatever decision the jury reaches at the trial
level.”111
V. Simplifying the Lottery: A Tale of Two Cases

Id. at 227–28 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 924 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110
111
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As the legislature and the court have expanded
the opportunity for arbitrariness by expanding the class
of death eligible defendants, and as the court has
removed a check against arbitrariness by declining to
conduct meaningful comparative proportionality review,
it is time to ask how Tennessee’s capital punishment
system operates in fact. Returning to the lottery scenario,
let us simplify the problem by considering just two cases
and asking two questions: (i) which of the two cases is
more deserving of capital punishment? and, (ii) which of
the two cases actually resulted in a death sentence?112
A. Case #1
The two defendants were both convicted of six
counts of first degree premeditated murder. They shot a
man and a woman in the head. They strangled two
women to death, one of whom was pregnant, thus also
killing her unborn child. They also “stomped” a 16-month
old child to death.
Both of the defendants had previously served time
in jail or prison. When one of the defendants was released
from prison, the two of them got together and dealt drugs
including marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, and pills.
Their drug business was successful, progressing from
selling to “crack heads” and addicts to selling to other
dealers. One of the defendants, the apparent leader of the
two, was described as intelligent.

The description of Case #1 is a summary of the facts
described during the direct appeal, State v. Moss, No. M201400746-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016) perm app. denied, 2017 Tenn.
LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017), and the denial of postconviction relief, Burrell v. State, No. M2015-02115-CCA-R3PC, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 176 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar.
9, 2017). The description of Case #2 is a summary of the facts
described in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180 (Tenn. 2013)
112
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The defendants planned to rob WC, a male who
also dealt drugs. On the night of the crime, WC and AM,
a female, went to WC’s mother’s house. The defendants
were together in Huntsville, Alabama, and one of them
telephoned WC. After receiving the call, WC and AM left
WC’s mother’s house and went to pick up the defendants.
The four of them left Huntsville with one of the
defendants driving the car. WC was sitting in the front
passenger seat. The other defendant was sitting behind
WC, and AM was sitting behind the driver. They drove to
a house where the defendants kept their drugs. When the
car pulled into the garage, the defendant in the back seat
shot WC in the back of the head three times. The killer
then shot AM in the head. The defendants pulled AM out
of the back seat, dragged her into the utility room and put
a piece of plywood over the doorway to conceal her body.
The defendants then went inside the house and
found CC, a pregnant woman. They bound her hands
behind her back and dunked her head in a bathtub to
force her to reveal where WC kept his drugs and money.
When CC was unwilling or unable to tell them, they
strangled her to death. When the defendants killed CC,
they also killed her unborn child. After killing CC and her
unborn child, they stomped to death the sixteen-monthold child who was also in the house.
The defendants then drove to another house
where WC kept drugs. WC’s body was still in the car.
They found JB, a woman who was inside the house, and
strangled her to death in the same manner that they had
killed CC. After killing JB, the defendants ransacked the
house, looking for money and drugs. They took drugs
from one or both houses, and they took WC’s AK-47s from
the second house. According to the prosecution’s theory,
the defendants intended to “pin” the killing on WC, so
they spared the lives of his two children and disposed of
his body in the woods.
The aggravators that would support death
sentences in these cases included: (i)(1) (murder against
a person less than twelve years old); (i)(5) (the murders
[126]
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were heinous, atrocious or cruel); (i)(6) (the murders were
committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest or
prosecution); (i)(7) (the murders were committed while
the defendants were committing other felonies including
first degree murder, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping,
and aggravated child abuse); (i)(12) (mass murder); and
(i)(16) (one of the victims was pregnant).
B. Case #2
The defendant was convicted of first degree felony
murder for causing the death of an elderly man in the
course of carjacking the victim’s car. There was no
evidence that the defendant intended the victim’s death.
The defendant had prior convictions for
aggravated burglary, robbery, criminal intent to commit
robbery, and theft over $500. His I.Q. was tested at 66
and 68, which was within the intellectual disability
range, but the court found that he was not sufficiently
deficient in adaptive behavior to meet the legal definition
of intellectual disability that would have exempted him
from the death penalty.113
The defendant planned to rob a car. He went to
the Apple Market and stood outside the store’s door. An
older man, the victim, came out of the market with
groceries in his arms and walked to his car. As the man
reached the driver’s side door, the defendant ran up
behind him, and there ensued a short scuffle lasting
about 15 seconds. The defendant threw the man into the
car and/or the pavement, causing severe injuries
including brain trauma, fractured bones, and internal
bleeding. The defendant slammed the car door and drove
away. The man was taken to the hospital where he died
of his head injuries the following day.
The aggravators that would support a death
sentence in this case were: (i)(2) (prior violent felonies);
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (disqualifying the intellectually disabled
from the death penalty).
113
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(i)(7) (felony murder); and (i)(14) (victim over 70 years
old).

C. Analysis
We submit that the majority of persons presented
with these two case scenarios, without any further
information about the operation of Tennessee’s death
penalty system, would choose Case #1 as the more
appropriate and likely candidate for the death penalty.
In fact, however, in Case #1 neither defendant received a
death sentence—one received six consecutive life
sentences,114 and the other received four concurrent and
two consecutive life sentences.115 On the other hand, the
defendant in Case #2, who did not premeditate or intend
the victim’s death, was sentenced to death.116
These cases are not comparable. How could the
single felony murder case result in a death sentence
while the premeditated multi-murder case resulted in life
sentences? They are both fairly recent cases. The multivictim premeditated murder case was in a rural county
in the Middle Grand Division of the state, where no death
sentences have been imposed since 2001. By contrast, the
single-victim felony murder case, involving a borderline
intellectually disabled defendant, was in Shelby County
which has accounted for 52% of all new Tennessee death
sentences since mid-2001, of which 86% involved black
defendants.117 These may not be the only factors that
could explain the disparity between these cases, but they
stand out.
Moss, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 709, at *1.
Burrell, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 176, at *1.
116 Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 186.
117 See infra Appendix 1.
114
115
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These cases may represent an extreme
comparison—although 90% of all multi-murder cases
resulted in life or LWOP sentences118—but this
comparison most clearly illustrates a problem with our
death penalty system. Geographic location, differing
prosecutorial attitudes, and the prejudicial influences of
defendants’ mental impairments are arbitrary factors
that, along with other arbitrary factors discussed below,
too often determine the application of capital
punishment. In the next part, we review Mr. Miller’s
survey of first degree murder cases since 1977, which we
believe supports the proposition that arbitrariness
permeates the entire system.
VI. Mr. Miller’s Survey of First Degree Murder
Cases
A. The Survey Process
Given
the
Tennessee
Supreme
Court’s
abandonment of the original purpose behind Rule 12 data
collection, how can we systematically evaluate the
manner by which Tennessee has selected, out of more
than 2,500 convicted first degree murderers, only 86
defendants to sentence to death—and only 6 defendants
to execute—during the 40 years the system has been in
place? Is there a meaningful distinction between deathsentenced and life-sentenced defendants? Are we
imposing the death penalty only upon those criminals
who are the “worst of the bad”? Does our system meet the
constitutional demand for heightened reliability,
consistency, and fairness? Or is our system governed by
arbitrary factors that should not enter into the
sentencing decision?
To test the degree of arbitrariness in Tennessee’s
death penalty system, attorney H. E. Miller, Jr.,
118

See infra Appendix 1.
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undertook a survey of all Tennessee first degree murder
cases decided during the 40-year period beginning July 1,
1977, when the current system was installed. Mr. Miller
devoted thousands of hours over several years in
conducting his survey.
Mr. Miller began his survey by reviewing the filed
Rule 12 reports. He soon discovered, however, that in
close to one-half of first degree murder cases, trial judges
failed to file Rule 12 reports—and for those cases, there
is no centralized data collection system. Further, many of
the filed Rule 12 reports were incomplete or contained
errors.119
Mr. Miller found that Rule 12 reports were filed in
1,348 adult first degree murder cases. He identified an
additional 1,166 first degree murder cases for which Rule
12 reports were not filed, bringing the total of adult first
degree murder cases that he has been able to find to
2,514.120 Thus, trial judges failed to comply with Rule 12
OFFICE OF RESEARCH, TENN. COMPTROLLER OF THE
TREASURY, TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES
(2004)
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/deathpenalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RDX-VCUT].
In 2004, the Tennessee Comptroller of the Treasury noted:
“Office of Research staff identified a considerable number of
cases where defendants convicted of first[ ]degree murder did
not have a Rule 12 report, as required by law. . . . Rule 12
reports are paper documents, which are scanned and
maintained on CD-ROM. The format does not permit data
analysis.” Id. at 46–47. The situation with Rule 12 reports has
not improved since the Comptroller’s report.
120 There undoubtedly exist additional first degree murder
cases for which Rule 12 reports were not filed and that Mr.
Miller did not find. For example, some cases are settled at the
trial court level and are never taken up on appeal; and without
filed Rule 12 reports, these cases are extremely difficult to find.
Certainly, a fair number of recent cases were not found because
of the time it takes for a case to proceed from trial to the Court
of Criminal Appeals before an appellate court record is created.
It also is possible that cases decided on appeal were
inadvertently overlooked, despite great effort to be thorough.
119
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in at least 46% of adult first degree murder cases.121 This
astounding statistic is perhaps explainable by the fact
that Rule 12 data has never been used by the court in a
meaningful way and has become virtually obsolete since
Bland v. State122 when the Tennessee Supreme Court
decided to limit its comparative proportionality review
only to other capital cases that it had previously
reviewed.123
Because of problems with the Rule 12 reports, Mr.
Miller found it necessary to greatly broaden his research
to find and review the first degree murder cases for which
Rule 12 reports were not filed, and to verify and correct
information contained in the Rule 12 reports that were
filed. As described in his Report, Mr. Miller researched
numerous sources of information including cases
reported in various websites and databases, Tennessee
Department
of
Correction
records,
Tennessee
Administrative Office of the Courts reports, and original
court records, among other sources.
Mr. Miller compiled information about each
case—to the extent available—including: name, gender,
age, and race of defendant; date of conviction; county of
conviction; number of victims; gender, age, and race of
To the extent there are additional first degree murder cases
that were not found, statistics including those cases would
more strongly support the infrequency of death sentences and
the capricious nature of our death penalty lottery.
121 See infra Appendix 1. The Rule 12 noncompliance rate is
50% in juvenile first degree murder cases.
122 See supra notes 102–105, and accompanying text.
123 The perpetuation of Rule 12 on the books gives rise to two
unfortunate problems. First, Rule 12 creates a false impression
of meaningful data collection, which clearly is not the case
when we realize the 46% noncompliance rate and the lack of
evidence that Rule 12 data has served any purpose under the
current system. Second, the 46% noncompliance rate among
trial judges who preside over first degree murder cases tends
to undermine an appearance of integrity. We should expect
judges to follow the court’s rules.
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victims (to the extent this information was available);
and results of appeals and post-conviction proceedings—
information that should have been included in Rule 12
reports.
B. Factors Contributing to Arbitrariness
Mr. Miller’s survey reveals that Tennessee’s
capital sentencing scheme fails to fulfill Furman’s basic
requirement to avoid arbitrariness in imposing the
ultimate penalty. Capital sentencing in Tennessee is not
“regularized” or “rationalized.” The statistics and the
experiences of attorneys who practice in this area
demonstrate a number of factors that contribute to
system’s capriciousness.
1. Infrequency and Downward Trend
As stated previously, frequency of application is
the most important factor in assessing the
constitutionality of the death penalty. As the death
penalty becomes less frequently applied, there is an
increased chance that capital punishment becomes “cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.”124 Infrequency of
application sets the foundation for analysis of the system.
Since July 1, 1977, only 192 defendants received
death sentences among the 2,514 Tennessee defendants
who were convicted of first degree murder. Among those
192 defendants, only 86 defendants’ death sentences
have been sustained as of June 30, 2017, while the death
sentences imposed on 106 defendants have been vacated
or reversed. Accordingly, over the span of the past 40
years only approximately 3.4% of convicted first degree
murderers have received sustained death sentences—
and most of those cases are still under review. Of those
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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86 defendants whose death sentences have been
sustained, only six were actually executed, representing
less than 0.2% of all first degree murder cases—or less
than one out of every 400 cases. In other words, the
probability that a defendant who commits first degree
murder is arrested, found guilty, sentenced to death, and
executed is miniscule. Even if Tennessee were to
hurriedly execute the approximately dozen death row
defendants who are currently eligible for execution
dates,125 the percentage of executed defendants as
compared to all first degree murder cases would remain
extremely small.
Additionally, over the past twenty years there has
been a sharp decline in the frequency of capital cases.
Table 23 from Mr. Miller’s Report tells the story:

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12.4 provides that an
execution date will not be set until the defendant’s case has
completed the “standard three tiers” of review (direct appeal,
post-conviction, and federal habeas corpus), which occurs when
the defendant’s initial habeas corpus proceeding has run its
full course through the U.S. Supreme Court. The Tennessee
Administrative Office of the Courts lists eleven “capital cases
that have, at one point, neared their execution date.” Capital
Cases, TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/media/capital-cases
[https://perma.cc/QD4Y-929R]. At the time of publication,
execution dates had been set to occur in the latter part of 2018
in three cases: Billy Ray Irick (on death row for close to 32
years), Edmund Zagorski (on death row for over 34 years), and
David Earl Miller (on death row for close to 37 years).
125
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Table 1: Frequency of Tennessee
Sentences in 4-Year Increments
4-Year
Period

7/1/77 –
6/30/81
7/1/81 –
6/30/85
7/1/85 –
6/30/89
7/1/89 –
6/30/93
7/1/93 –
6/30/97
7/1/97 –
6/30/01
7/1/01 –
6/30/05
7/1/05 –
6/30/09
7/1/09 –
6/30/13
7/1/13–
6/30/17

Death

Trials New Death Sustaine
Ave. New
1st Degree % “New” Death
%
ReSen-tences d Death
Death
Murder
Sentences / Sustained
sulting (i.e., Initial Sentence Sentences per Cases127
1st Degree
Death
in
Capital
s126
Year
Murders
SenDeath
Trials)
tences /
Sentenc
1st
es
Degree
Murders

25

25

6

6.25/year

155

16%

4%

37

33

12

8.25/year

197

17%

6%

34

32

15

8.00/year

238

13%

6%

38

37

18

9.25/year

282

13%

6%

21

17

9

4.45/year

395

4%

2%

32

24

14

6.00/year

316

8%

4%

20

16

5

4.00/year

283

6%

2%

5

4

4

1.00/year

271

1.5%

1.4%

6

6

5

1.50/year

284
Data128

2%
Incomplete
Data

1.7%
Incomplete
Data

>2,514

<8%

<3.5%

Incomplete

3

1

1

0.25/year
4.88 per year

TOTALS

221

(40 years)

Defendants who received Sustained Death Sentences based
on dates of their Initial Capital Trials.
127 Counted by defendants, not murder victims.
128 Thus far Mr. Miller has found records for only 93 cases
resulting in first degree murder convictions for murders
occurring during the most recent 4-year period. Because of the
time it takes for a case to be tried and appealed, we have an
incomplete record of cases from the most recent years.
According to Tennessee Bureau of Investigation statistics,
however, the annual number of homicides in Tennessee has
remained relatively consistent over the period. See infra
Appendix 1, Table 25.
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195129

89130

Graph of New Death Sentences131 in Tennessee
by 4-Year Increments

One defendant had three separate “new” trials each
resulting in “new” and “sustained” death sentences, while
another defendant had two such trials. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Accordingly, there were 195 “new” trials
involving a total of 192 defendants and 89 “sustained” death
sentences involving a total of 86 defendants.
130 See supra note 128. While 89 trials resulted in Sustained
Death Sentences, only 86 defendants received Sustained Death
Sentences.
131 This graph includes all original capital trials resulting in
“new” death sentences, including those that were subsequently
reversed or vacated.
129
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As we can see, disregarding cases that were
subsequently reversed or vacated, the frequency of new
death sentences has fallen from a high of 9.25 per year
from 1989 to 1993, to a low of 0.25 per year during the
most recent 4-year period of 2013 to 2017—a 97%
reduction in the rate of new death sentences. Moreover,
no new death sentence was imposed in Tennessee over
the three-year period from July 2014 through June 2017,
and over the 16-year period from February 2001 through
June 2017, no death sentence had been imposed in the
Middle Grand Division of the State (which includes
Nashville-Davidson County and 40 other counties,
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representing more than one-third of the state’s
population).132
Mr. Miller broke down the statistics into two
groups—cases originally tried during the first 24 years,
before June 30, 2001, and those originally tried during
the most recent 16 years, through June 30, 2017. Mr.
Miller used 2001 as a dividing line because it was during
the period leading up to that year when Tennessee began
experiencing its steep decline in the frequency of new
death sentences. Also, 2001 was the year when the Office
of the District Attorney General for Davidson County
issued its Death Penalty Guidelines,133 setting forth the
procedure and criteria that the Office would use in
determining when to seek a death sentence.
During the initial 24-year period, Tennessee
imposed sustained death sentences on 5.8% of the
defendants convicted of first degree murder, at the
average rate of 4 sustained death sentences per year.
Since 2001, the percentage of first degree murder cases
resulting in death sentences has dropped to less than 2%,
at a rate of less than 1 sustained death sentence per year.
At this level of infrequency, it is impossible to
conceive how Tennessee’s death penalty system is
serving any legitimate penological purpose. No
reasonable scholar could maintain that there is any
See infra Appendix 2. In April 2018, which falls outside the
timeframe of Mr. Miller’s survey, a new death sentence was
imposed in Madison County on defendant Urshawn Miller. At
the time of publication, this case was still in the trial court
pending an expected motion for new trial. As of the date of this
article, this is the only new death sentence in Tennessee since
June 2014.
133 OFFICE OF THE DIST. ATT’Y GEN. FOR THE 20TH JUDICIAL
DIST. OF TENN., DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES (Oct. 18, 2001)
(On file with authors). The current Davidson County District
Attorney confirmed to one of the authors that the guidelines
remain in effect. Based on our inquiries, no other district
attorney general office has adopted written guidelines or
standards for deciding when to seek death.
132
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deterrence value to the death penalty when it is imposed
with such infrequency.134 There is minimal retributive
value when the overwhelming percentage of first degree
murder cases (now more than 98%) end up with life or
LWOP.135 Any residual deterrent or retributive value in
Tennessee’s sentencing system is further diluted to the
point of non-existence by the other factors of
arbitrariness listed below. As Justice White stated in
Furman, “[T]he death penalty could so seldom be
imposed that it would cease to be a credible deterrent or
Although a small minority of studies have purported to
document a deterrent effect, none have documented such an
effect in a state like Tennessee where the vast majority of
defendants get life or LWOP sentences, and where those who
do receive death sentences long survive their sentencing date,
usually until they die of natural causes, and are rarely
executed. In fact, “the majority of social science research on the
issue concludes that the death penalty has no effect on the
homicide rate.” Donald L. Beschle, Why Do People Support
Capital Punishment? The Death Penalty as Community Ritual,
33 CONN. L. REV. 765, 768 (2001); see also NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 2 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper Eds., 2012)
(“[R]esearch to date on the effect of capital punishment on
homicide is not informative about whether capital punishment
decreases, increases, or has no effect on homicide rates.”).
135 The role of retribution in our criminal justice system is a
debatable issue. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949) (“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the
criminal law.”). Over time, “our society has moved away from
public and painful retribution toward ever more humane forms
of punishment.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 80 (2008) (Stevens,
J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court has
cautioned that, of the valid justifications for punishment,
“retribution . . . most often can contradict the law’s own ends.
This is of particular concern . . . in capital cases. When the law
punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into
brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to
decency and restraint.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
420 (2008).
134
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measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment
in the criminal justice system.”136
The decline in the frequency of new death
sentences in Tennessee also evidences Tennessee’s
evolved standard of decency away from capital
punishment. As further explained below, in the vast
majority of Tennessee counties, including all counties
within the Middle Grand Division, the death penalty is
essentially dead.137
2. Geographic Disparity
Death sentences are not evenly distributed
throughout the state. Whether it is a function of differing
crime rates, political environment, racial tensions, the
attitude of prosecutors, the availability of resources, the
competency of defense counsel, or the characteristics of
typical juries, a few counties have zealously pursued the
death penalty in the past, while others have avoided it
altogether. Over the 40-year period, only 48 of
Tennessee’s 95 counties (roughly one-half) have
conducted trials resulting in death sentences,138 but as
indicated above, the majority of death sentences were
reversed or vacated. More significantly, only 28 counties,
representing 64% of Tennessee’s population, have
imposed sustained death sentences;139 since 2001, only
eight counties, representing just 34% of Tennessee’s

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972).
The decline in new death sentences in Tennessee mirrors a
nationwide trend. According to the Death Penalty Information
Center, the nationwide number of death sentences has declined
from a total of 295 in 1998 to a total of just 31 in 2016—a 90%
decline. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death
Penalty, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HU36-8PC5].
138 See infra Appendix 2.
139 See infra Appendix 1, Table 21.
136
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population, have imposed sustained death sentences.140
In the most recent five-year period, from July 1, 2012, to
June 30, 2017, Shelby County was the only county to
impose death sentences.
The decline in the number of counties resorting to
the death penalty is illustrated by the following table
taken from Mr. Miller’s report, which gives the number
of counties that conducted capital trials (i.e., trials
resulting in death sentences) during each of the ten 4year increments during the 40-year period:141

4-Year Period

7/1/1977 – 6/30/1981
7/1/1981 – 6/30/1985
7/1/1985 – 6/30/1989
7/1/1989 – 6/30/1993
7/1/1993 – 6/30/1997
7/1/1997 – 6/30/2001
7/1/2001 – 6/30/2005
7/1/2005 – 6/30/2009

Number of Counties
Conducting
Capital Trials142
During the
Indicated 4-Year
Period
13
18
17
18
11
12
11
3

Id. at Table 22. See also infra Appendix 2.
Id. at Table 24.
142 These include all 221 Initial Capital Trials and Retrials,
whether or not the convictions or death sentences were
eventually sustained. Obviously, several counties conducted
Capital Trials in several of the 4-Year Periods. Shelby County,
for example, conducted Capital Trials in each of these periods.
140
141
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7/1/2009 – 6/30/2013
7/1/2013 – 6/30/2017

5
1

It is costly to maintain a capital punishment
system.143 As the number of counties that impose the
death penalty declines, an increasing majority of
Tennessee’s taxpayers are subsidizing the system that is
not being used on their behalf, but instead is being used
only by a diminishingly small number of Tennessee’s
counties.
Shelby County stands at one end of the spectrum.
Since 1977, it has accounted for 37% of all sustained
death sentences; over the past 10 years, it has accounted
for 57% of Tennessee death sentences during that period;
and, as mentioned above, it has accounted for all of
Tennessee’s death sentences during the most recent 5year period.144
Lincoln County is one of the many counties that
stand at the other end of the spectrum. In Lincoln County
over the past 39 years, there have been ten first-degree
There has been no study of the costs of Tennessee’s system.
See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, TENN. COMPTROLLER OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 119, at i–iv (concluding that capital
cases are substantially more expensive than non-capital cases,
but itemizing reasons why the Comptroller was unable to
determine the total cost of Tennessee’s capital punishment
system). Studies from other states, however, have concluded
that maintaining a death penalty system is quite expensive,
costing millions of dollars per year. For a general discussion of
costs, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW
KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
95–100 (2017) (citing studies from several states). See also
Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty
[https://perma.cc/AY2D-PMNB].
144 See infra Appendix 2 at 244. This does not account for the
most recent new death sentence in Tennessee that was
imposed in Madison County in April 2018, which was outside
the timeframe of Mr. Miller’s survey. See supra note 132.
143
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murder cases involving eleven defendants and 22 victims
(an average of 2.2 victims per case). No death sentences
were imposed, even in two mass murder cases. For
example, in the recent case of State v. Moss, discussed in
Part V above, the defendant and his co-defendant were
each convicted of six counts of first degree premeditated
murder; the murders were egregious; but the defendants
received life sentences, not death.145 According to the
Rule 12 reports, in another Lincoln County case, State v.
Jacob Shaffer, on July 22, 2011, the defendant, who had
committed a prior murder in Alabama, was convicted of
five counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to
LWOP, not death.146
Indeed, in the entire Middle Grand Division, over
the past 25 years, since January 1, 1992, only six
defendants received sustained death sentences—a rate of
only one case every four years, and no cases since
February 2001.
There is a statistically significant disparity
between the geographic distribution of first degree
murder cases, on the one hand, and the geographic
distribution of capital cases, on the other. Mere
geographic location of a case makes a difference,
contributing an indisputable element of arbitrariness to
the system.
3. Timing and Natural Death
To the consternation of many, capital cases take
years to work through the three tiers of review—from
trial and direct appeal through post-conviction and
145State

v. Moss, No. M2014-00746-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2016) perm
app. denied, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Jan. 19, 2017).
146 See Claire Aiello, Jacob Shaffer Pleads Guilty to Madison
County Murder, WHNT 19 NEWS (March 8, 2013, 1:27 PM),
http://whnt.com/2013/03/08/shaffer-pleads-guilty-madisoncounty-murder/ [https://perma.cc/AUS6-3XJ2].
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federal habeas—and further litigation beyond that.
Perhaps that is as it should be, given the heightened need
for reliability in capital cases and the exceedingly high
capital sentencing reversal rate due to trial errors, as
discussed below. But the long duration of capital cases,
combined with natural death rates among death row
defendants, contributes an additional form of
arbitrariness in determining which defendants are
ultimately executed.
As of June 30, 2017, among the 56 surviving
defendants on death row, the average length of time they
had lived on death row was more than 21 years, and this
average is increasing as the death row population ages
while fewer new defendants are entering the
population.147 Only ten new defendants were placed on
death row during the most recent ten years, equal in
number to the ten surviving defendants who had been on
death row for over 30 years. One surviving defendant had
been on death row for more than 35 years. Mr. Miller’s
Report breaks down the surviving defendants’ length of
time on death row as follows:148

Length of
Time on Death
Row

147
148

Number of
Defendants
(as of 6/30/2017)

> 30 Years

10

20 – 30 Years

20

10 – 20 Years

16

< 10 Years

10

See infra Appendix 1, Table 20.
Id.
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Of the six whom Tennessee has executed, their average
length of time on death row was 20 years, and one had
been on death row for close to 29 years.149
The length of time defendants serve on death row
facing possible execution further diminishes any
arguable penological purpose in capital punishment to
the point of nothingness. With the passage of time, the
force of deterrence disappears, and the meaning of
retribution is lost.150
Moreover, during the 40-year period, 24
condemned defendants died of natural causes on death
row. This means that, so far at least, a defendant with a
sustained death sentence is four times more likely to die
of natural causes than from an execution. Even if
Tennessee hurriedly executes the approximately dozen
death-sentenced defendants who have completed their
“three tiers” of review,151 with the constantly aging death
row population the number of natural deaths will
continue to substantially exceed deaths by execution.
Given the way the system operates, a high
percentage of natural deaths among the death row
population is an actuarial fact affecting the carrying out
This includes Daryl Holton, who waived his post-conviction
proceedings and was executed in 1999 when he had been on
death row only 8 years.
150 See Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 543 (2009)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (dissenting from
the denial immediately before Tennessee’s execution of Cecil
Johnson, who had been on death row for close to 29 years:
“[D]elaying an execution does not further public purposes of
retribution and deterrence but only diminishes whatever
possible benefit society might receive from petitioner’s death.”)
(quoting Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1300 (200)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)).
151 See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 12.4(A) (describing the “standard
three-tier appeals process” in capital cases to include trial and
direct appeal, state post-conviction proceedings, and federal
habeas corpus).
149
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of the death penalty. Consequently, the timing of a case
during the 40-year period, along with the health of the
defendant, is an arbitrary factor determining not only
whether a defendant will be sentenced to death, but also
whether he will ever be executed. Furthermore, if a
death-sentenced defendant is four times more likely to
die of natural causes than by execution, then the death
penalty loses any possible deterrent or retributive effect
for that reason as well.
4. Error Rates
Of the 192 Tennessee defendants who received
death sentences during the 40-year period, 106
defendants had seen their sentences or convictions
vacated because of trial error, and only 86 defendants
had sustained death sentences (of whom 56 were still
living as of June 30, 2017)—and most of their cases are
still under review.152 This means that during the 40-year
period the death sentence reversal rate was 55%. Among
those reversals, three defendants were exonerated of the
crime, and a fourth was released upon the strength of
new evidence that he was actually innocent.153
If 55% of General Motors automobiles over the
past 40 years had to be recalled because of manufacturing
defects, consumers and shareholders would be outraged,
the government would investigate, and the company
certainly would go out of business. One of the
fundamental principles under the Eighth Amendment is

See infra Appendix 1 at 213. During the 40-year period, 24
defendants died of natural causes while their death sentences
were pending. These are counted as “sustained” death
sentences, along with the six defendants who were executed
and the 56 defendants on death row as of June 30, 2017.
153 Id.
152
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that our death penalty system must be reliable.154 With a
55% reversal rate, reliability is lacking.
The existence of error in capital cases and the
prospect of reversal is a random factor that introduces a
substantial element of arbitrariness into the system. Two
causes of error—ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct—are discussed below.155
5. Quality of Defense Representation
We have identified 45 defendants whose death
sentences or convictions were vacated by state or federal
courts on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 156
In other words, courts have found that 23% of the
Tennessee defendants sentenced to death were deprived
of their constitutional right to effective legal
representation. This is an astounding figure, especially
given the difficulty in proving both the “deficiency” and
“prejudice” prongs under the Strickland standard for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment.157 In two additional cases affirmed by
See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985)
(“[M]any of the limits that this Court has placed on the
imposition of capital punishment are rooted in a concern that
the sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and
reliable exercise of sentencing discretion.”).
155 Other reversible errors have included unconstitutional
aggravators, erroneous evidentiary rulings, improper jury
instructions, and insufficient evidence to support the verdict
among other grounds for reversals. See THE TENN. JUSTICE
PROJECT, TENNESSEE DEATH PENALTY CASES SINCE 1977 (June
15, 2008) (on file with authors).
156 These cases are listed infra Appendix 3, List of Capital IAC
Cases.
157 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The
difficulty of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is
embodied in the following oft-quoted passage from Strickland:
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
154
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the courts, Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen commuted
the death sentences based, in part, on his determination
that the defendants suffered from “grossly inadequate
defense representation” at trial and/or during the postconviction process.158 These are findings of legal
malpractice.159 If a law firm were judicially found to have
committed malpractice in more than 23% of their cases
over the past 40 years, the firm would incur substantial
liability and dissolve. How can we tolerate a capital
punishment system that yields these results?
The reasons for deficient defense representation
in capital cases are not hard to locate. The problem begins
with the general inadequacy of resources available to
fund the defense in indigent cases. In a recently
published report, the Tennessee Indigent Defense Task
Force, appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court,
found:
There is a strongly held belief in the
legal community that attorneys do not
receive reasonable compensation when
representing clients as counsel appointed
by the State. The Task Force was
repeatedly reminded that, in almost every
trial situation, the attorney for the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance[.]” Id.
158 See infra Appendix 1 at 214.
159 There are additional capital cases in which courts have
vacated death sentences on grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, only to be reversed on appeal. See, e.g., Morris v.
Carpenter, 802 F.3d 825, 828 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing by
applying a strict standard of reviewing state court decisions);
Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 226 F.3d 696, 698 (6th Cir. 2000)
(affirming a finding of deficient performance, but reversing on
the prejudice prong). These cases illustrate differing judicial
viewpoints on capital punishment, which is another arbitrary
factor discussed below.
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defendant will be paid less than every
other person with the trial associated in a
professional capacity—less than the
testifying experts, the investigators, and
interpreters.
Attorneys and judges from across
the state, in a variety of different roles and
stages of their careers, as well as other
officials and experts in the field were
overwhelmingly in favor of increasing the
compensation for attorneys in appointed
cases. Concern regarding compensation is
not new.160
According to the Task Force, there is a general consensus
among lawyers and judges that “the current rates for
paying certain experts . . . are below market rate.”161
Virtually all defendants in capital cases are
indigent and must rely upon appointed counsel for their
defense.162 A typical capital defendant has no role in
choosing the defense attorneys who will represent him.
Capital cases are unique in many respects and place
peculiar demands on the defense: mitigation
investigation, extensive use of experts, “death
qualification” and “life qualification” in jury selection,
and the sentencing phase of trial—the only kind of trial
in the Tennessee criminal justice system in which a jury
makes the sentencing decision. Thus, capital defense
representation is regarded as a highly specialized area of

INDIGENT REPRESENTATION TASK FORCE, LIBERTY & JUSTICE
FOR ALL: PROVIDING RIGHT TO COUNSEL SERVICES IN
TENNESSEE 35 (2017) [hereinafter “Task Force Report”],
160

http://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/irtfreportfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZU4N-5QUZ].
161 Id. at 52.
162 See infra note 176.
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law practice.163 As noted by the American Bar
Association:
[D]eath penalty cases have become so
specialized that defense counsel have
duties and functions definably different
from those of counsel in ordinary criminal
cases.
....
. . . “Every task ordinarily performed in
the representation of a criminal defendant
is more difficult and time-consuming when
the defendant is facing execution. The
responsibilities thrust upon defense
counsel in a capital case carry with them
psychological and emotional pressures
unknown elsewhere in the law. In
addition, defending a capital case is an
intellectually
rigorous
enterprise,
requiring command of the rules unique to
capital litigation and constant vigilance in
keeping abreast of new developments in a
volatile and highly nuanced area of the
law.”164
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 section 3 acknowledges
the specialized nature of capital defense representation by
imposing special training requirements on appointed capital
defense attorneys. This is the only area of law in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court imposes such a requirement.
Unfortunately, the Tennessee training requirements for
capital defense attorneys is inadequate. Cf. William P. Redick,
Jr., et al., Pretend Justice—Defense Representation in
Tennessee Death Penalty Cases, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 303, 328–
33 (2008).
164 Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 923 (2003) [hereinafter “ABA
Guidelines”] (footnote omitted) (quoting Douglas W. Vick,
Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
163
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Handling a death case is all consuming, requiring
extraordinary hours and nerves. It is difficult for a
private attorney to build and maintain a successful law
practice while effectively defending a capital case at
billing rates that do not cover overhead.165 Most public
defender offices have excessive caseloads without having
to take on capital cases.166 For these and other reasons,
capital defense litigation is a surpassingly difficult,
highly specialized field of law requiring extensive
training, experience, and the right frame of mind—as
well as sufficient time and resources. In Tennessee,
especially with the sharp decline in the frequency of
capital cases, few attorneys have acquired any
meaningful experience in actually trying capital cases
through the sentencing phase, and the training is sparse.
Moreover, given the constraints on compensation and
funds for expert services, Tennessee offers inadequate
resources to properly defend a capital case, or to attract
the better lawyers to the field.167
On the other hand, some highly effective
attorneys, willing to suffer the harsh economics and
emotional stress of capital cases, do handle these kinds of
cases, often with great success and at great personal and
financial sacrifice.168 Unfortunately, there simply are not
enough of these kinds of lawyers to go around.
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 357–58
(1995)).
165 See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 13, § 3(k) (setting maximum billing
rates for appointed counsel and funding for investigators and
experts).
166 See Task Force Report, supra note 160, at 40–43.
167 For a thorough discussion of the problems with capital
defense representation in Tennessee, see Redick, et al., supra
note 163.
168 Effective capital defense representation requires defense
counsel to expend their own funds to cover investigative
services, because funding provided under Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 13 section 3(k) is grossly inadequate.
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With a reversal rate based on inadequate defense
representation exceeding 23%, Tennessee’s experience
confirms the conclusion reached by the American Bar
Association several years ago:
Indeed, problems with the quality of
defense representation in death penalty
cases have been so profound and pervasive
that several Supreme Court Justices have
openly
expressed
concern.
Justice
Ginsburg told a public audience that she
had “yet to see a death case among the
dozens coming to the Supreme Court on
eve-of-execution stay applications in which
the defendant was well represented at
trial” and that “people who are well
represented at trial do not get the death
penalty.” Similarly, Justice O’Connor
expressed concern that the system “may
well be allowing some innocent defendants
to be executed” and suggested that
“[p]erhaps it’s time to look at minimum
standards for appointed counsel in death
cases and adequate compensation for
appointed counsel when they are used.” As
Justice Breyer has said, “the inadequacy of
representation in capital cases” is “a fact
that aggravates the other failings” of the
death penalty system as a whole.169
It goes without saying that the quality of defense
representation can make a difference in the outcome of a
case. A defendant’s life should not turn on his luck of the
draw in the lawyers appointed to his case, but we know
that it does—yet another source of arbitrariness in the
system.
ABA Guidelines, supra note 164, at 928–29 (footnotes
omitted).
169
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6. Prosecutorial Discretion and Misconduct
Prosecutors vary in their attitude towards the
death penalty. Some strongly pursue it, while others
avoid it. In more sparsely populated districts, the costs
and burdens of prosecuting a capital case may be
prohibitive. In other districts (such as Shelby County),
the political environment and other factors may
encourage the aggressive pursuit of the death penalty.170
In a 2004 report on the death penalty, Tennessee’s
Comptroller of the Treasury concluded:
Prosecutors are not consistent in their
pursuit of the death penalty. Some
prosecutors interviewed in this study
indicated that they seek the death penalty
only in extreme cases, or the “worst of the
worst.” However, prosecutors in other
jurisdictions make it a standard practice
on every first[ ]degree murder case that
meets at least one aggravating factor. Still,
surveys and interviews indicate that
others use the death penalty as a
“bargaining chip” to secure plea bargains
for lesser sentences. Many prosecutors also
Although we have not collected the data on this issue, it is
well known among the defense bar that in Shelby County, in a
significant percentage of capital trials, juries do not return
verdicts of first degree murder, suggesting a tendency on the
part of the prosecution to over-charge. In Davidson County, by
contrast, in capital trials, juries always return guilty verdicts
for first degree murder, although they also are known
occasionally (especially in recent years) to return life or LWOP
sentences.
170
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indicated that they consider the wishes of
the victim’s family when making decisions
about the death penalty.171
In 2001, the Office of the District Attorney
General for Davidson County, Tennessee, issued a set of
Guidelines that Office would follow in deciding whether
to seek the death penalty in any case.172 Unfortunately,
other district attorneys general have not followed suit as
they resist any written limitations on the exercise of their
prosecutorial discretion. There are no uniformly applied
standards or procedures among the different district
attorneys general in deciding whether to seek capital
punishment. The lack of uniform standards, combined
with the differing attitudes towards the death penalty
among the various district attorneys general throughout
the state, injects a substantial degree of arbitrariness in
the sentencing system.
In addition to the vagaries of prosecutorial
discretion, the occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct
adds another element of capriciousness. Prosecutorial
misconduct is a thorn in the flesh of the death penalty
system that can influence outcomes.173 Sixth Circuit

OFFICE OF RESEARCH, TENN. COMPTROLLER OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 119, at 13.
172 See OFFICE OF THE DIST. ATT’Y GEN. FOR THE 20TH JUDICIAL
DIST. OF TENN., supra note 133; see also infra Appendix 2.
173 For a discussion of the prevalence of prosecutorial
misconduct throughout the country, see INNOCENCE PROJECT,
PROSECUTORIAL OVERSIGHT: A NATIONAL DIALOGUE IN THE
WAKE
OF
CONNICK
V.
THOMPSON
8–10
(2016),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IPProsecutorial-Oversight-Report_09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5XAH8Q7]. In a recent study, the Fair Punishment Project found
that the Shelby County district attorney’s office had the
highest rate of prosecutorial misconduct findings in the nation.
The Recidivists: New Report on Rates of Prosecutorial
Misconduct, FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT (Aug. 9, 2017),
171
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Judge Gilbert Merritt has written: “[T]he greatest threat
to justice and the Rule of Law in death penalty cases is
state prosecutorial malfeasance—an old, widespread,
and persistent habit. The Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts are constantly confronted with these socalled Brady exculpatory and mitigating evidence cases.
. . . In capital cases, this malfeasance violates both due
process and the Eighth Amendment.”174
We have located at least six Tennessee capital
cases in which either convictions or death sentences were
set aside because of prosecutorial misconduct, and at
least three other cases in which courts found
prosecutorial misconduct but affirmed the death
sentences notwithstanding.175 Presumably, capital cases
are handled by the most experienced and qualified
prosecutors, so there is no excuse for this level of
http://fairpunishment.org/new-report-on-rates-ofprosecutorial-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/6KJ4-SL5Y].
174 Gilbert Stroud Merritt, Jr., Prosecutorial Error in Death
Penalty Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2009) (footnotes
omitted) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
175 See Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (improper
closing argument); House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-883, 2007 WL
4568444 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (Brady violation); Johnson v. State,
38 S.W.3d 52 (Tenn. 2001) (Brady violation); State v. Bigbee,
885 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. 1994) (improper closing argument);
State v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn. 1988) (improper closing
argument); State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. 1984)
(improper closing argument and Brady violation). There are
other cases of Brady violations which did not serve as grounds
for reversal. See, e.g., Thomas v. Westbrooks, 849 F.3d 659 (6th
Cir. 2017) (Brady violation); Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 999 F.
Supp. 1073, 1088–90, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1998), vacated in part,
226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000) (vacating the sentence on
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) grounds and finding that
Brady violations were not material); Order Granting Post
Conviction Relief, Rimmer v. State, Nos. 98-010134, 97-02817,
98-01003 (Tenn. Shelby Co. Crim. Crt. Oct. 12, 2012) (vacating
the conviction on IAC grounds although the prosecution has
suppressed evidence).
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judicially found misconduct. Also, we can reasonably
assume that undetected misconduct, potentially affecting
convictions and sentences, has occurred in other cases.
Suppressed evidence is not always discovered. Although
inexcusable, some degree of misconduct is explainable,
because prosecutors are elected officials, and capital
cases are fraught with emotion and often highly
publicized. These kinds of circumstances can lead to
excessive zeal.
7. Defendants’ Impairments
From our personal experiences, combined with
our research, we submit that the vast majority of capital
defendants are impaired due to mental illness and/or
intellectual disability.176 On the one hand, these kinds of
impairments can serve as powerful mitigating
circumstances that reduce culpability in support of a life
instead of death sentence, although too frequently
defendants’ impairments are inadequately investigated
and presented to the sentencing jury by defense counsel.
On the other hand, a defendant’s impairments can create
obstacles in effective defense representation and can
further create, in subtle ways, an unfavorable
appearance to the jury during the trial. Too often, a
defendant’s impairments can unjustly aggravate the
Poverty is another cause of mental impairment, which
unfortunately is not discussed in the case law. According to a
2007 report, every Tennessee death-sentenced defendant who
was tried since early 1990 was declared indigent at the time of
trial and had to rely on court-appointed defense counsel; a
large majority of those who were tried before then were also
declared indigent. THE TENN. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note
155. There is a growing body of social science research
demonstrating the adverse psychological and cognitive effects
of poverty. See, e.g., SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR,
SCARCITY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HAVING LESS AND HOW IT
DEFINES OUR LIVES (2013); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN
WORK DISAPPEARS 75–79 (1997).
176
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jurors’ and the court’s attitude towards the defendant,
which is another factor contributing to the arbitrariness
of the system.
i. Mental Illness
Mental illness is rampant among criminal
defendants. A study published in 2006 by the United
States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, found that nationwide, 56% of state prisoners,
45% of federal prisoners, and 64% of those incarcerated
in local jails suffered from a serious mental health
problem.177 Other studies indicate that the percentage of
mentally ill inmates is particularly high on death row. 178
For example, one study found “that of the 28 people
executed in 2015, seven suffered from serious mental
illness, and another seven suffered from serious
intellectual impairment or brain injury.”179 Another
study concluded: “Over half (fifty-four) of the last one
hundred executed offenders had been diagnosed with or
displayed symptoms of severe mental illness.”180
From examining Tennessee capital postconviction cases, where evidence of mental illness among
death-sentenced defendants is often investigated and
developed in support of claims of ineffective assistance of
DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates
(2006),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=789
[https://perma.cc/K7TE-N4ED].
178 Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with
Mental Illnesses, MENTAL HEALTH AM. (June 14, 2016),
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/death-penalty
[https://perma.cc/K9MY-BURJ].
179 Id. at n.9 (citing Report: 75% of 2015 Executions Raised
Serious Concerns About Mental Health or Innocence, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
node/6331 [https://perma.cc/QQJ8-DDQD]).
180 Id. at n.9 (quoting Robert J. Smith et al., The Failure of
Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1221, 1245 (2014)).
177
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counsel, we can conclude that a significant number of
defendants on Tennessee’s death row suffer from severe
mental disorders. The following cases illustrate the issue.
Cooper v. State was the first Tennessee case in
which a death sentence was vacated on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel.181 Trial counsel
inadequately investigated the defendant’s social history
and mental condition. 182 In post-conviction, expert
testimony was presented that the defendant suffered
from an affective disorder with recurrent major
depression over long periods of time, and at the time of
the homicide his condition had deteriorated to a full
active phase of a major depressive episode. 183
In Wilcoxson v. State, the defendant had been
diagnosed at different times with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder. 184 The Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals found trial counsel’s
performance to be deficient in failing to raise the issue of
the defendant’s competency to stand trial, and in failing
to present evidence of the defendant’s psychiatric
problems to the jury as mitigating evidence in
sentencing. 185 While the court found that post-conviction
counsel failed to carry their burden of retrospectively
proving the defendant’s incompetency to stand trial, the
court vacated the death sentence on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel for their failure to
present social history and mental health mitigation
evidence at sentencing. 186
In Taylor v. State the post-conviction court set
aside the defendant’s conviction and death sentence on
the ground that his trial counsel were deficient in their
Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
Id. at 524–25.
183 Id. at 526.
184 Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
185 Id. at 311, 314.
186 Id. at 293.
181
182

[157]
157

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

investigation and presentation of the defendant’s
psychiatric disorders pre-trial in connection with his
competency to stand trial, and during the trial in
connection with his insanity defense and his sentencing
hearing. 187 The evidence included an assessment by a
forensic psychiatrist for the state, who was not discovered
by defense counsel and therefore did not testify at trial,
that the defendant was psychotic. 188
In Carter v. Bell, according to expert testimony
presented in federal habeas, the defendant suffered from
psychotic symptoms involving hallucinations, paranoid
delusions, and thought disorders consistent with
paranoid schizophrenia or an organic delusional disorder.
189 His death sentence was vacated on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyers
failed to investigate his social and psychiatric history. 190
In Harries v. Bell, the federal habeas court found
that the defendant’s trial counsel failed to investigate
and develop evidence of the defendant’s abusive
childhood background; his frontal lobe brain damage,
which impaired his mental executive functions; and his
mental illness, which had been variously diagnosed as
bipolar mood disorder, anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. 191 The federal court vacated
the death sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 192
Adverse childhood experiences and severe mental
illness can profoundly affect cognition, judgment,
impulse
control,
mood
and
decision-making.
Unfortunately, these cases are typical in the death

Taylor v. State, No. 01C01-9709-CC-00384, 1999 WL
512149 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 1999).
188 Id. at *4–5.
189 Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2000).
190 Id. at 596, 608.
191 Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2005).
192 Id. at 642.
187
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penalty arena.193 A defendant’s mental illness, if not fully
realized by defense counsel, and if not properly presented
and explained to the jury at trial, can prejudice the
defendant both in his relationship with his defense
counsel and in his demeanor before the jury.194
Regarding the effect of mental illness on the
attorney-client relationship, the ABA Guidelines explain:
Many capital defendants are . . . severely
impaired in ways that make effective
communication difficult: they may have
mental illnesses or personality disorders
that make them highly distrustful or
impair their reasoning and perception of
reality; they may be mentally retarded or
have other cognitive impairments that
affect their judgment and understanding;
they may be depressed and even suicidal;
or they may be in complete denial in the
face of overwhelming evidence. In fact, the
prevalence of mental illness and impaired
reasoning is so high in the capital
defendant population that “[i]t must be
assumed that the client is emotionally and
intellectually impaired.”195
Regarding the potential effect of a defendant’s
mental illness at trial, Justice Kennedy’s comment in
One of the authors, Mr. MacLean, has worked on a number
of capital cases in state post-conviction and federal habeas
proceedings. In every case he has worked on, the defendant has
been diagnosed with a severe mental disorder.
194 For a discussion of the potential effects of a defendant’s
impairments on his legal representation, see Bradley A.
MacLean, Effective Capital Defense Representation and the
Difficult Client, 76 TENN. L. REV. 661 (2009).
195 ABA Guidelines, supra note 164, at 1007–08 (quoting Rick
Kammen & Lee Norton, Plea Agreements: Working with
Capital Defendants, THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 2000, at 31).
193
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Riggins v. Nevada, involving the side-effects of
antipsychotic medication in a capital case, is instructive:
It is a fundamental assumption of the
adversary system that the trier of fact
observes the accused throughout the trial,
while the accused is either on the stand or
sitting at the defense table. This
assumption derives from the right to be
present at trial, which in turn derives from
the right to testify and rights under the
Confrontation Clause. At all stages of the
proceedings, the defendant’s behavior,
manner, facial expressions, and emotional
responses, or their absence, combine to
make an overall impression on the trier of
fact, an impression that can have a
powerful influence on the outcome of the
trial. If the defendant takes the stand, . . .
his demeanor can have a great bearing on
his credibility and persuasiveness, and on
the degree to which he evokes sympathy.
The defendant’s demeanor may also be
relevant to his confrontation rights.196
ii. Intellectual Disability
In Atkins v. Virginia, decided in 2000, the United
States Supreme Court declared that if a defendant fits a
proper definition of intellectual disability (or “mental
retardation,” as the term was used at the time), he is
ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.197
The Court left it to the states to formulate an appropriate
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (citation
omitted).
197 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Hall v.
Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
196
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definition and procedure for determining intellectual
disability. 198
Before Atkins was decided, in 1990 the Tennessee
General Assembly enacted Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-13-203 to exempt from the death penalty those
defendants who fit the statutory definition of “mental
retardation.”199 The statute has since been amended to
change the label from “retardation” to “intellectual
disability,” but the three statutory elements to the
definition remain the same: “(1) Significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a
functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or
below; (2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) The
intellectual disability must have been manifested during
the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of
age.”200 Many Tennessee capital defendants have low
intellectual functioning, and a number of them can make
viable arguments that they fit within the statutory
definition of intellectual disability and therefore should
be exempt from capital punishment, although often they
do not prevail on this issue.201
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 416–17 (1986)).
199 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1038 (codified as amended in TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (2010)).
200 State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 202 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)); see also Van Tran v. Colson,
764 F.3d 594, 605 (6th Cir. 2014).
201 A number of capital defendants have reported I.Q.’s in the
borderline range of intellectual disability, even if many of them
did not qualify for the intellectual disability exemption. See,
e.g., Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 794 (Tenn. 2014)
(reported I.Q. of 74); Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 202–03 (reported
I.Q. of 66 and 68); Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 617 (Tenn.
2012) (Wade, J., dissenting) (reported I.Q. of 67); State v.
Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. 2007) (reported I.Q. of 69); State
v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 660 (Tenn. 2006) (reported I.Q. of 79);
Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 463 (Tenn. 2004) (reported
I.Q. of between 62 and 73, with a high score of 91); State v.
198
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A defendant’s low intellectual functioning can
lead to two additional avenues of arbitrariness in
Tennessee’s capital punishment system.
First, the statutory category of intellectual
disability is arbitrarily and vaguely defined. Intellectual
disability is determined on a multi-dimensional set of
sliding or graduated scales, and the condition can
manifest itself in a multitude of ways. How are we to
measure those scales, and how are we to draw a fine line
in identifying those who fall within the category of
defendants who shall be exempted from capital
punishment? For example, what is the practical
difference between a functional I.Q. of 71 versus 69? In
many cases, the defendant has been administered several
I.Q. tests at different points in his life yielding different
scores. How are those scores to be reconciled? Moreover,
the measure of each scale cannot be ascertained strictly
from raw test scores but requires the application of an
expert witness’s “clinical judgment.”202 In a battle of
Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tenn. 2003) (reported I.Q. of 78);
State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 465–66 (Tenn. 2002)
(reported I.Q. of between 72 and 83); Van Tran v. State, 66
S.W.3d 790, 793–94 (Tenn. 2001) (reported I.Q. of between 65
and 72); State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 278 (Tenn. 1998)
(reported I.Q. of 74); State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 912
(Tenn. 1994) (reported I.Q. ranging from 54 to 88); State v.
Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Tenn. 1991) (reported I.Q. of 76);
State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tenn. 1990) (reported I.Q.
of 78 to 82); Cribbs v. State, No. W2006-01381-CCA-R3-PD,
2009 WL 1905454, at *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 21, 2009)
(reported I.Q. of 73); Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 525
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (I.Q. in the “sixties and seventies”).
202 Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 242 (Tenn. 2011). In
Coleman, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
statutory definition “does not require that raw scores on I.Q.
tests be accepted at their face value and that the courts may
consider competent expert testimony showing that a test score
does not accurately reflect a person’s functional I.Q. . . . .” Id.
at 224.
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testifying experts, whose clinical judgment are we to
trust? As the Tennessee Supreme Court has
acknowledged, “Without question, mental retardation is
a difficult condition to accurately define. The United
States Supreme Court, in Atkins v. Virginia, admitted as
much, stating: ‘[t]o the extent there is serious
disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact
retarded.’”203 With reference to the I.Q. element of the
statutory definition, the Howell Court went on to say,
“The statute does not provide a clear directive regarding
which particular test or testing method is to be used.”204
Consequently, the proper interpretation of the definition,
and its application to specific cases, has generated
considerable litigation.205 These cases involve a battle of
the experts, and whether a defendant is found to be
intellectually disabled under the statutory definition and
therefore exempt from the death penalty may well
depend on the quality of his defense counsel, the
personality and persuasiveness of the expert testimony,
and the disposition and receptivity of the judge making
the ultimate determination. In close cases, the issue has
a markedly subjective aspect, leaving room for arbitrary
decision-making.
The second factor contributing to arbitrariness
relates to one of the reasons for disqualifying the
intellectually disabled from capital punishment—their
Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 457 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317).
Id. at 459.
205 See, e.g., Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2017)
(reflecting years of litigation in a case involving a broad range
of I.Q. scores); Van Tran, 764 F.3d 594 (vacating the state
court’s judgment after years of litigation and ruling that
defendant was intellectually disabled and therefore exempt
from execution); Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn.
2011) (discussing a line of Tennessee intellectual disability
cases illustrating the court’s struggle in interpreting the
meaning of the statutory elements).
203
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reduced capacity to assist in their defense. In Atkins, the
United States Supreme Court explained:
The reduced capacity of mentally retarded
offenders provides a second justification
for a categorical rule making such
offenders ineligible for the death penalty.
The risk “that the death penalty will be
imposed in spite of factors which may call
for a less severe penalty” is enhanced, not
only by the possibility of false confessions,
but also by the lesser ability of mentally
retarded defendants to make a persuasive
showing of mitigation in the face of
prosecutorial evidence of one or more
aggravating factors. Mentally retarded
defendants may be less able to give
meaningful assistance to their counsel and
are typically poor witnesses, and their
demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes. . . . [M]oreover, reliance on mental
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a
two-edged sword that may enhance the
likelihood that the aggravating factor of
future dangerousness will be found by the
jury. Mentally retarded defendants in the
aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution.206
In this respect, intellectual disability and mental
illness similarly affect the reliability of capital
sentencing, by impairing, through no fault of the
defendant, both the defendant’s capacity to work with
defense counsel and the defendant’s capacity to present
himself to the court and the jury in a favorable way.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted).
206
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With regard to sentencing, this problem may be
partially resolved when the defendant is found to fall
within the statutory definition of intellectual disability,
but there are several other cases in which the defendant’s
intellectual functioning is compromised yet the
defendant is not declared intellectually disabled. Too
often it is simply a matter of degree and subjective
evaluation by the judge in the face of conflicting expert
testimony. Even if a defendant is held not to be exempt
from capital punishment, his reduced intellectual
functioning can nevertheless impair his capacity to assist
in his defense and to present himself in the courtroom,
which contributes to the arbitrariness of the system.
8. Race
African Americans represent 17% of Tennessee’s
population, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, but
they represent 44% of Tennessee’s current death row
population207 (only 51% of the current death row
population is non-Hispanic White).208 While a number of
factors may account for this discrepancy, it cannot be
ignored, and it suggests a pernicious form of
arbitrariness.
No one can doubt the existence of implicit racial
bias in our criminal justice system, and this bias
inevitably infects the capital punishment system.209 The
See infra Appendix 1.
See infra Appendix 2.
209 For general discussions of implicit racial bias, see generally
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias,
94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004). The presence of racial bias in our
criminal justice system—whether explicit or implicit—has
been well established. See, e.g., NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, RACE AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (Samuel R.
Gross et al, eds., 2017); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
207
208
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exercise of discretion permeates a capital case—from the
time of arrest through the charging decision, the district
attorney’s decision to seek the death penalty,
innumerable decisions by all of the parties and the
judiciary throughout the proceedings, and the ultimate
jury decision of life versus death. Where there is
discretion, there is room for implicit racial bias.
In 1997, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
Commission on Racial and Ethnic Fairness issued its
Final Report at the conclusion of its two-year review of
the state’s judicial system.210 Among other things, the
Commission concluded that while no “explicit
manifestations of racial bias abound” in the Tennessee
judicial system, “institutionalized bias is relentlessly at
work.”211 While our society continually attempts to
eradicate the effects of implicit bias from our institutions,
there is no indication that it has been eliminated from
our capital sentencing system.
The American Bar Association commissioned a
study of racial bias in Tennessee’s capital punishment
system that was published in 2007.212 The study
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010); see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN
SENTENCING
(2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/demographicdifferences-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/5QPE-6AJK]
(concluding based on several studies that “Black male
offenders continue[] to receive longer sentences than similarly
situated White male offenders” by a substantial margin).
210 TENN. SUP. CT. COMM’N ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS,
FINAL
REPORT
(1997),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/
default/files/docs/report_from_commission_on_racial__ethnic_
fairness.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE42-93VR].
211 Id. at 5.
212 GLENN PIERCE ET AL., Race and Death Sentencing in
Tennessee: 1981-2000, in AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS:
THE TENNESSEE DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT, app.
(2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
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concluded that the race of the defendant and the victim
influences who receives the death sentence, “even after
the level of homicide aggravation is statistically
controlled.”213
The recent trend regarding race is disturbing.
Over the past ten years, from July 1, 2007, to June 30,
2017, there were nine trials resulting in new death
sentences; in all but one of those cases (i.e., in 89% of the
cases), the defendant was African American.214 It appears
that as the death penalty becomes less frequently
imposed, it is imposed on African Americans in an
increasing percentage of cases.
9. Judicial Disparity
While judges are presumed to be objective and
impartial, from our experience in capital cases we know
that different judges view these cases differently, and the
predisposition of a judge can influence his or her
decisions in capital cases. We can begin by looking at the
deeply divided death penalty opinions issued by the
Supreme Court on a yearly basis, from the nine differing
opinions issued in Furman v. Georgia in 1972 through the
five conflicting opinions issued in Glossip v. Gross in 2015
and in cases since then.173 For example, Justices Brennan
and Marshall categorically opposed the death penalty
and always voted to reverse or vacate death sentences,
while Justices Rehnquist and Scalia consistently voted to
uphold death sentences. This split continues with the
current members of the Court.
We see similarly opposing views expressed on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
moratorium/assessmentproject/tennessee/finalreport.authcheckd
am.pdf [https://perma.cc/43LZ-QRRH].
213 Id. at R.
214 See infra Appendix 2. These numbers exclude retrials.
173 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Glossip v. Gross,
135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
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These judges, persons of integrity and intelligence, acting
in good faith, and looking at the same cases involving the
same legal principles, often come to opposing conclusions
about what the proper outcomes should be. Among the
defense bar, and probably within the Attorney General’s
office, we know that in many federal habeas cases, the
judge or panel that we draw will likely determine the
outcome of the case.
Our review of the voting records of Sixth Circuit
judges in capital habeas cases arising out of Tennessee
emphasizes the point. The Chart of Sixth Circuit Voting
in Tennessee Capital Habeas Cases, published as
Appendix 4, breaks down the Sixth Circuit votes
according to political party affiliation—i.e., according to
whether the judges were appointed by Republican or
Democrat administrations. We found 37 Sixth Circuit
decisions in which the court finally disposed of capital
habeas cases from Tennessee. In those cases, Republicanappointed judges cast 88% of their votes to deny relief
and only 12% of their votes to grant relief. By contrast,
Democrat-appointed judges cast only 22% of their votes
to deny relief, and 78% of their votes to grant relief. In
other words, the voting records for Republican-appointed
judges were the opposite from the voting records for
Democrat-appointed
judges;
Republican-appointed
judges were significantly more favorable to the
prosecution, whereas Democrat-appointed judges were
significantly more favorable to the defense.215
The political skewing of the voting records is
greater in the twenty cases that were decided by split
votes, which represent a majority of the Sixth Circuit
cases. In those cases, Republican-appointees voted
against the defendant 93% of the time, and for defendant
only 7% of the time; whereas Democrat-appointees voted
exactly the opposite way—against the defendant only 7%
of the time, and for the defendant 93% of the time.
Similarly, in the six Tennessee capital cases that were
215

See infra Appendix 4.
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decided by the full en banc court, Republican-appointed
judges cast 91% of their votes against the defendants,
whereas Democrat-appointed judges cast 97% of their
votes in favor of the defendants. In five of the six en banc
cases, the court’s decision was determined strictly along
party lines.216
Without pointing to individual members of the
Tennessee judiciary, it is reasonable to believe that
different state court judges also differ in their exercise of
judgment in these kinds of cases. All practicing attorneys
know that a judge’s worldview can shape his or her
attitude towards the death penalty, towards criminal
defendants, and towards the criminal justice system in
general. These attitudes can affect decisions ranging
from the final judgment in a post-conviction case to
rulings on evidentiary and procedural issues during the
course of pre-trial and trial proceedings.
That is to be expected in the highly controversial
and emotionally charged arena of capital punishment. It
is human nature. Everyone approaches these kinds of
issues with certain cognitive biases shaped by differing
worldviews.217 Trial judges are elected officials, and we
know from the experience of Justice Penny White that
the politics of the death penalty can even influence the

Id. at 5–6.
For interesting discussions of how different cognitive styles
deal with controversial social issues in different ways, see
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008);
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional
Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping
Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 312 (2008); Dan M. Kahan &
Donald Bramam, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (2006). For studies of judicial bias
based on differing political perspectives, see generally Max M.
Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the
Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence,
and Reform, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 715 (2008); Chris Guthrie,
Misjudging, 7 Nev. L.J. 420 (2007).
216
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court’s composition.218 It goes without saying that liberal
judges tend to be somewhat more sympathetic to defense
arguments and conservative judges tend to be somewhat
more sympathetic to prosecution arguments. This is not
necessarily a criticism, for in our society, diversity of
viewpoint is a good thing. However, in highly charged
death penalty cases where divergent points of view are
more likely to come to the fore and where arbitrariness is
not to be tolerated, differences in judicial disposition
contribute to the capriciousness of the capital
punishment system. From our study, this is obviously
true to a remarkable degree in the federal court system,
and there is good reason to believe it is true at least to
some degree in the state court system as well.
C. Comparative Disproportionality: Single vs.
Multi-Murder Cases
It is beyond the scope of this article to identify the
many extremely egregious cases resulting in life or
LWOP sentences, or to compare them to the many
significantly less egregious cases leading to death
sentences or executions. Yet the statistics concerning one
simple metric make the point—number of victims. Mr.
Miller has identified 339 defendants convicted of
multiple counts of first degree murder since 1977. Of
In 1996, Justice White became the only Tennessee Supreme
Court Justice who was removed from office in a retention
election. She was the political victim of a campaign to remove
her from the court because of her concurring vote to reverse the
death sentence in a single death penalty case—State v. Odom,
928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). Justice White’s experience was
discussed in a recent study regarding the effects of political
judicial elections on judicial decision-making in capital cases.
See Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, Uneven Justice: In States
With Elected High Court Judges, a Harder Line on Capital
Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges/
[https://perma.cc/7XGW-2AYT].
218
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those, only 33 (or 10%) received sustained death
sentences, whereas 306 (or 90%) received life or LWOP.219
Several in the life/LWOP category were convicted of three
or more murders. These numbers can be broken down as
follows:

219

See infra Appendix 1 at 209.
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Multi-Murder Cases - Breakdown By Number of
Victims & Sentences220
Number of
Victims

Life or
LWOP
Sentences

Sustained
Death
Sentences

Totals

2

259
(92% of 2Victim cases)

24
(8% of 2Victim cases)

283

3

32
(82% of 3Victim cases)

7
(18% of 3Victim cases)

39

4

11
(92% of 4Victim cases)

1
(8% of 4Victim cases)

12

5

1
(100% of 5Victim cases)

0
(0% of 5Victim cases)

1

6

3
(75% of 6Victim cases)

1
(25% of 6Victim cases)

4

TOTALS

306
(90% of MultiMurder Cases)

33
(10% of MultiMurder Cases)

339

Virtually all of these defendants were found guilty
of premeditated murder (as opposed to felony murder).
Thus, from these statistics, if a defendant deliberately
killed two or more victims, he was nine times more likely
to be sentenced to life or LWOP than death; and the
sentence he received most likely depended on extraneous
factors such as the geographic location of the crime, the
220

Table 13A, Miller Report.
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prosecutor, quality of defense counsel, timing of the case,
and the other factors described above.
On the other hand, compared to the 306 multiple
murder defendants who were sentenced to life or LWOP
instead of death, a majority of the defendants with
sustained death sentences (53 out of a total of 86, or 62%)
committed single murders, and several of them were
found guilty of felony murder and not premeditated
murder.221
This
comparative
disproportionality
demonstrates a lack of rationality in Tennessee’s system.
The evidence of such inconsistent results, of sentencing
decisions that cannot be explained solely on the basis of
individual culpability, indicates that the system operates
arbitrarily, contrary to the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment.
VII. Conclusion
A. U.S. Supreme Court Dissenting Opinions
We are not alone in claiming that the historical
record shows that capital sentencing systems like
Tennessee’s fail Furman’s commandment against
arbitrariness and capriciousness. The death penalty has
hung by a thin thread since it was reinstated in Gregg.
The vote to uphold the guided discretion scheme in Gregg
We have identified ten cases resulting in sustained death
sentences in which the defendants were convicted of felony
murder and not premeditated murder: State v. Bell, 480 S.W.3d
486 (Tenn. 2015); State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180 (Tenn. 2013);
State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Powers,
101 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913
(Tenn. 2000); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1994);
State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Howell,
868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Middlebrooks, 840
S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992); and State v. Barnes, 703 S.W.2d 611
(Tenn. 1985).
221

[173]
173

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

was seven-to-two.222 Justices Powell, Blackmun, and
Stevens were among the seven in the majority.223
However, after years of observing the application of
guided discretion sentencing schemes in the real world,
each of these Justices have changed his mind. These
three Justices, combined with the dissenting Justices in
Gregg,224 would have constituted a majority going the
other way.
Justice Powell dissented in Furman, voting to
uphold discretionary death penalty statutes, and also
authored the Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,
which upheld Georgia’s death penalty against a
challenge based upon demonstrated racial bias.225
Shortly after his retirement, however, his biographer
published the following colloquy:
In a conversation with the author [John C.
Jeffries, Jr.] in the summer of 1991, Powell
was asked if he would change his vote in
any case:
“Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.”
“Do you mean you would now accept
the argument from statistics?”
“No, I would vote the other way in
any capital case.”
“In any capital case?”
“Yes.”
“Even in Furman v. Georgia?”
“Yes, I have come to think that
capital punishment should be abolished.”
Capital punishment, Powell added, “serves
no useful purpose.” The United States was
“unique among the industrialized nations
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id.
224 Justices Brennan and Marshall cast the dissenting votes.
Id.
225 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
222
223
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of the West in maintaining the death
penalty,” and it was enforced so rarely that
it could not deter.226
Justice Blackmun, who also dissented in Furman
and voted to uphold discretionary sentencing statutes,
and voted with the majority in Gregg, first expressed his
changed view in 1992:
Twenty years have passed since this Court
declared that the death penalty must be
imposed fairly, and with reasonable
consistency, or not at all, and, despite the
effort of the States and the Court to devise
legal formulas and procedural rules to
meet this daunting challenge, the death
penalty
remains
fraught
with
arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and
mistake. 227
Justice Stevens, who was relatively new to the
Court when he joined the Gregg majority, followed suit in
2008:
I have relied on my own experience in
reaching the conclusion that the
imposition of the death penalty represents
“the pointless and needless extinction of
life with only marginal contributions to
any discernible social or public purposes. A
penalty with such negligible returns to the
State [is] patently excessive and cruel and

JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A
BIOGRAPHY 451–52 (1994).
227 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
226
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unusual punishment violative of the
Eighth Amendment.”228
With reference to current Justices who were not
on the Court when Gregg was decided, in the case of
Glossip v. Gross, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg recently
looked at the historical record. In a careful analysis, they
explained why a system such as Tennessee’s can no
longer be sustained. They summarized their analysis as
follows:
In 1976, the Court thought that the
constitutional infirmities in the death
penalty could be healed; the Court in effect
delegated significant responsibility to the
States to develop procedures that would
protect against those constitutional
problems. Almost 40 years of studies,
surveys, and experience strongly indicate,
however, that this effort has failed. Today’s
administration of the death penalty
involves three fundamental constitutional
defects: (1) serious unreliability, (2)
arbitrariness in application, and (3)
unconscionably
long
delays
that
undermine the death penalty’s penological
purpose. Perhaps as a result, (4) most
places within the United States have
abandoned its use.229
The Glossip dissent is significant because it represents a
shifting view and eloquently reflects on the failed effort
over forty years to apply guided discretion capital
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
229 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
228
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sentencing schemes that were supposed to address the
problem of arbitrariness. The historical record in
Tennessee, as well as in other states that have attempted
to maintain capital sentencing systems, speaks to how
this kind of system simply has not been able to
accomplish that goal.
B. Opinions From the ALI and the ABA
Tennessee Assessment Team
The opinions of the dissenting Supreme Court
Justices are echoed by other leading authorities.
As mentioned above, Tennessee’s capital
punishment scheme was patterned after the Georgia
scheme approved in Gregg, which in turn was patterned
in part after section 210.6 of the American Law
Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code.230 In 2009, the ALI
withdrew section 210.6 from the Model Penal Code
because of its concerns about whether death penalty
systems can be made fair.231 In recommending
withdrawal of this section from the Model Penal Code,
the ALI Council issued a Report to its membership
stating, “Section 210.6 was an untested innovation in
1962. We now have decades of experience with deathpenalty systems modeled on it. . . . [O]n the whole the
section has not withstood the tests of time and
experience.”232 The Report went on to describe the ALI
Council’s reasons for its concerns about fairness in death
penalty systems, as follows:

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
231 See AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE
MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER
OF
THE
DEATH PENALTY (2009) https://www.ali.org/
media/filer_public/3f/ae/3fae71f1-0b2b-4591-ae5c-5870ce5975c6/
capital_punishment_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RBL-ZPQ6].
232 Id. at 4.
230
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These [concerns] include (a) the tension
between clear statutory identification of
which murders should command the death
penalty
and
the
constitutional
requirement
of
individualized
determination; (b) the difficulty of limiting
the list of aggravating factors so that they
do not cover (as they do in a number of
state statutes now) a large percentage of
murderers; (c) the near impossibility of
addressing by legal rule the conscious or
unconscious racial bias within the
criminal-justice system that has resulted
in statistical disparity in death sentences
based on the race of the victim; (d) the
enormous economic costs of administering
a death-penalty regime, combined with
studies
showing
that
the
legal
representation provided to some criminal
defendants is inadequate; (e) the
likelihood, especially given the availability
and reliability of DNA testing, that some
persons sentenced to death will later, and
perhaps too late, be shown to not have
committed the crime for which they were
sentenced; and (f) the politicization of
judicial elections, where—even though
nearly all state judges perform their tasks
conscientiously—candidate statements of
personal views on the death penalty and
incumbent judges’ actions in death-penalty
cases become campaign issues.233

Id. at 5. The ALI reported an “overwhelming” vote for
withdrawal of section 210.6. Model Penal Code, AM. LAW INST.,
https://www.ali.org/publications/show/model-penal-code
[https://perma.cc/4W2E-MGTT].
233
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In a similar vein and focusing on Tennessee, the
American Bar Association appointed a Tennessee Death
Penalty Assessment Team to assess fairness and
accuracy in Tennessee’s death penalty system.234 The
Assessment Team conducted an extensive study of
Tennessee’s system and issued its lengthy report in
March 2007.235 The Team concluded that “Tennessee’s
death penalty system falls short in the effort to afford
every capital defendant fair and accurate procedures.”236
The Report identified the following areas “as most in
need of reform”:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Inadequate procedures to address innocence
claims
Excessive caseloads of defense counsel
Inadequate access to experts and investigators
Inadequate qualification and performance
standards for defense counsel
Lack of meaningful proportionality review
Lack of transparency in the clemency process
Significant capital juror confusion

The members of the Assessment Team were Professor
Dwight L. Aarons, Chair, Associate Professor of Law at The
University of Tennessee College of Law; W.J. Michael Cody,
former Tennessee Attorney General; Kathryn Reed Edge,
former President of the Tennessee Bar Association; Jeffrey S.
Henry, Executive Director of the Tennessee District Public
Defenders Conference; Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, former Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit; attorney Bradley A. MacLean; and attorney William T.
Ramsey.
235 AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN
STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE TENNESSEE DEATH
PENALTY
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
(2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/mora
torium/assessmentproject/tennessee/finalreport.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/43LZ-QRRH].
236 Id. at iii.
234
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•
•
•

Racial disparities in Tennessee’s capital
sentencing
Geographical disparities in Tennessee’s
capital sentencing
Death sentences imposed on people with
severe mental disability237

C. Final Remarks
It is clear from the statistics and our experience
over the past 40 years that Tennessee’s death penalty
system “fails to provide a constitutionally tolerable
response to Furman’s rejection of unbridled jury
discretion in the imposition of capital sentences.”238 The
system is riddled with arbitrariness.
A person of compassion and empathy cannot deny
that the death penalty is cruel. “Death is truly an
awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human
being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial
of the executed person’s humanity.”239 “The penalty of
death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its
total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal
justice. And it is unique, finally in its absolute
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity.”240
When over the past 40 years Tennessee has
executed fewer than one out of every 400 defendants (less
than 1/4 of 1%) convicted of first degree murder; when
Tennessee sentences 90% of multiple murderers to life or
life without parole and only 10% to death; when the
Id. at iii–vi.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
239 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 446, 469 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
240 Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
237
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majority of capital cases are reversed or vacated because
of trial error; when the courts have found that in over
23% of capital cases, defense counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient; when the number of death row
defendants who die of natural causes is four times
greater than the number Tennessee actually executed;
when we have seen only one new capital case in
Tennessee since mid-2014; when we have not seen any
death sentences in the Middle Grand Division since early
2001—then, it must also be said that the death penalty
is an “unusual” and unfair punishment. The statistics
make clear that Tennessee’s system is at least as
arbitrary and capricious as the systems declared
unconstitutional in Furman—and that is without
accounting for the exorbitant delays and costs inherent
in Tennessee’s system, which far exceed the delays and
costs inherent in the pre-Furman era.
The lack of proportionality and rationality in our
selection of the few whom we decide to kill is
breathtakingly indifferent to fairness, without
justification by any legitimate penological purpose. The
death penalty system as it has operated in Tennessee
over the past 40 years, and especially over the past ten
years, is but a cruel lottery, entrenching the very
problems that Furman sought to eradicate.
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Forty years ago, the Tennessee legislature
enacted the state’s current capital sentencing scheme to
replace prior statutes that had been declared
unconstitutional.2 Although the current scheme has been

This report is subject to updating as additional first degree
murder cases are found.
2 See State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. 1974); Collins v.
State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977) (invalidating Tennessee’s
then-existing death penalty statutes).
1
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amended in certain of its details, its essential features
remain in place.3
In Tennessee, a death sentence can be imposed
only in a case of “aggravated” first degree murder upon a
“balancing”
of
statutorily
defined
aggravating
circumstances4 proven by the prosecution and the
mitigating circumstances presented by the defense.5 The
Tennessee Supreme Court is statutorily required to
review each death sentence “to determine whether: (A)
[t]he sentence of death was imposed in any arbitrary
fashion; (B) [t]he evidence supports the jury’s finding of
statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances;
(C) [t]he evidence supports the jury’s finding that the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh
any mitigating circumstances; and (D) [t]he sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of
the crime and the defendant.”6 The court’s consideration
of whether a death sentence is “excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases”
is referred to as “comparative proportionality review.”7
In 1978, the court promulgated Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 12 (formerly Rule 47), requiring
that “in all cases . . . in which the defendant is convicted
of first[ ]degree murder,” the trial judge shall complete
and file a report (the “Rule 12 Report”) to include

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2011) (sentencing for first
degree murder); § 39-13-206 (1993) (appeal and review of death
sentence).
4 Aggravating circumstances are defined in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-13-204(i).
5 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g) To impose a death
sentence, the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances; if a single juror votes for life or life
without parole, then the death sentence cannot be imposed. Id.
6 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1).
7 See State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 232 (Tenn. 2005).
3
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information about the case.8 Rule 12 was intended to
create a database of first degree murder cases for use in
comparative proportionality review.9
The modern history of Tennessee’s death penalty
system raises questions that go to the heart of
constitutional issues: How have we selected the “worst of
the bad”10 among convicted first degree murderers for
imposition of the ultimate sanction of death? Is there a
meaningful distinction between those cases resulting in
death sentences and those resulting in life (or life without
parole) sentences? Does Tennessee’s capital punishment
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 12.
In State v. Adkins, 725 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tenn. 1987), the
court stated that “our proportionality review of death penalty
cases since Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12 (formerly Rule
47) was promulgated in 1978 has been predicated largely on
those reports and has never been limited to the cases that have
come before us on appeal.” See also the court’s press release
issued January 1, 1999, announcing the use of CD-ROMs to
store copies of Rule 12 reports, in which then Chief Justice
Riley Anderson was quoted as saying, “The court’s primary
interest in the database is for comparative proportionality
review in these cases, which is required by court rule and state
law[.] . . . The [Tennessee] Supreme Court reviews the data to
ensure rationality and consistency in the imposition of the
death penalty and to identify aberrant sentences during the
appeal process.” Press Release, Tenn. Admin. Office of the
Courts, Court Provides High-Tech Tool for Legal Research in
Murder Cases, (Jan. 1, 1999), http://tncourts.gov/press/
1999/01/01/court-provides-high-tech-tool-legal-researchmurder-cases [https://perma.cc/K48E-E27V]. But cf. State v.
Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997) (changing the comparative
proportionality review methodology by limiting the pool of
comparison cases to capital cases that previously came before
the court on appeal).
10 The expression “the worst of the bad” has been used by the
court to refer to those defendants deserving of the death
penalty. See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 739 (Tenn.
1994); State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563, 573 (Tenn. 1993)
(Drowota, J., concurring).
8
9

[185]
185

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

system operate rationally, consistently, and reliably; or
does it operate in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion?
Is there meaning to comparative proportionality review?
To assist in addressing these questions, I
undertook a survey of all Tennessee cases resulting in
first degree murder convictions since implementation of
the state’s current death penalty system—covering the
40-year period from July 1, 1977, through June 30, 2017.
I. The Survey Process
My starting point was to review all Rule 12
Reports on file with the Administrative Office of the
Courts and the Office of the Clerk of the Tennessee
Supreme Court. I quickly encountered a problem. In close
to half of all first degree murder cases, trial judges failed
to file the required Rule 12 Reports, and in many other
cases, the filed Rule 12 Reports were incomplete or
inaccurate, or were not supplemented by subsequent case
developments such as reversal or retrial. I found that
because many first degree murder cases are reviewed on
appeal, appellate court decisions are an essential source
of the information that cannot be found in the Rule 12
Reports. But many cases are resolved by plea agreements
at the trial level without an appeal, leaving no record
with the appellate court; and many appellate court
decisions are not published in the standard case
reporters.
Accordingly, over the past three years I have
devoted untold hours searching various sources to locate
and review Tennessee’s first degree murder cases.11 I
have had the assistance of Bradley A. MacLean and other
attorneys who handle first degree murder cases. I have
also received generous help from officials with the
Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts and the
Tennessee Department of Correction, along with
numerous court officials throughout the state. I would
11

I have spent well in excess of 3,000 hours on this project.
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like to specifically acknowledge the tremendous
assistance offered by the staff of the Tennessee State
Library.
In conducting this survey, I have reviewed the
following sources of information:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•

•

All Rule 12 Reports as provided by the Tennessee
Administrative Office of the Courts and the Office
of the Clerk for the Tennessee Supreme Court;
Reports on capital cases issued by the
Administrative Office of the Courts;
The report, Tennessee Death Penalty Cases Since
1977, published by The Tennessee Justice
Project;12
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and
Tennessee Supreme Court decisions in first
degree murder cases, as published on the
Administrative Office of the Courts’ website;
Cases published in Fastcase on the Tennessee Bar
Association website;
Cases published in Westlaw and Google Scholar;
Data furnished by the Tennessee Department of
Correction;
Information found in the Tennessee Department
of Correction’s TOMIS system as published on its
website, and information separately provided by
officials at the Tennessee Department of
Correction;
Information found in the Shelby County Register
of Deeds’ Listing of Tennessee Deaths (the statewide “Death Index” maintained by Tom
Leatherwood, the Register of Deeds, has been very
helpful in obtaining information regarding
victims);
Original court records;

THE TENN. JUSTICE PROJECT, TENNESSEE DEATH PENALTY
CASES SINCE 1977 (June 15, 2008) (on file with authors).
12
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•

News publications.

I have attempted to compile the following data
regarding each first degree murder case, to the extent
available from the sources I reviewed:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Name and TOMIS number of the defendant;
Date of the offense;
Defendant’s date of birth and age on the date of
the offense;
Defendant’s gender and race;
Number, gender, race, and age(s) of first degree
murder victim(s) in each case;
Whether a notice to seek the death penalty was
filed (if indicated in the Rule 12 Forms);
County where the judgment of conviction was
entered, and county where the offense occurred (if
different);
Sentence imposed for each first degree murder
conviction; and
Whether a Rule 12 Report was filed.
In capital cases, whether the conviction or
sentence was reversed, vacated or commuted, and
the status of the case as of June 30, 2017.

The data I compiled is set forth in the following
Appendices:
Appendix A : Master Chart of Adult Defendants with
Sustained First Degree Murder Convictions from July
1, 1977 through June 30, 2017, in which Rule 12
Reports Were Filed.
Appendix B: Master Chart of Adult Defendants with
Sustained First Degree Murder Convictions During
the 40-Year Period, in which Rule 12 Reports Were
Not Filed.
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Appendix C: Master Chart of Juvenile Defendants (tried
and convicted as adults) with Sustained First Degree
Murder Convictions During the 40-Year Period, in
which Rule 12 Reports Were Filed.
Appendix D: Master Chart of Juvenile Defendants (tried
and convicted as adults) with Sustained First Degree
Murder Convictions During the 40-Year Period, in
which Rule 12 Reports Were Not Filed.
Appendix E: Chart Showing Numbers of Adult &
Juvenile Defendants with Sustained First Degree
Convictions.
Appendix F: Chart of Adult Cases Broken Down by
County and Grand Division and Rule 12 Compliance.
Appendix G: Chart of Adult Multi-Murder Cases.
Appendix H: Chart of Tennessee Capital Trials During
the 40-Year Period.
Ultimately all of this data can be derived from
public court records.
A. Caveats
I am confident that I have found and reviewed all
cases decided during the 40-Year Period in which death
sentences have been imposed. This was a feasible task,
for several reasons. The total number of capital trials
that resulted in death sentences during this period (221)
is relatively small compared to the total number of first
degree murder cases (2,514)13 that I have been able to
find. The Tennessee Supreme Court reviews on direct
appeal all trials resulting in death sentences, creating a
This excludes cases of juvenile offenders who were not
eligible for the death penalty.
13
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published opinion in each case. There exist various
sources of information that specifically deal with capital
cases, including records maintained by public defender
offices, The Tennessee Justice Project reports of 2007 and
2008, the monthly and quarterly reports on capital cases
issued by the Tennessee Administrative Office of the
Courts, and records maintained by the Tennessee
Department of Correction concerning the death row
population.
On the other hand, I am equally confident that I
have not found all first degree murder cases. I have
carefully studied all filed Rule 12 Reports, but in 46% of
first degree murder cases, trial judges failed to file the
required Rule 12 Reports. This Rule 12 noncompliance is
especially problematic in regards to the most recent cases
because of the time it typically takes for a first degree
murder case to create a readily accessible record as it
works through the trial and appellate processes.14
Consequently, the ratios presented in this report
are distorted because the totals of first degree murder
cases that I have found are lower than the totals of actual
cases. For example, among the cases I have been able to
find, 3.4% of defendants convicted of first degree murder
convictions received Sustained Death Sentences. We can
be sure that, in fact, the actual percentage of Sustained
Death Sentences is lower, because I am certain that I
have not found all first degree murder cases resulting in
life or LWOP sentences that should be included in the
totals.
I have spent considerable time verifying my data
by double-checking and cross-referencing my research,
and by consulting with others in the field. Due to the
For example, there were only 93 first degree murder cases
from the past four years (2013–2017), as compared to an
average of 269 cases for each of the nine preceding four-year
periods, even though Tennessee’s murder rate over this most
recent period was virtually the same as in prior periods. See
infra Tables 23 and 25.
14
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sheer volume of data involved, the absence of Rule 12
Reports in many cases, and the inaccuracies in the Rule
12 Reports that have been filed in several other cases, I
am sure my data contain some errors. Notwithstanding,
in my view any errors are relatively minor and
statistically insignificant except as otherwise noted.
I have included two master charts reflecting
Sustained First Degree Murder Convictions of
juveniles—i.e., of defendants who were less than 18 years
old at the time of the offense but were tried and convicted
as adults. This report does not focus attention on juvenile
cases because juvenile defendants are ineligible for the
death sentence. Nonetheless, information about juvenile
defendants may be helpful to indicate the scope of
juvenile convictions and the degree of Rule 12
noncompliance in juvenile cases.
The percentages indicated in this report are
rounded to the nearest 1% unless otherwise indicated.
II. Summary of Findings
A. Definitions
For purposes of this report and the Appendices,
the following definitions apply:
40-Year Period: The period of this survey, from
July 1, 1977, to June 30, 2017. This survey is based on
the date of the crime. All data regarding defendants on
Death Row are as of June 30, 2017, without taking
account of subsequent developments in their cases.
Awaiting Retrial: A Capital Case in which the
defendant received Conviction Relief or Sentence Relief
and was awaiting a retrial as of June 30, 2017.
Capital Case: A case decided during the 40-Year
Period in which the defendant received a death sentence
[191]
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at the Initial Trial, including cases in which death
sentences or the underlying convictions were
subsequently reversed or vacated.
Capital Trial: An Initial Trial or a subsequent
Retrial resulting in a death sentence.
Conviction Relief: A defendant receives
Conviction Relief from a Capital Trial when a conviction
from that Capital Trial is reversed on direct appeal or
vacated in state post-conviction or federal habeas
proceedings, even if the defendant is convicted on retrial.
Death Row consists of all defendants with
Pending Death Sentences as of June 30, 2017. It does not
include defendants not under death sentence while
awaiting Retrial.
Death Sentence Reversal Rate: The percentage of
Capital Trials that result in Conviction Relief or
Sentence Relief. The Death Sentence Reversal Rate
refers to Capital Trials, not capital defendants. A
defendant’s Initial Capital Trial might be reversed, and
on Retrial he might be resentenced to death. That would
count as one reversal out of two trials.
Deceased: A defendant who died during the 40Year Period while he was under a sentence of death.
Initial Capital Trial: In any Capital Case during
the 40-Year Period, the Initial Capital Trial is the initial
trial at which the defendant was sentenced to death. The
Initial Capital Trial is to be distinguished from any
Retrial.
LWOP: Life without parole sentence.
Multi-Murder Case: A Sustained Adult First
Degree Murder Case in which the defendant was
[192]
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convicted of two or more counts of first degree murder
involving two or more murder victims.
New Death Sentence: Death sentence(s) imposed
in the Initial Capital Trial. Except as otherwise
indicated, multiple death sentences imposed in a single
Multi-Murder Case are treated statistically as a single
“death sentence.” If a Retrial results in a death sentence,
it is not treated as a “New Death Sentence.”
Pending Death Sentence: Death sentence that
was in place and pending as of June 30, 2017. If a
defendant received Conviction Relief or Sentence Relief
and was awaiting Retrial as of June 30, 2017, then the
defendant did not have a Pending Death Sentence.
Retrial: In Capital Cases, a second or subsequent
trial on the underlying criminal charge, or a second or
subsequent sentencing hearing, following a remand after
the original conviction or sentence from the Initial
Capital Trial was reversed or vacated. (As of June 30,
2017, there were eight defendants who were not under
death sentence but were awaiting Retrial.)
Reversed versus Vacated: The term “reversed”
refers to the setting aside of a conviction or sentence on
direct appeal, which may or may not be followed by a
Retrial on remand. The term “vacated” refers to the
setting aside of a conviction or sentence in collateral
litigation such as state post-conviction or federal habeas
corpus, which may or may not be followed by a Retrial.
Rule 12 Report: The report filed in a first degree
murder case pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
12.
Rule 12 Noncompliance: The failure of a trial
judge to fill out and file a Rule 12 Report as required by
[193]
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Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12. Rule 12 Compliance
indicates that a Rule 12 Report was filed in the case, but
“Compliance” as used here does not indicate whether the
Report was completely filled out in an accurate manner.
Sentence Relief: A defendant receives Sentence
Relief from a Capital Trial when the death sentence from
that Capital Trial is reversed on direct appeal, vacated in
state post-conviction or federal habeas proceedings, or
commuted by the Governor.15
Sustained Death Sentence: Death sentence(s)
imposed during the 40-Year Period that were in place as
of June 30, 2017, or as of the date of the defendant’s
death. If a conviction or sentence was vacated and the
case remanded for Retrial, and if as of June 30, 2017, or
as of the date of the defendant’s death, the case had not
been retried and the defendant was not under a death
sentence, then the case does not count as a Sustained
Death Sentence.
Sustained Adult First Degree Murder Cases:
Cases in which the defendant was age 18 or older on the
date of the offense, the defendant was convicted of one or
more counts of first degree murder, and the conviction
was sustained on appeal and/or post-conviction review.
In the master charts attached as Appendices A through
D, the cases are dated as of the date of the offense and
are listed according to the defendants convicted. In some
cases, the same defendant was convicted of two or more
In one case, the federal court granted a conditional writ of
habeas corpus barring execution until the state conducts a
hearing on the defendant’s intellectual disability. See Van Tran
v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2014). The state has not
conducted the hearing within the time required, and therefore
the state is barred from executing the defendant. For our
purposes, this case is counted as Sentence Relief and Awaiting
Retrial.
15
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first degree murders in two or more separate proceedings
involving different first degree murder charges. In those
cases, the defendant is listed only once in the master
charts and treated as one case, although the charts
indicate if the defendant was involved in more than one
separate case involving separate charges.
Sustained Juvenile First Degree Murder Cases
are those in which the defendant was under 18 years of
age at the time of the offense and was tried and convicted
as an adult.
III. Sustained Adult First Degree Murder Cases
For the 40-Year Period, I have found at least 2,514
with Sustained Adult First Degree Murder Cases and
210 Sustained Juvenile First Degree Murder Cases. The
numbers can be broken down as follows:
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TABLE 1
Breakdown of Sustained First Degree Murder
Cases By Rule 12 Compliance

Sustained
Adult First
Degree
Murder
Cases
Sustained
Juvenile
First
Degree
Murder
Cases
TOTALS of
Adult +
Juvenile
Cases

Totals

Rule 12
Reports
Filed

Rule 12
Reports
Not
Filed

Noncompliance
Rate

2,514

1,348

1,166

46%

210

104

106

50%

2,724

1,452

1,272

47%

TABLE 2
Breakdown of Sustained First Degree Murder
Cases According to Sentences
Statewide (Adult Cases)
Sentences for
First Degree
Murder
Convictions
(Adult) —
Statewide
Life
Life Without
Parole (LWOP)

Number of
Defendants

% of the
Total
(rounded)

2,090
332

83%
13%
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Sustained Death
Sentence
Awaiting Retrial

85

3.4%16

7

0.2%

TOTAL

2,514

100%

TABLE 3
Breakdown of Sustained First Degree Murder
Cases According to Sentences
Shelby County (Adult Cases)
Sentences for First
Degree Murder
Convictions
(Adult) — Shelby
County
Life
Life Without Parole
(LWOP)
Awaiting Retrial
Sustained Death
Sentence

Number of
Defendants

% of the
Total
(rounded)

476
85

80%
14%

6
30

1%
5%

TOTAL

597

100%

TABLE 4
As explained in the Caveats section supra, the actual
percentage of Sustained Death Sentences is almost certainly
lower than 3.4%. While I am relatively certain that I have
captured all cases resulting in death sentences, both sustained
and unsustained, I am equally sure that I have not found all
first degree murder cases because of the high rate of Rule 12
Noncompliance. As more first degree murder cases are found,
the measured percentage of Sustained Death Sentence cases
will decline.
16
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Breakdown of Sustained First Degree Murder
Cases According to Sentences
Davidson County (Adult Cases)
Sentences for First
Degree Murder
Convictions
(Adult) — Davidson
County
Life
Life Without Parole
(LWOP)
Awaiting Retrial
Sustained Death
Sentence

Number of
Defendants

% of the
Total
(rounded)

332
35

88%
9%

0
11

0%
3%

TOTAL

378

100%

TABLE 5
Breakdown of Sustained First Degree Murder
Cases According to Sentences
Knox County (Adult Cases)

Sentences for First
Degree Murder
Convictions
(Adult) — Knox
County
Life
Life Without Parole
(LWOP)
Awaiting Retrial
Sustained Death
Sentence

Number of
Defendants

% of the
Total
(rounded)

149
17

86%
10%

1
6

<1%
<4%

TOTAL

173

100%
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IV. Breakdown of Sustained Adult First Degree
Murder Cases According to Race and Rule 12
Compliance
TABLE 6
Statewide Sustained Adult First Degree Murder
Cases
Race
(% Gen.
Pop.)17
Black
(17%)
White
(78%)
Other
(5%)

Rule 12
Reports
Filed18
(Compliance
Rate)
646

Rule 12
Reports
Not Filed19
(NonCompliance
Rate)
543

(54% Filed)

(46% Not Filed)

665

602

(53% Filed)

(47% Not Filed)

37

21

(64% Filed)

1,348

Total
Cases

% of
Total
Cases
20

1,189

47%

1,267

50%

(36% Not Filed)

58

2%

1,166

2,514

100%

In this column, the percentages designate the percentage of
that race in the general population according to the 2010
Census. For example, according to the 2010 Census, 17% of
Tennessee’s general population was black.
18 This column represents the numbers and percentages of
cases in which Rule 12 Reports were filed in cases involving
defendants in the designated races. For example, among the
total of 1,189 cases involving black defendants, Rule 12 Reports
were filed in 646 of those cases for a Rule 12 Compliance Rate
of 54%.
19 This column represents the numbers and percentages of
cases in which Rule 12 Reports were not filed in cases involving
defendants in the designated races. For example, among the
total of 1,166 cases involving black defendants, Rule 12 Reports
were not filed in 543 of those cases for a Rule 12 compliance
rate of 46%.
20 This column represents the percentage of defendants of the
designated race. Thus, 47% of all Sustained Adult First Degree
Murder Cases throughout the state during the 40-Year Period
involved black defendants.
17
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TOTALS

(54% Filed)

(46% Not Filed)

TABLE 7
Shelby County Sustained Adult First Degree
Murder Cases
Race
(% Gen’l
Pop)

Rule 12
Reports
Filed

Black
(52%)
White
(41%)
Other
(7%)
TOTALS

Total
Cases

% of
Total
Cases

271
(52%
Filed)
38
(57%
Filed)
5
(83%
Filed)

Rule 12
Reports
Not
Filed
252
(48% Not
Filed)
29
(43% Not
Filed)
1
(17% Not
Filed)

523

88%

67

11%

6

1%

314
(53%
Filed)

282
(47% Not
Filed)

596

100%

[200]
200

APPENDIX 1
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 183 (2018)

TABLE 8
Davidson County Sustained Adult First Degree
Murder Cases
Race
(% Gen’l
Pop.)

Rule 12
Reports
Filed

Black
(28%)

136
(62% Filed)

White
(61%)

81
(58% Filed)

Other
(11%)

12
(71% Filed)

TOTALS

229
(60%
Filed)

Rule 12
Reports
Not
Filed
85
(38% Not
Filed)
59
(42% Not
Filed)
5
(29% Not
Filed)

Total
Cases

% of
Total
Cases

221

58%

140

37%

17

5%

149
(40% Not
Filed)

378

100%

TABLE 9
Knox County Sustained Adult First Degree
Murder Cases
Race
(% Gen’l
Pop.)
Black
(8%)
White
(86%)
Other
(6%)

Rule 12
Reports
Filed
42
(58%
Filed)
56
(59%
Filed)
4

Rule 12
Reports
Not Filed
30
(42% Not
Filed)
39
(41% Not
Filed)
2

Total
Cases

% of
Total
Cases

72

42%

95

55%

6

3%
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TOTALS

(67%
Filed)

(33% Not
Filed)

102
(59%
Filed)

71
(41% Not
Filed)

173

100%

V. Multi-Murder Cases
Sentences imposed in the Multi-Murder Cases
break down as follows:
TABLE 10: Multi-Murder Cases—Statewide
Sentences for MultiMurder Convictions
During the 40-Year
Period
Statewide — Adult
Life
Life Without Parole
(LWOP)
Sustained Death
Sentence

230
76

% of the
Total
MultiMurder
Cases
68%
22%

33

10%

339

100%

Number of
Defendants

TOTAL

TABLE 11: Multi-Murder Cases—Shelby County
Sentences for MultiMurder Convictions
During the 40-Year
Period
Shelby County —
Adult
Life
Life Without Parole
(LWOP)

Number of
Defendants

30
14

% of the
Total
MultiMurder
Cases
54%
25%
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Sustained Death
Sentence

12

21%

TOTAL

56

100%

TABLE 12: Multi-Murder Cases—Davidson County
Sentences for
Multi-Murder
Convictions
During the 40-Year
Period
Davidson County
— Adult
Life
Life Without
Parole (LWOP)
Sustained Death
Sentence

Number of
Defendants

TOTAL

% of the
Total
MultiMurder
Cases

35
11

66%
21%

7

13%

53

100%

TABLE 13: Multi-Murder Cases—Knox County
Sentences for
Multi-Murder
Convictions
During the 40-Year
Period
Knox County —
Adult
Life
Life Without
Parole (LWOP)
Sustained Death
Sentence

Number of
Defendants

% of the
Total
MultiMurder
Cases

19
4

79%
27%

1

4%
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TOTAL

24
100%
TABLE 13A
Multi-Murder Cases—Breakdown By Number of
Victims & Sentences
Number of
Victims

Life or
LWOP
Sentences

Sustained
Death
Sentences

Totals

2

259
(92% of 2Victim cases)

24
(8% of 2Victim cases)

283

3

32
(82% of 3Victim cases)

7
(18% of 3Victim cases)

39

4

11
(92% of 4Victim cases)

1
(8% of 4Victim cases)

12

5

1
(100% of 5Victim cases)

0
(0% of 5Victim cases)

1

6

3
(75% of 6Victim cases)

1
(25% of 6Victim cases)

4

TOTALS

306
(90% of MultiMurder Cases)

33
(10% of MultiMurder Cases)

339
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The total of single-murder cases during the 40-Year
Period was 2,175. Among those, 53 (2.4%) received
Sustained Death Sentences.
A. Pre-October 21, 2001, Multi-Murder Cases
On October 18, 2001, the Office of the District
Attorney General for the 20th Judicial District issued its
Death Penalty Guidelines. Since that date through June
30, 2017, no death sentences have been imposed in
Davidson County. The breakdown of single and MultiMurder Cases, before and after October 18, 2001, can be
set forth as follows:
TABLE 14
Pre-October 2001 Multi-Murder Cases
By Largest Counties

Sentence
Life
LWOP
Sustained
Death
TOTALS
%
Sustained
Death
Sentences

Shelby
County
23
6
9

Davidson
County
18
4
7

Knox
County
9
1
0

38

29

10

24%

24%

0%
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TABLE 15
Pre-October 2001 Multi-Murder Cases
By Grand Divisions & Statewide

Sentence
Life
LWOP
Sustained
Death

West
23
11
10

Middle
56
10
12

East
58
13
4

Statewide
Totals
137
34
26

TOTALS
%
Sustained
Death
Sentences

44

78

75

197

22%

15%

5%

13%

B. Post-October 2001 Multi-Murder Cases
TABLE 16
Post-October 2001 Multi-Murder Cases
By Largest Counties

Sentence
Life
LWOP
Sustained
Death
TOTALS
%
Sustained
Death
Sentences

Shelby
County
7
8
3

Davidson
County
17
7
0

Knox
County
10
3
1

18

24

14

17%

0%

7%
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TABLE 17
Post-October 2001 Multi-Murder Cases
By Grand Divisions & Statewide

Sentence
Life
LWOP
Sustained
Death

West
18
9
4

Middle
37
22
0

East
29
11
2

Statewide
84
42
6

TOTALS
%
Sustained
Death
Sentences

31

59

42

132

13%

0%

5%

5%

VI. Capital Cases
A. Basic Capital Case Statistics During the 40Year Period
TABLE 18
Separate Capital Trials
resulting in death
sentences21
Defendants who received
death sentences22

221
192

These include all Initial Trials and Retrials.
One defendant (Paul Reid) is listed with three Initial Capital
Trials and another (Stephen Laron Williams) with Two Initial
Trials, all on separate murder charges, which were not
Retrials. Eighteen other defendants are listed with two trials
on the same charges resulting in death sentences (i.e., an
Initial Trial and a Retrial); and four are listed with three trials
on the same charges (i.e., an Initial Trial and two Retrials),
leaving a total of 26 Retrials. Of those Retrials, in 14 cases the
death sentences were reversed or vacated (54%), and in 12
21
22
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Defendants with Sustained
Death Sentences
Defendants whose death
sentences were not
Sustained
Trials resulting in
Conviction Relief
Trials resulting in
Sentence Relief
Total Trials resulting in
Relief
Defendants with Pending
Death Sentences
Defendants who died of
natural causes with
Sustained Death Sentences
Multi-Murder Defendants
with Sustained Death
Sentences
Single-Murder Defendants
with Sustained Death
Sentences
Awaiting Retrial
Executions in Tennessee

86 (45% of total Defs.)
106 (55% of total Defs.)23
28 (13% of total trials)
104 (47% of total trials)
132 (60% of total trials)24
56 (29% of total Defs.)25
24 (12% of total Defs.)
32 (37% of Sust. Death Sent.)
54 (63% of Sust. Death Sent.)
8 (4% of total Defs.)
6 (3% of total Defs.)

B. Exonerations
During the 40-Year Period, there have been three
exonerations of death row inmates, as follows:

cases they were sustained (46%), which closely corresponds
with the overall ratio of reversed vs. sustained death sentences.
23 This is the overall Death Sentence Reversal Rate among
defendants who received death sentences, after accounting for
Retrials. Commutations are counted here as reversals.
24 This is the overall reversal rate of trials resulting in death
sentences.
25 This is the size of Death Row as of June 30, 2017, based on
the definitions set forth in Part I, supra. Additionally, eight
defendants whose convictions or sentences were vacated were
awaiting retrial.
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Michael Lee McCormick (acquitted in his retrial).
-Sentenced in 1988; Exonerated in 2008; 20 years
on death row.
Paul Gregory House (charges dismissed based on
evidence of actual innocence)
-Sentenced in 1986; Exonerated in 2009; 23 years
on death row.
Gussie Willis Vann (charges dismissed based on evidence
of actual innocence)
-Sentenced in 1994; Exonerated in 2011; 17 years
on death row.
Additionally, Ndume Olatushani (formerly Erskine
Johnson), who was sentenced to death in 1985, was
granted a new trial in his coram nobis proceeding, in
which he claimed actual innocence. He was released in
2012 on an Alford plea after being incarcerated for 26
years.
C. Commutations
Governor Phil Bredesen commuted the death sentences
of three defendants, as follows:
Michael Boyd (a.k.a. Mika’eel Abdullah Abdus-Samad)
was granted a commutation of his sentence to life without
parole on September 14, 2007, after being on death row
for 19 1/2 years. The Certificate of Commutation stated:
[T]his appears to me an extraordinary
death penalty case where the grossly
inadequate legal representation received
by the defendant at his post-conviction
hearing, combined with procedural
limitations, has prevented the judicial
system from
ever comprehensively
[209]
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reviewing his legitimate claims of having
received ineffective assistance of counsel at
the sentencing phase of his trial . . . .
Gaile K. Owens’ sentence was commuted to life on July
10, 2010, after being on death row for 2 1/2 years. The
Certificate of Commutation stated:
[T]his appears to me an extraordinary
death penalty case in which the defendant
admitted her involvement in the murder of
her husband and attempted to accept the
district attorney’s conditional offer of life
imprisonment. This acceptance was
ineffective only because of her codefendant’s refusal to accept such an
agreement . . . . .
Edward Jerome Harbison’s sentence was commuted to
life without parole on January 11, 2011, after being on
death row for 26 years. The Certificate of Commutation
stated:
[T]his appears to me an extraordinary
death penalty case where grossly
inadequate legal representation received
by the defendant at the direct appeal
phase,
combined
with
procedural
limitations, have prevented the judicial
system from
ever comprehensively
reviewing his legitimate claims of having
received ineffective assistance of counsel at
the sentencing phase of his trial . . . .
D. Executions
During the 40-Year Period, six defendants were
executed:
TABLE 19
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Executed
Defendant

Sentencing
Date

Execution
Date

Robert
Glenn Coe
Sedley
Alley
Philip
Workman
Daryl
Holton
Steve
Henley
Cecil C.
Johnson, Jr.

Feb. 2, 1981

Apr. 19,
2000
June 28,
2006
May 9,
2007
Sept. 12,
2007
Feb. 4,
2009
Dec. 2,
2009

Mar. 18,
1987
Mar. 31,
1982
June 15,
1999
Feb. 28,
1986
Jan. 20,
1981

Time on
Death
Row
19 years,
2 months
19 years,
3 months
25 years,
1 month
8 years, 3
months26
22 years,
11 months
28 years,
10 months

E. Residency on Death Row
Among the 56 defendants with Pending Death
Sentences, the lengths of time they resided on death row
(from sentencing date in the Initial Capital Trial to June
30, 2017), can be summarized as follows:

Daryl Holton waived his rights to post-conviction and federal
habeas review, which accounts for the shortened period
between his sentencing and execution dates.
26
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TABLE 20
Length of
Time on Death
Row
> 30 Years
20 – 30 Years
10 – 20 Years
< 10 Years

Number of
Defendants
(as of 6/30/2017)
10
20
16
10

The median residency on Death Row (as of June
30, 2017) was 21 1/2 years.
The longest residency on Death Row (as of June
30, 2017) was 35 years, 3 months.
F.
Geographic/Racial
Distribution
Sustained Death Sentences

of

During the 40-Year Period, 48 of the 95 Tennessee
counties (51%) conducted Capital Trials, although only 28 of
the 95 (29%) counties imposed Sustained Death. The 28
counties that imposed Sustained Death Sentences represent
64% of Tennessee’s general population according to the most
recent census estimates.

[212]
212

APPENDIX 1
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 183 (2018)

TABLE 21
Sustained Death Sentences by County/Race
During 40-Year Period
County

Dyer
Fayette
Hardeman
Henderson
Lake
Madison
Shelby
Tipton
Weakley
Bedford
Cheatham
Coffee
Davidson
Jackson
Montgomery
Robertson
Stewart
Williamson
Blount
Bradley
Campbell
Cocke
Hamilton
Knox
Morgan
Sullivan
Union
Washington
TOTALS

Grand Race of Race of Def: Race of Def:
Division Def:
White
Other
Black
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
West
Middle
Middle
Middle
Middle
Middle
Middle
Middle
Middle
Middle
East
East
East
East
East
East
East
East
East
East

1
1
0
0
0
2
18
1
0
0
0
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
30 (35%)

1
0
1
1
1
3
10
0
1
1
1
0
7
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
3
5
1
2
1
2
53 (62%)

0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3 (3%)

Totals

2
1
1
1
1
5
30
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
3
6
1
3
1
2
86 (100%)

Most
Recent
Crime
Date27
1/2/00
5/2/97
1/17/02
2/5/97
2/3/86
1/11/05
1/19/12
6/1/10
9/7/79
11/30/97
3/3/85
1/1/85
7/8/99
7/24/85
7/8/96
4/23/83
8/20/88
9/24/84
2/22/92
12/9/98
8/15/88
12/3/89
9/6/01
1/7/07
1/15/85
11/27/04
3/17/86
10/6/02

Western Grand Division = 23 Blacks + 18 Whites + 2 Other = 43 (50% of statewide total)
Middle Grand Division = 5 Blacks + 15 Whites + 1 Other = 21 (24% of statewide total)
Eastern Grand Division = 2 Blacks + 20 Whites + 0 Other = 22 (26% of statewide total)

The “Most Recent Crime Date” is the date of the most recent
offense in the county that resulted in a Sustained Death
Sentence.
27
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Since October 2001,28 14 New Death Sentences,
which have been sustained, were imposed in 8 counties—
or in 8% of the counties representing 34% of Tennessee’s
general population (according to the 2010 Census).
TABLE 22
Sustained Death Sentences by County/Race
Since October 2001
County

Grand
Division

Hardeman
Madison
Shelby
Tipton
Hamilton
Knox
Sullivan
Washington

West
West
West
West
East
East
East
East

Totals

Race of
Def:
Black
0
2
7
1
0
1
0
0

Race of
Def:
White
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1

Race of
Def:
Other
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Totals

10
(71%)

4
(29%)

0
(0%)

14
(100%)

1
1
7
1
1
1
1
1

Western Grand Division = 9 Blacks + 1 White = 10 Total (71% of statewide total)
Middle Grand Division = 0 Total
Eastern Grand Division = 1 Black + 3 Whites = 4 Total (29% of statewide total)

As indicated in Table 21, above, for each of the
three Grand Divisions, the last murder resulting in a
Sustained Death Sentence occurred on the following
dates:
West Grand Division: Jan. 19, 2012 (Shelby County)
As mentioned previously, in October 2001, the Office of the
District Attorney General for the 20th Judicial District issued
its Death Penalty Guidelines. Since then, no death sentences
have been imposed in Davidson County, or the entire Middle
Grand Division of Tennessee. Also, the frequency of death
sentences throughout the state since October 2001 is markedly
lower than during the prior 24-year period. Accordingly, it may
be useful to compare certain statistics from the two different
periods before and after October 2001.
28
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Middle Grand Division: July 8, 1999 (Davidson County)
East Grand Division: January 7, 2007 (Knox County)
G. Frequency and Decline
During the 40-Year Period, the frequency of trials
resulting in New Death Sentences reached a peak around
1990. Beginning around 2005, we have seen a steady and
accelerating decline, as follows:
TABLE 23
Trials
New Death Sustained Ave. New
4-Year Resulting in Sentences
Death
Death
Period
Death
(i.e., Initial Sentences29 Sentences
Sentences
Capital
per Year
Trials)

1st
% “New” % Sustained
Degree
Death
Death
Murder Sentences / Sentences /
Cases30 1st Degree 1st Degree
Murders
Murders

7/1/77 –
6/30/81

25

25

6

6.25/year

155

16%

4%

7/1/81 –
6/30/85

37

33

12

8.25/year

197

17%

6%

7/1/85 –
6/30/89

34

32

15

8.00/year

238

13%

6%

7/1/89 –
6/30/93

38

37

18

9.25/year

282

13%

6%

7/1/93 –
6/30/97

21

17

9

4.45/year

395

4%

2%

7/1/97 –
6/30/01

32

24

14

6.00/year

316

8%

4%

7/1/01 –
6/30/05

20

16

5

4.00/year

283

6%

2%

7/1/05 –
6/30/09

5

4

4

1.00/year

271

1.5%

1.4%

7/1/09 –
6/30/13
7/1/136/30/17

6

6

5

1.50/year

284

2%

1.7%

3

1

1

0.25/year

Incomplete Incomplete
Data31
Data

Incomplete
Data

Defendants who received Sustained Death Sentences based
on dates of their Initial Capital Trials.
30 Counted by defendants, not murder victims.
31 Thus far I have found records for only 93 cases resulting in
first degree murder convictions for murders occurring during
the most recent 4-year period. Because of the time it takes for
a case to be tried and appealed, we have an incomplete record
29
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TOTALS

221

19532

8933

4.88 per
year
(40 years)

>2,514

<8%

<3.5%

VII. Frequency of Tennessee Death Sentences in
4-Year Increments
Totals for the first 24 years, from July 1, 1977, to June
30, 2001:
168 “New” death sentences ≥
7 “New” death sentences per year (13.2% of First
Degree Murder Cases)
74 “Sustained” death sentences ≥
4 “Sustained” death sentences per year (5.8% of
First Degree Murder Cases)
Totals for the most recent 16 years, from July 1, 2001, to
June 30, 2017:
27 “New” death sentences ≥
1.7 “New” death sentences per year (3.5% of First
Degree Murder Cases)

of cases from the most recent years. According to Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation (TBI) statistics, however, the annual
number of homicides in Tennessee has remained relatively
consistent over the period. See Table 25.
32 One defendant had three separate “new” trials each resulting
in “new” and “sustained” death sentences; another defendant
had two such trials. See supra note 1. Accordingly, there were
195 “new” trials involving a total of 192 defendants, and 89
“sustained” death sentences involving a total of 86 defendants.
33 See supra note 28. While 89 trials resulted in Sustained
Death Sentences, only 86 defendants received Sustained Death
Sentences.
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15 “Sustained” death sentences ≥
0.9 “Sustained death sentences per year (< 2.0% of
First Degree Murder Cases)
Throughout the state, no new death sentences were
imposed during the most recent three-year period (from
June 15, 2014, to June 30, 2017).
The decline in death sentences is also reflected in
the numbers of counties that have imposed death
sentences, which can be broken down in 4-year
increments as follows:

[217]
217

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

TABLE 24
Number of Counties Conducting Capital Trials
By 4-Year Increments
Number of Counties
Conducting
Capital Trials34
During the Indicated
4-Year Period
13
18
17
18
11
12
11
3
5
1

4-Year Period

7/1/1977 – 6/30/1981
7/1/1981 – 6/30/1985
7/1/1985 – 6/30/1989
7/1/1989 – 6/30/1993
7/1/1993 – 6/30/1997
7/1/1997 – 6/30/2001
7/1/2001 – 6/30/2005
7/1/2005 – 6/30/2009
7/1/2009 – 6/30/2013
7/1/2013 – 6/30/2017

The annual rate of “New Death Sentences” has
declined while the annual number of murder cases has
remained relatively constant.

These include all 221 Initial Capital Trials and Retrials,
whether or not the convictions or death sentences were
eventually sustained. Obviously, several counties conducted
Capital Trials in several of the 4-Year Periods. Shelby County,
for example, conducted Capital Trials in each of these periods.
34
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TABLE 25
New Death Sentences Compared to Murders
2002–2016

Year

“Murders”35

New Death
Sentences

% New
Death
Sentences
per
Murders

Sustained
New Death
Sentences

% Sustained
New Death
Sentences
per Murders

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

385
394
350
430
409
395
408
461
360
375
390
333
375
406
470

6
3
4
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
0
1
0
0

1.6 %
1.0 %
1.1 %
0.4 %
0.3 %
0.3 %
0.3 %
0.4 %
0.6 %
0.6 %
0.3 %
0%
0.3 %
0%
0%

1
3
0
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
0
0

0.3 %
1.0 %
0%
0.2 %
0.3 %
0.3 %
0.3 %
0.4 %
0.6 %
0.3 %
0.3 %
0%
0.3%
0%
0%

TOTALS

5,941
(Avg =
396/year)

25
(1.7/year)

0.4 %

14 (0.9/
year)

0.2 %

During the 10-year period 2003–2012:
Total non-negligent homicides = 3,972 ≥ 397/year
Total New Death Sentences = 18 ≥ 1.8/year
% New Death Sentences per non-neg. homicides =
0.5%
Total sustained New Death Sentences = 12 ≥
1.2/year
% sustained new death sentences per non-neg.
homicides = 0.3%

The “Murders” statistics come from the TBI annual reports
which date back to 2002. For statistical purposes, TBI defines
“Murders” as non-negligent homicides.
35
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During the 4-year period 2013–2016:
Total non-negligent homicides = 1,584 ≥ 396/year
Total New Death Sentences = 1 ≥ 0.25/year
% New Death Sentences per non-neg. homicides =
0.06%
Of the 19 defendants who received New Death Sentences
over this 14-year period, none have been executed, and
six have had their sentences vacated. The remaining
Pending Cases are under review and could ultimately
result in reversals.
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APPENDIX 2

TENNESSEE TRIALS IN WHICH
DEATH SENTENCES WERE
IMPOSED
DURING THE PERIOD 7/1/1977 THROUGH
6/30/2017
This chart identifies in chronological order, by the
defendant’s name, each “Capital Trial” that resulted in
the imposition of one or more death sentences. For
purposes of this chart, the term Capital Trial includes a
resentencing hearing.
The county listed is where the murder allegedly
occurred, not necessarily where the case was tried.
A number in parentheses immediately following
the defendant’s name in a multi-murder case indicates
the number of murder victims for which death sentences
were imposed.
Asterisks indicate cases that have had two or
more Capital Trials arising from the same charges. A
single asterisk indicates the result of the defendant’s first
Capital Trial, a double asterisk indicates the result of the
defendant’s second trial for the same murder(s), etc. The
other Capital Trials involving the same defendant and
charges are cross-referenced in the far right column.
A Capital Trial is “Pending” if it has not been
reversed or vacated—i.e., if the defendant is still under a
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sentence of death from that Capital Trial. Because
capital cases typically are challenged until a defendant is
executed, a case remains Pending as long as the
defendant is alive.
If a case is ultimately resolved by plea agreement
or by the prosecution’s withdrawal of the death notice
(e.g., while the defendant is awaiting retrial or
resentencing), that fact is not reflected in the chart.

Capital
Trial
No.

Defendant

County
Where
Offense
Occurred

Sentence Defendant Type of Other
Date (of Race and
Relief Capital
instant
Gender
Trial(s)
“(AR)” =
senfor
Awaiting
tencing
Same
Retrial
proDefceeding)
endant

1

Richard Hale
Austin* see

Shelby

10/22/77

White/Male Sentence No. 169
Relief

2

Ronald Eugene Shelby
Rickman

03/04/78

White/Male Conviction

3

William
Edward
Groseclose

Shelby

03/04/78

White/Male Conviction

4

Larry Charles Shelby
Ransom

04/07/78

Black/Male

5

Ralph Robert
Cozzolino

Hamilton

04/22/78

White/Male Sentence
Relief

6

Russell Keith
Berry

Greene

08/28/78

White/Male Conviction

7

Donald Wayne Sullivan
Strouth

09/04/78

White/Male

Relief

Relief

Sentence
Relief

Relief

DECEASED
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8

Richard
Houston

Knox

9

Donald
Shelby
Michael Moore

Conviction
Relief

11/03/78

Black/Male

11/10/78

White/Male Sentence
Relief

10 Jeffrey Stuart Sullivan
Dicks

02/10/79

White/Male

11 Luther Terry
Pritchett

Marion

08/16/79

White/Male Sentence
Relief

12 Michael Angelo Shelby
Coleman

04/19/80

Black/Male

DECEASED

Sentence
Relief

13 Carl Wayne
Adkins*

Washington 01/29/80

White/Male Sentence Nos. 52,
Relief
62

14 Loshie Pitts
Harrington

Dickson

06/01/80

White/Male Sentence
Relief

06/20/80

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

Montgomery 06/26/80
16 Richard
Weldon Simon

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

17 Raymond
Eugene
Teague*

11/22/80

White/Male Sentence No. 44
Relief

18 Hugh Warren Madison
Melson

12/05/80

White/Male

DECEASED

19 Cecil C.
Johnson, Jr.
(3)

01/20/81

Black/Male

EXECUTED

01/24/81

White/Male Sentence
Relief

15 Stephen Allen Shelby
Adams

Hamilton

Davidson

20 Joseph Glenn Smith
Buck
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EXECUTED

21 Robert Glen
Coe

Weakley

02/28/81

White/Male

22 Walter Keith
Johnson*

Hamilton

03/25/81

White/Male Sentence No. 47
Relief

23 Hubert Loyd
Sheffield

Shelby

03/26/81

White/Male Sentence
Relief

24 Timothy
Greene
Eugene Morris

04/09/81

White/Male Sentence
Relief

25 Thomas Gerald Sullivan
Laney

04/11/81

White/Male Sentence
Relief

26 Ronald
Richard
Harries

Sullivan

08/08/81

White/Male Sentence
Relief

27 Stephen Leon Hawkins
Williams

10/16/81

White/Male Sentence
Relief

28 Laron Ronald Shelby
Williams (2)

11/06/81

Black/Male

DECEASED

29 Laron Ronald Madison
Williams

12/14/81

Black/Male

DECEASED

30 David Earl
Miller*

Knox

03/17/82

White/Male Sentence No. 76
Relief

31 Kenneth
Wayne
Campbell

Washington 03/26/82

White/Male Sentence
Relief

32 Phillip Ray
Workman

Shelby

03/31/82

White/Male

33 Michael David Hamilton
Matson

04/22/82

White/Male Sentence
Relief

34 Gary Bradford Shelby
Cone (2)

04/23/82

White/Male

EXECUTED

DECEASED
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35 Michael
Eugene
Sample (2)

Shelby

11/02/82

Black/Male

PENDING

36 Larry McKay
(2)

Shelby

11/02/82

Black/Male

PENDING

37 Tommy Lee
King

Maury

11/13/82

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

38 Richard
Caldwell

Henderson 12/04/82

White/Male Conviction

39 Walter Lee
Caruthers

Knox

02/08/83

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief
(AR)1

40 David Carl
Duncan

Sumner

04/01/83

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief
(AR)

41 Richard
Carlton
Taylor*

Hickman

05/07/83

White/Male Conviction No. 198

42 Willie James
Martin

Shelby

06/24/83

Black/Male

43 Charles
Edward
Hartman*

Montgomery 05/23/83

White/Male Sentence No. 153
Relief

44 Raymond
Eugene
Teague**

Hamilton

08/25/83

White/Male Sentence No. 17
Relief

45 Ricky Goldie
Smith

Shelby

02/10/84

Black/Male

46 Edmund
George
Zagorski (2)

Robertson

03/02/84

White/Male PENDING

47 Walter Keith
Johnson**

Hamilton

03/08/84

White/Male Sentence No. 22
Relief

Relief

Relief

Conviction
Relief

Sentence
Relief

Died while awaiting Retrial.
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48 William
Wesley Goad

Sumner

03/22/84

White/Male Sentence
Relief

49 Willie
Claybrook

Crockett

06/06/84

Black/Male

50 David Lee
McNish

Carter

08/15/84

White/Male Sentence
Relief
(AR)2
DECEASED

51 James William Washington 09/14/84
Barnes

White/Male

52 Carl Wayne
Adkins**

Washington 10/01/84

White/Male Sentence Nos. 13,
Relief
62

53 Edward
Jerome
Harbison

Hamilton

10/05/84

Black/Male

54 James David
Carter

Hamblen

11/14/84

White/Male Sentence
Relief

55 Willie Sparks Hamilton

11/14/84

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

56 Kenneth
Wayne
O'Guinn

Madison

01/22/85

White/Male

DECEASED

57 Terry Lynn
King

Knox

02/06/85

White/Male PENDING

58 Vernon
Franklin
Cooper

Hamilton

02/15/85

White/Male Sentence
Relief

02/22/85

Black/Male

59 Tony Lorenzo Shelby
Bobo

2

Conviction
Relief

Sentence
Relief
(Commutation)

Sentence
Relief

Died while awaiting Retrial.
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60 Leonard
Edward
Smith*

Sullivan

61 Charles
Davidson
Walton Wright
(2)

03/20/85

White/Male Conviction Nos. 97,
Relief
143

04/05/85

Black/Male

PENDING

62 Carl Wayne
Adkins***

Washington 06/28/85

White/Male Sentence Nos. 13,
Relief
52

63 Rocky Lee
Coker

Sequatchie 07/11/85

White/Male Sentence
Relief

64 Thomas Lee
Crouch

Williamson 08/08/85

White/Male

DECEASED

65 Gregory S.
Thompson

Coffee

08/22/85

Black/Male

DECEASED

66 Donnie
Edward
Johnson

Shelby

10/04/85

White/Male PENDING

67 Erskine Leroy Shelby
Johnson

12/07/85

Black/Male

68 Anthony
Cheatham
Darrell Hines*

01/10/86

White/Male Sentence No. 96
Relief

69 Sidney
Porterfield

Shelby

01/15/86

Black/Male

DECEASED

70 Gaile K.
Owens

Shelby

01/15/86

White/

Sentence
Relief
(Commutation)

71 Paul Gregory
House

Union

72 Steve Morris
Henley* (2)

Jackson

Female

02/08/86

Conviction
Relief

White/Male Conviction
Relief

(Exonerated)

02/28/86

White/Male Sentence No. 161
Relief
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73 Roger Morris
Bell

Hamilton

05/23/86

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

74 Terry Dwight
Barber

Lake

08/18/86

White/Male

DECEASED

75 Billy Ray Irick Knox

11/3/86

White/Male PENDING

76 David Earl
Miller**

02/12/87

White/Male PENDING No. 30

77 Bobby Randall Hamilton
Wilcoxson

02/13/87

White/Male Sentence
Relief

78 Sedley Alley

03/18/87

White/Male

03/25/87

White/Male PENDING

Knox

Shelby

79 Stephen
Union
Michael West
(2)
80 David Scott
Poe

Montgomery 03/28/87

EXECUTED

White/Male Sentence
Relief

81 Darrell Wayne Shelby
Taylor

04/24/87

Black/Male

82 Nicholas Todd Morgan
Sutton (2)

03/04/86

White/Male PENDING

83 Wayne Lee
Bates

05/21/87

White/Male Sentence
Relief

84 James Lee
Davidson
Jones, Jr.
(a.k.a. Abu-Ali
Abdur’
Rahman)

07/15/87

Black/Male

85 Homer Bouldin Marion
Teel

08/31/87

White/Male Sentence
Relief

Coffee

Sentence
Relief

PENDING
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86 Michael Lee
McCormick

Hamilton

01/15/88

White/Male Conviction
Relief

(Exonerated)

87 Pervis Tyrone Shelby
Payne (2)

02/27/88

Black/Male

PENDING

88 Michael Boyd Shelby
(a.k.a. Mikaeel
Abdullah
Abdus-Samud)

03/10/88

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief
(Commutation)

89 Ronald
Michael
Cauthern*(2)

Montgomery 03/18/88

90 J.B. McCord

Warren

White/Male Sentence No. 140
Relief

05/01/88

White/Male Conviction

91 Edward Leroy Sevier
Harris (2)

05/13/88

White/Male Sentence
Relief

92 John David
Terry*

Davidson

09/22/88

White/Male Sentence No. 157
Relief

93 Byron Lewis
Black (3)

Davidson

03/10/89

Black/Male

94 Mack Edward Knox
Brown

05/22/89

White/Male Conviction

95 Heck Van Tran Shelby
(3)

06/23/89

Asian/Male Sentence
Relief
(AR)

96 Anthony
Darrell
Hines**

Cheatham

06/27/89

White/Male PENDING No. 68

97 Leonard
Edward
Smith**

Sullivan

08/25/89

White/Male Sentence Nos. 60,
Relief
143

09/22/89

White/Male Sentence No. 144
Relief

98 Donald Ray
Davidson
Middlebrooks*

Relief

PENDING

Relief
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10/26/89

Native A m/
Male

DECEASED

100 Thomas Daniel Washington 11/18/89
Eugene Hale

Black/Male

Conviction
Relief

101 Jonathan
Hamblen
Vaughn Evans

12/16/89

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

102 Gary June
Caughron

Sevier

02/03/90

White/Male Sentence
Relief

103 John Michael Shelby
Bane*

02/23/90

White/Male Sentence No. 156
Relief

104 Danny Branam Knox

05/04/90

White/Male Sentence
Relief

105 Harold Wayne Hamilton
Nichols

05/12/90

White/Male PENDING

106 Tommy Joe
Walker

Knox

05/14/90

White/Male Sentence
Relief

107 Randy Duane Cocke
Hurley

05/23/90

White/Male Sentence
Relief

108 Oscar Franklin Davidson
Smith (3)

07/26/90

White/Male PENDING

109 David M.
Keen*

Shelby

8/15/90

White/Male Sentence No. 158
Relief

110 Victor James
Cazes

Shelby

11/01/90

White/Male

111 Jonathan
Wesley
Stephenson*

Cocke

10/19/90

White/Male Sentence No. 194
Relief

112 Olen Edward
Hutchison

Campbell

01/18/91

White/Male

99 Michael Wayne Shelby
Howell

DECEASED

DECEASED
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113 Kenneth
Patterson
Bondurant*

Giles

02/09/91

White/Male Conviction No. 201

114 David Allen
Brimmer

Anderson

03/02/91

White/Male Sentence
Relief

115 Roosevelt
Bigbee

Sumner

03/15/91

Black/Male

116 Joseph Arlin
Shepherd

Monroe

04/04/91

White/Male Sentence
Relief

117 Ricky Eugene Shelby
Estes

06/26/91

White/Male Conviction

118 James Blanton Stewart
(2)

07/27/91

White/Male

DECEASED

119 Sylvester
Smith

Shelby

09/27/91

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

120 Millard
Curnutt

Campbell

11/22/91

White/Male

DECEASED

121 William
Eugene Hall
(2)

Stewart

12/04/91

White/Male PENDING

122 Derrick
Desmond
Quintero (2)

Stewart

12/04/91

Latino/Male PENDING

123 Henry Eugene Davidson
Hodges

01/28/92

White/Male PENDING

124 Craig
Thompson

Shelby

02/29/92

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

125 Timothy
Dewayne
Harris

Shelby

03/04/92

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

Relief

Sentence
Relief

Relief
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126 Leroy Hall, Jr. Hamilton

03/11/92

White/Male PENDING

127 Ricky
Thompson*

McMinn

04/04/92

White/Male Conviction 182

128 Derrick
Johnson

Shelby

04/22/92

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

129 Robert
Williams

Hamilton

06/19/92

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

130 Richard Odom* Shelby

10/15/92

White/Male Sentence Nos.
Relief
177, 210

131 William Arnold Shelby
Murphy

11/20/92

White/Male Sentence
Relief

132 Michael Dean Putnam
Bush

02/22/93

White/Male Sentence
Relief

133 Gary Wayne
Sutton

Blount

02/24/93

White/Male PENDING

134 James
Anderson
Dellinger (2)

Blount

02/24/93

White/Male PENDING

135 Fredrick
Sledge

Shelby

11/04/93

Black/Male

136 Christopher
Shelby
Scott Beckham

11/17/93

White/Male Sentence
Relief

137 Andre S. Bland Shelby

02/14/94

Black/Male

PENDING

138 Glen Bernard Dyer
Mann

07/19/94

Black/Male

DECEASED

139 Gussie Willis
Vann

08/10/94

White/Male Conviction

McMinn

Relief

Sentence
Relief

Relief

(Exonerated)
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140 Perry A.
Cribbs

Shelby

11/16/94

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

141 Preston
Shelby
Carter* (a.k.a.
Akil Jahi ) (2)

01/25/95

Black/Male

Sentence No. 179
Relief

Montgomery 01/25/95
142 Ronald
Michael
Cauthern**(2)

White/Male Sentence No. 89
Relief

143 Clarence C.
Nesbit

Shelby

02/24/95

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief
(AR)

144 Kevin B.
Burns (2)

Shelby

09/23/95

Black/Male

PENDING

145 Leonard
Edward
Smith***

Sullivan

09/27/95

White/Male Sentence Nos. 60,
Relief
97

146 Donald Ray
Davidson
Middlebrooks*
*

10/12/95

White/Male PENDING No. 98

147 Christa Gail
Pike

03/30/96

White/Femal PENDING
e

148 Tony V.
Shelby
Carruthers (3)

04/26/96

Black/Male

PENDING

149 James
Montgomery
(3)

Shelby

04/26/96

Black/Male

Conviction
Relief

150 Jon D. Hall

Henderson 02/05/97

Knox

White/Male PENDING

PENDING

151 Farris Genner Madison
Morris, Jr. (2)

04/01/97

Black/Male

152 Bobby Gene
Godsey, Jr.

04/25/97

White/Male Sentence
Relief

Sullivan
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153 Charles
Edward
Hartman**

Montgomery 08/01/97

White/Male Sentence No. 43
Relief

154 Roy E. Keough Shelby

05/09/97

White/Male Sentence
Relief

155 Tyrone L.
Chalmers

Shelby

06/19/97

Black/Male

156 John Michael Shelby
Bane**

07/18/97

White/Male PENDING No. 103

157 John David
Terry**

Davidson

08/07/97

White/Male

158 David M.
Keen**

Shelby

08/15/97

White/Male PENDING No. 109

159 Jerry Ray
Davidson

Dickson

09/03/97

White/Male Sentence
Relief

160 Dennis Wade
Suttles

Knox

11/04/97

White/Male PENDING

161 Steve Morris
Henley** (2)

Jackson

12/15/97

White/Male

EXECUTED

162 James Patrick Shelby
Stout

03/03/98

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

163 Vincent C.
Sims

05/01/98

Black/Male

PENDING

164 Kennath Artez Fayette
Henderson

07/13/98

Black/Male

PENDING

165 Michael Dale
Rimmer*

Shelby

11/09/98

White/Male Sentence Nos.
Relief
200, 221

166 Gregory
Robinson

Shelby

11/23/98

Black/Male

Shelby

PENDING

DECEASED

No. 92

No. 72

PENDING

[234]
234

APPENDIX 2
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 221 (2018)
12/14/98

Asian/Male PENDING

168 William Pierre Knox
Torres

02/25/99

Latino/Male Sentence
Relief

169 Richard Hale
Austin**

Shelby

03/05/99

White/Male

170 James A.
Mellon

Knox

03/05/99

White/Male Conviction

171 Paul Dennis
Reid (2)

Davidson

04/20/99

White/Male

DECEASED

172 Daryl Keith
Holton (4)

Bedford

06/15/99

White/Male

EXECUTED

173 Christopher A. Davidson
Davis (2)

06/17/99

Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

174 Timothy
Terrell
McKinney

Shelby

07/16/99

Black/Male

Conviction
Relief

175 William
Richard
Stevens (2)

Davidson

07/23/99 White/Male

DECEASED

176 Paul Dennis
Reid (2)

Montgomery 09/22/99 White/Male

DECEASED

177 Richard
Odom**

Shelby

167 Gerald Lee
Powers

Shelby

DECEASED

No. 1

Relief

10/01/99 White/Male Sentence Nos.
Relief
130, 210

178 William Glenn Montgomery 01/21/00 White/Male PENDING
Rogers
179 Preston
Carter**
(a.k.a. Akil
Jahi) (2)

Shelby

02/17/00 Black/Male

PENDING No. 139
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180 G'Dongalay
Davidson
Parlo Berry (2)

05/25/00 Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

181 Paul Dennis
Reid (3)

Davidson

05/27/00 White/Male

DECEASED

182 Ricky
Thompson**

McMinn

06/13/00 White/Male Sentence No. 127
Relief

183 Arthur Todd
Copeland

Blount

07/24/00 Black/Male

Conviction
Relief

184 David Lee
Smith (2)

Bradley

11/06/00 White/Male

DECEASED

185 Robert Lee
Leach, Jr. (2)

Davidson

02/16/01 White/Male

DECEASED

186 Robert
Faulkner

Shelby

03/10/01 Black/Male

Conviction
Relief (AR)

187 Hubert Glenn Scott
Sexton (2)

06/30/01 White/Male Sentence
Relief

188 Charles
Edward Rice

Shelby

01/14/02 Black/Male

PENDING

189 Steven Ray
Thacker

Dyer

02/08/02 White/Male

DECEASED

190 John Patrick
Henretta

Bradley

04/06/02 White/Male Sentence
Relief

191 Detrick
Shelby
Deangelo Cole

04/19/02 Black/Male

192 Leonard
Shelby
Jasper Young

08/24/02 White/Male Sentence
Relief
(AR)

193 Andrew
Thomas

09/26/02 Black/Male

Shelby

Sentence
Relief

Conviction
Relief (AR)
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194 Jonathan
Cocke
Wesley
Stephenson**

10/05/02 White/Male PENDING No. 111

195 David Ivy

01/11/03 Black/Male

Shelby

PENDING

196 Steven James Sullivan
Rollins

06/21/03 White/Male Conviction

197 Stephen L.
Hugueley

Hardeman

09/16/03 White/Male PENDING

198 Richard
Carlton
Taylor**

Hickman

10/16/03 White/Male Sentence No. 41
Relief

Relief

199 Marlan Duane Hamilton
Kiser

11/20/03 White/Male PENDING

200 Michael Dale
Rimmer**

Shelby

01/13/04 White/Male Conviction Nos.
Relief
165, 221

201 Kenneth
Patterson
Bondurant**

Giles

01/20/04 White/Male Sentence No. 113
Relief

202 Robert Hood

Shelby

05/06/04 Black/Male

203 Joel
Schmeiderer

Wayne

05/15/04 White/Male Sentence
Relief

204 James Riels (2) Shelby

08/13/04 White/Male Sentence
Relief

205 Franklin Fitch Shelby

10/29/04 Black/Male

206 Harold Hester McMinn

03/12/05 White/Male Sentence
Relief

Sentence
Relief

Sentence
Relief
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207 Devin Banks

Shelby

04/11/05 Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

208 David Lynn
Jordan (3)

Madison

09/25/06 White/Male PENDING

209 Nickolus
Johnson

Sullivan

04/27/07 Black/Male

210 Richard
Odom***

Shelby

12/08/07 White/Male PENDING Nos.
130, 177

PENDING

211 Corinio Pruitt Shelby

03/01/08 Black/Male

PENDING

212 Henry Lee
Jones (2)*

Shelby

05/14/09 Black/Male

Conviction No. 220
Relief

213 Lemaricus
Davidson (2)

Knox

10/30/09 Black/Male

PENDING

214 Howard Hawk Washington 06/21/10 White/Male PENDING
Willis (2)
215 Jessie Dotson Shelby
(6)

10/12/10 Black/Male

PENDING

216 John Freeland Chester

05/23/11 Black/Male

Sentence
Relief

217 James
Hawkins

Shelby

06/11/11 Black/Male

PENDING

218 Rickey Bell

Tipton

03/30/12 Black/Male

PENDING

219 Sedrick
Clayton (3)

Shelby

06/15/14 Black/Male

PENDING

220 Henry Lee
Jones (2)**

Shelby

05/16/15 Black/Male

PENDING No. 212
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221 Michael Dale
Rimmer***

Shelby

05/07/16 White/Male PENDING Nos.
165, 221

222 Urshawn
Miller3

Madison

04/03/18 Black/Male

PENDING

This case was tried after June 30, 2017—i.e. after the 40-year
period.
3

[239]
239

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

[240]
240

TENNESSEE JOURNAL
OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13

SUMMER 2018

ISSUE 1

APPENDIX 3

LIST OF TENNESSEE CAPITAL
CASES GRANTED RELIEF
ON GROUNDS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DURING THE 40-YEAR PERIOD 7/1/1977–
6/30/2017
Tennessee capital cases granted relief in state
court for IAC:
1.
State v. Ransom, No. B57716 (Tenn. Shelby Co.
Crim. Ct. Jan. 1, 1983) (sentence relief) (settled for life)
2.
Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1988) (sentence relief) (settled for life)
3.
Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1992) (grant of sentence relief from PC court aff’d)
(resentenced to less than death)
4.
Johnson v. State, No. 1037, 1992 WL 210576
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 1992) (sentence relief)
(released in 2012 on Alford plea)
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5.
Campbell v. State, No. 03C01-9012-CR-00283,
1993 WL 122057 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 1993)
(sentence relief) (settled for life sentence; subsequently
paroled)
6.
Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1994) (sentence relief) (resentenced to less than
death)
7.
Teel v. State, No. 1460 (Tenn. Marion Co. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 12, 1995) (sentence relief) (settled for life)
8.
Bell v. State, No. 03C01-9210-CR-00364, 1995 WL
113420 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 1995) (sentence relief)
(resentenced to less than death)
9.
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996)
(sentence relief) (resentenced to life)
10.
Coker v. State, No. 4778 (Tenn. Sequatchie Co.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 22, 1996) (sentence relief) (resentenced to
life)
11.
Brimmer v. State, 29 S.W.3d 497 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1998) (sentence relief) (resentenced to less than
death)
12.
Smith v. State, No. 02C01-9801-CR-00018, 1998
WL 899362 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1998) (conviction
relief) (settled for life)
13.
Hurley v. State, No. 4802 (Tenn. Cocke Co. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 12, 1998) (sentence relief) (settled for life)
14.
Taylor v. State, No. 01C01-9707-CC-00384, 1999
WL 512149 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 21, 1999) (conviction
relief) (settled for life)

[242]
242

APPENDIX 3
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2018)

15.
Darrell Wayne Taylor v. State, Nos. P-7864, 8603704 (Tenn. Shelby Co. Crim. Ct.) (settled for life;
paroled)
16.
McCormick v State, No. 03C01-9802-CR-00052,
1999 WL 394935 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 1999)
(conviction relief) (acquitted on retrial—exoneration)
17.
Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1999) (sentence relief) (resentenced to less than
death)
18.
Caughron v. State, No. 03C01-9707-CC-00301,
1999 WL 49906 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 1999) (sentence
relief) (resentenced to less than death)
19.
State v. Bush, No. 84–411 (Tenn. Cumberland Co.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2002) (sentence relief) (settled for life)
20.
Vann v. State, No. 99-312 (Tenn. McMinn Co. Cir.
Ct. May 29, 2008) (conviction relief) (charges dismissed—
exoneration)
21.
Nesbit v. State, P-21818 (Tenn. Shelby Co. Crim.
Ct. July 9, 2009) (sentence relief)
22.
Cribbs v. State, No. P-20670, 2009 WL 1905454
(Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2009) (sentence relief) (settled
for life)
23.
McKinney v State, No. W2006-02132-CCA-R3PD, 2010 WL 796939 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2010)
(conviction relief) (after 2 subsequent mistrials (hung
juries), pled to 2d degree murder and released)
24.
Cole v. State, No. W2008-02681-CCA-R3PD, 2011
WL 1090152 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2011) (sentence
relief) (settled for life without parole)
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25.
Young v. State, No. 00-04018 (Tenn. Shelby Co.
Crim. Ct. Mar. 28, 2011) (sentence relief)
26.
Banks v. State, No. 03-01956 (Tenn. Shelby Co.
Crim. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011) (sentence relief) (settled for
LWOP)
27.
Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011)
(sentence relief) (settled for life)
28.
Stout v. State, No. W2011-00277-CCA-R3-PD,
2012 WL 3612530 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 12, 2012)
(sentence relief) (sentenced to life)
29.
Rollins v. State, No. E2010-01150-CCA-R3-PD,
2012 WL 3776696 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2012)
(sentence relief by trial P.C. court; conviction relief on
appeal) (settled for life)
30.
Rimmer v. State, Nos. 98–01034, 97–02817, 98–
01033 (Tenn. Shelby Co. Crim. Ct. Oct. 12, 2012)
(conviction relief) (retried, convicted, sentenced to death
again after mitigation waiver)
31.
Hester v. State, No. 00-115 (Tenn. McMinn Co.
Cir. Ct. May 20, 2013) (settled for LWOP without PC
hearing; at the plea hearing, State acknowledged
IAC/mitigation)
32.
Davidson v. State, 453 S.W.3d 386 (Tenn. 2014)
(sentence relief) (settled for LWOP)
33.
Schmeiderer v. State, No. 14488 (Tenn. Maury Co.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2014) (settled for LWOP without PC
hearing;
agreed
disposition
order
references
IAC/mitigation)
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Tennessee capital cases granted relief in federal
court for IAC:
1.
Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1997)
(sentence relief) (resentenced to death)
2.
Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997)
(conviction relief) (resentenced to life)
3.
Groseclose v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997)
(conviction relief) (resentenced to life)
4.
Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2000)
(sentence relief) (settled for life)
5.
Caruthers v. Carpenter, 3:91-CV-0031 Docket
(Doc) #287 and #288 (June 6, 2001) (order granting
sentencing relief) (on appeal)
6.
Timothy Morris v. Bell, No. 2:99-CD-00424 (E.D.
Tenn. May 16, 2002) (sentence relief) (settled for life)
7.
Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2005)
(sentence relief) (settled for life)
8.
King v. Bell, No. 1:00-cv-00017 (M.D. Tenn. July
13, 2007) (sentence relief) (resentenced to life)
9.
House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-883, 2007 WL 4568444
(E.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007) (conviction relief) (charges
dismissed in 2009—exoneration)
10.
Cauthern v. Colson, 736 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2013)
(sentence relief) (sentenced to life)
11.
Duncan v. Carpenter, No. 3:88-00992 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 4, 2015) (sentence relief)
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12.
McNish v. Westbrooks, No. 2:00-CV-095-PLRCLC, 2016 WL 755634 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2016)
(sentence relief)
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APPENDIX 4

CHART OF SIXTH CIRCUIT
VOTING IN TENNESSEE
CAPITAL HABEAS CASES
Republican Appointed Judges

REPUBLICAN
APPOINTED
JUDGES

DATE
APPOINTED
TO 6TH
CIRCUIT

VOTES
TO
DENY
RELIEF

Batchelder
Boggs
Cook
Gibbons
Griffin
Guy
Kethledge
McKeague
Nelson
Norris
Rogers
Ryan
Siler
Suhrheinrich
Sutton

1991
1986
2003
2002
2005
1985
2008
2005
1985
1986
2002
1985
1991
1990
2003

8
12
10
4
3
0
1
2
2
7
6
3
11
4
4

VOTES
TO
GRANT
RELIEF
(or remand)

1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
1
0
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White

2008

TOTALS

2

2

79 (88%)

11 (12%)

Democrat Appointed Judges

DEMOCRAT
APPOINTED
JUDGES
Clay
Cole
Daughtrey
Donald
Gilman
Keith
Martin
Merritt
Moore

DATE
APPOINTED
TO 6TH
CIRCUIT
1997
1995
1993
2011
1997
1977
1979
1979
1995

TOTALS

VOTES
TO
DENY
RELIEF
3
4
1
0
2
0
0
0
3

VOTES
TO
GRANT
RELIEF
8
7
3
1
4
2
5
9
6

13 (22%)

45 (78%)
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Sixth Circuit Capital Habeas Cases from
Tennessee
Final Dispositions in the Court of Appeals1

CASE

VOTES TO
DENY
RELIEF

VOTES TO
GRANT
RELIEF
(or remand)

Houston v. Dutton
50 F.3d 381 (6th
Cir. 1995)

Guy (R)
Merritt (D)
Ryan (R)

Austin v. Bell
126 F.3d 843 (6th
Cir. 1997)
Suhrheinrich (R)
Rickman v. Bell
131 F.3d 1150 (6th
Cir. 1997)
Groseclose v. Bell Suhrheinrich (R)
130 F.3d 1161 (6th
Cir. 1997)
Coe v. Bell
Boggs (R)
161 F.3d 320 (6th
Norris (R)
Cir. 1998)
Carter v. Bell
Clay (D)
218 F.3d 581 (6th
Gilman (D)
Cir. 2000)
Nelson (R)
Workman v. Bell
Batchelder (R)
Boggs (R)
Nelson (R)
Norris (R)

Martin (D)
Merritt (D)
Suhrheinrich (R)

Keith (D)
Ryan (R)
Keith (D)
Ryan (R)
Moore (D)

Clay (D)
Cole (D)
Daughtrey (D)
Gilman (D)

The cases included in this chart are the final Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals dispositions of Tennessee capital habeas
cases. This chart does not include other decisions that
addressed collateral issues or that were superseded by
subsequent Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions.
1
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227 F.3d 331 (6th
Cir. 2000) (en
banc)2
Abdur’Rahman v.
Bell
226 F.2d 696 (6th
Cir. 2000)
Caldwell v. Bell
288 F.3d 838 (6th
Cir. 2002)
Hutchison v. Bell
303 F.3d 720 (6th
Cir. 2002)
Alley v. Bell
307 F.3d 380 (6th
Cir. 2002)
Thompson v. Bell
315 F.3d 566 (6th
Cir. 2003)
Donnie Johnson v.
Bell
344 F.3d 567 (6th
Cir. 2003)
House v. Bell
386 F.3d 668 (6th
Cir. 2004) (en
banc)3

Ryan (R)
Siler (R)
Suhrheinrich (R)

Batchelder (R)
Siler (R)
Norris (R)

Martin (D)
Merritt (D)
Moore (D)
Cole (D)

Clay (D)
Merritt (D)

Cole (D)
Moore (D)
Siler (R)
Batchelder (R)

Boggs (R)
Ryan (R)
Moore (D)

Clay (D)

Suhrheinrich (R)

Boggs (R)
Norris (R)

Clay (D)

Batchelder (R)
Boggs (R)
Cook (R)
Gibbons (R)

Clay (D)
Cole (D)
Daughtrey (D)
Gilman (D)

In Workman v. Bell, 160 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 1998), Judges
Nelson, Ryan, and Siler, all Republican appointees, voted to
affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief. In Workman
v. Bell, 227 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc), the seven
Democrat appointees voted to remand the case for further
proceedings, while the seven Republican appointees voted to
affirm the district court. Because the vote was evenly split, the
district court’s denial of habeas relief was affirmed. Mr.
Workman was executed.
3 The United States Supreme Court overturned the Sixth
Circuit’s en banc decision. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
2
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Norris (R)
Rogers (R)
Siler (R)
Sutton (R)
Bates v. Bell
402 F.3d 635 (6th
Cir. 2005)
Harbison v. Bell
408 F.3d 823 (6th
Cir. 2005)
Harries v. Bell
407 F.3d 631 (6th
Cir. 2005)
Payne v. Bell
418 F.3d 644 (6th
Cir. 2005)
Henley v. Bell
487 F.3d 379 (6th
Cir. 2007)
Cone v. Bell
505 F.3d 610 (6th
Cir. 2007)4

Cook (R)
Siler (R)

Martin (D)
Merritt (D)
Moore(D)
Batchelder (R)
Merritt (D)
Moore (D)
Clay (D)
Boggs (R)
Cook (R)
Gibbons (R)

Cook (R)
Rogers (R)
Sutton (R)
Cook (R)
Siler (R)
Batchelder (R)
Boggs (R)
Cook (R)

Cole (D)
Clay (D)
Cole (D)
Daughtrey (D)

On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court granted
relief on Mr. House’s claims relating to actual innocence, and
the state then dismissed the charges—resulting in Mr. House’s
exoneration.
4 In Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2001), Judges Norris
(R), Merritt (D), and Ryan (R) voted unanimously to grant
relief. The United States Supreme Court overturned that
decision in Cone v. Bell, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). On remand,
Judges Ryan and Merritt voted for relief, while Judge Norris
(R) dissented. Cone v. Bell, 359 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2004). Again,
the Supreme Court overturned the decision. Bell v. Cone, 543
U.S. 447 (2005). Then on remand, Judges Norris and Ryan
voted to deny habeas relief, while Judge Merritt dissented.
Cone v. Bell, 492 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2007). On Mr. Cone’s
petition for rehearing en banc, seven Democrat appointees
dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. Cone v. Bell,
505 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2007). The remaining judges, all
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Cecil Johnson v.
Bell
525 F.3d 466 (6th
Cir. 2008)
Owens v. Guida
549 F.3d 399 (6th
Cir. 2008)
West v. Bell
550 F.3d 542 (6th
Cir. 2008)
Irick v. Bell
565 F.3d 315 (6th
Cir. 2009)
Smith v. Bell
381 F. App’x 547
(6th Cir. 2010)
Wright v. Bell
619 F.3d 586 (6th
Cir. 2010)
Nicholus Sutton
645 F.3d 752 (6th
Cir. 2011)
Strouth v. Colson
680 F.3d 596 (6th
Cir. 2012)
Cauthern v. Colson

Griffin (R)
McKeague (R)
Norris (R)
Rogers (R)
Ryan (R)
Sutton (R)
Batchelder (R)
Gibbons (R)

Gilman (D)
Martin (D)
Merritt (D)
Moore (D)

Boggs (R)
Siler (R)

Merritt (D)

Boggs (R)
Norris (R)

Moore (D)

Batchelder (R)
Siler (R)

Gilman (D)

Cole (D)
Cook (R)
Griffin (R)
Cole (D)
McKeague (R)
Rogers (R)
Boggs (R)
Daughtrey (D)
Cook (R)
Kethledge (R)
Sutton (R)
Rogers (R)

Cole (D)

Martin (D)

Clay (D)

Republican appointees, either voted to deny rehearing en banc
or acquiesced in the denial. (These opposing positions on the en
banc petition are counted as votes in the chart.) Then, again
the Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit, Cone v. Bell,
556 U.S. 449 (2009), and remanded the case to the district
court. Mr. Cone died on death row while his case was pending.
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726 F.3d 465 (6th
Cir. 2013)
Hodges v. Colson
727 F.3d 517 (6th
Cir. 2013)
Van Tran v. Colson
764 F.3d 594 (6th
Cir. 2014)
Middlebrooks v.
Bell
619 F.3d 526 (6th
Cir. 2010)
Middlebrooks v.
Carpenter
843 F.3d 1127 (6th
Cir. 2016)
Miller v. Colson
694 F.3d 691 (6th
Cir. 2012)
Morris v.
Carpenter
802 F.3d 825 (6th
Cir. 2015)
GSutton v.
Carpenter
617 F. App’x 434
(6th Cir. 2015)
Thomas v.
Westbrooks
849 F.3d 659 (6th
Cir. 2017)
Black v. Carpenter
866 F.3d 734 (6th
Cir. 2017)

Cole (D)
Batchelder (R)
Cook (R)

White (R)

Cook (R)
Rogers (R)
White (R)
Clay (D)
Gilman (D)
Moore (D)
White (R)

Gibbons (R)
Siler (R)

White (R)

Boggs (R)
Clay (D)
Siler (R)
Boggs (R)
Cook (R)
Gibbons (R)
Siler (R)

Merritt (D)
Donald (D)

Boggs (R)
Cole (D)
Griffin (R)

Further notes:
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Split Decisions: Of the 37 cases charted above, 21 (or
57%) resulted in split decisions. In these split decision
cases, 92% of the Republican appointee votes were
against relief, while 92% of the Democrat appointee votes
were for relief. The votes according to party affiliation of
the judges were:
Republican Appointee Votes Against Relief = 50 (93%)
Republican Appointee Votes For Relief = 4 (7%)
Democrat Appointee Votes Against Relief = 3 (7%)
Democrat Appointee Votes For Relief = 37 (93%)
Since 2005, no Republican appointee majority has voted
for relief.
En Banc Opinions: We have identified six Sixth Circuit
en banc opinions in capital cases from Tennessee. Three
are included in the chart because those en banc decisions
resulted in final disposition of the petitioners’ habeas
claims in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The other
three are not included in the chart because they decided
collateral issues that were not dispositive of the
petitioners’ habeas claims. The en banc opinions are as
follows:
O’Guinn v. Dutton, 88 F.3d 1409 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(per curiam) (7-6 decision resulting in a remand to
state court, in which 4 Democrat appointees and 3
Republican appointees voted favorably for the
petitioner; while 5 Republican appointees and 1
Democrat appointee voted unfavorably against the
petitioner) (not included in the chart);
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Workman v. Bell, 227 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(a tie 7-7 vote strictly along party lines, effectively
denying habeas relief) (included in the chart);
Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 392 F.3d 174 (2004) (en banc) (in
a 7-6 decision on a habeas procedural issue, all 6
Democrat appointees and 1 Republican appointee
voted in favor of the petitioner, and 6 Republican
appointees and no Democrat appointees voted against
the petitioner—i.e., the single swing Republican
appointee vote enabled the case to continue) (not
included in the chart);
House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (8-7
vote, strictly along party lines, denying habeas relief)
(included in the chart);
Alley v. Little, 452 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (85 vote rejecting method-of-execution claim, in which 7
Republican appointees and 1 Democrat appointee
voted against the petitioner, and 5 Democrat
appointees voted for the petitioner) (not included in
the chart);
Cone v. Bell, 505 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2007) (all 7 Democrat
appointees dissented from denial of en banc review,
while all 9 Republican appointees supported denial of
en banc review—resulting in denial of habeas relief)
(included in the chart).
Among these en banc opinions, Republican appointees
cast 42 of their 46 votes (91%) against the petitioners,
while Democrat appointees cast 36 of their 37 votes (97%)
in favor of the petitioners.
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APPENDICES A–H

DIGITAL APPENDICES
Appendices A–H are digital Excel spreadsheets of
the data used in Appendix 1. These appendices are
available for download on the Tennessee Journal of Law
and Policy’s website at:
https://tennesseelawandpolicy.org/volumes/volume-13/.
The individual archival links are to the direct download.
App. A: Tennessee Adult Defendant with Sustained First
Degree Murder Convictions (7/1/1977–6/30/2017) With
Rule 12 Reports [https://perma.cc/R8F2-3T7J]
App. B: Tennessee Sustained Adult First Degree Murder
Convictions (7/1/1977–6/30/2017) With NO Rule 12
Reports [https://perma.cc/FY2R-BZXF]
App. C: Juvenile Defendants Convicted of First Degree
Murder (7/1/1977–6/30/2017) With Rule 12 Reports
[https://perma.cc/REM2-QAQV]
App. D: Juvenile Defendants Convicted of First Degree
Murder (7/1/1977–6/30/2017) With NO Rule 12 Reports
[https://perma.cc/PT2V-QEPH]

[257]
257

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | SUMMER 2018 | ISSUE 1

App. E: Adult and Juvenile Defendants with Sustained
First Degree Murder by Grand Division County During
Period of July 1, 1977, to June 30, 2017
[https://perma.cc/W8ZF-LSQD]
App. F: Adult Defendants Convicted of Sustained First
Degree Murder Convictions (7/1/1977–6/30/2017) By
Grand Division, County, Rule 12 or NO Rule 12 Report
[https://perma.cc/6H8T-6639]
App. G: Defendants With Sustained First Degree Murder
Convictions of Multiple Victims With Number and Age of
Victims (7/1/1977–6/30/2017) Plus Rule 12 Report
Filed (Yes/No) [https://perma.cc/RKL9-5YQW]
App. H: Trials in Which Death Sentences Were Imposed
During
the
Period
of
7/1/1977–6/30/2017)
[https://perma.cc/VQZ7-YCYA]
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